Gray on Strategic Theory and COIN
….It is not sensible to categorize wars according to the believed predominant combat style of one of the belligerents.Guerrilla-style warfare is potentially universal and, on the historical evidence, for excellent reasons has been a favored military method of the weaker combatant eternally. There are no such historical phenomena as guerrilla wars. Rather, therehave been countless wars wherein guerrilla tactics have been employed, sometimes by both sides. To define a war according to a tactical style is about as foolish as definition according to weaponry. For example, it is not conducive of understanding to conceive of tank warfare when the subject of interest is warfare with tanks and so forth, typically, if not quite always, in the context of combined arms. It is important conceptually not to allow the muscle to dominate the brain.
So there is no qualitative difference between a nuclear war (WWIII) and a war in which some nuclear weapons were used (WWII)? What?
No. Gray is correct that many wars partake of a blend of tactical fighting styles or that most wars are better defined (or at least should be in terms of causation) by their political character. That said, a specific fighting style sometimes is a definitive descriptive characteristic of a war, particularly if a dominant tactical style explains one side’s consistent comparative advantage (ex. the Macedonian phalanx vs. the Persians) in battle and some of the resultant choices which were forced upon the adversary.
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Andy:
June 27th, 2012 at 3:31 pm
“So there is no qualitative difference between a nuclear war (WWIII) and a war in which some nuclear weapons were used (WWII)? What?”
That’s the exception that proves the rule. Nukes are inherently strategic weapons – they are not at all equivalent to a tank or machine gun or a drone.
seydlitz89:
June 27th, 2012 at 4:49 pm
Nukes can achieve strategic effect. Michael Wittmann’s Tiger tank company – mostly his own tank – inflicted shock on a British armored division in the summer of 1944, achieving operational effect, if only for a short time.
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I think Gray’s point is that we are concentrating too much on the time-bound material elements (warfare) whereas the timeless moral elements (war), that is the competing wills, objectives and character of the political communities involved, should be our focus.
zen:
June 28th, 2012 at 4:57 am
Hi Andy
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I agree that nukes are not equivalent. But also a nuclear exchange, because of the existential character of very few “moves” by adversaries in a full-scale nuclear exchange, adversaries are forced to calculate differently, possibly because nuclear war is an arena where “defense” does not have it’s normal advantage of being “stronger” than offense. Unless you consider having a sufficiently numerous and varied nuclear offensive capability that makes a successful first-strike victory by an enemy impossible to be a form of defense.
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Hi Seydlitz
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I think you have outlined the difference between looking at “war” as a strategic theorist and looking at “a war” as a historian. A theorist is interested in distilling the common/universal/timeless essence while a historian is going to emphasize the particulars of time and place in order to explain causation. The two fields are interdependent in explaining military history and both should have a lively interest in the political