Taliban: religiosity vs pragmatism
[ by Charles Cameron — a question of priorities ]
.
photo credit: Omar Sobhani/Reuters
.
The attack in Qargha was not about liberating one’s own people from an occupying power, but about imposing one’s religious morality on compatriots who do not share one’s enthusiasm. Or to put that another way: at times, war is the continuation of religiosity by other means.
Offered without further comment, from The attack in Kargha: Return of the Taleban Puritans? by Thomas Ruttig of Afghan Analysts Network:
For the first time in many months, the Taleban have attacked a target that is almost exclusively used by Afghan civilians, while statements by their leader Mulla Muhammad Omar and their code of conduct (the layha, see an AAN report about it here) suggested a desire to protect civilians as much as possible. In the past, when causing civilian casualties, Taleban spokesmen often argued that they had actually been attacking a military target (like a convoy, a checkpost or another military installation) and that they had not planned to harm civilians. This time, such an excuse would have sounded ridiculous. Instead, in a statement under the name of their spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed they called the hotel a ‘hub of obscenity and vulgarity frequented by the lusty foreign and local top-level military and officials to satisfy their impure lust especially on Thursday nights’ and where ‘anti-Islamic meeting are usually being held’ (sic).
Equally ridiculous was their claim that it was mainly foreigners who had been targeted at Kargha. In the statement already quoted they claimed that their fighters had killed and wounded ‘several dozens of the top-level foreign diplomats and military figures and high-ranking puppets’. But everyone in Kabul knows that many foreigners are not even allowed to go to most of the restaurants in the city centre, particularly ‘top-level diplomats’. Kargha, well outside the city, is off limits for all foreigners except those few who do not have strict security rules. Instead, Kargha, with its little restaurants (which Afghans tend to call ‘hotels’), ice cream parlours and even cottages furbished in Swedish style and a few pedalo boats to rent, is a typical weekend retreat for Kabulis from all walks of life, from the young and well-off to rather ordinary people who enjoy the only accessible lake in the vicinity of the capital. To target such an area is not only a clear deviation from recent stated Taleban policy, if not practice, it is also an outrage.
That the Taleban tried to justify their attack by claiming that it was a venue of ‘anti-Islamic’ behaviour also shows that the old puritan tendency in their movement is alive and kicking, to which all kind of temporal amusement are anathema, especially if men and women are attending without being strictly separated.
June 29th, 2012 at 4:14 am
I find this to be unconvincing.
.
There is abundant evidence that the manner in which the Taliban imposes control is to enforce norms of behavior that are distinctly those endorsed by Taliban clerics: a mix of Hanafi fiqh, rural custom, and deobandi-inspired principles. But, I am unaware of any evidence to suggest that the imposition of those norms are an end, rather than a means, for the vast majority of the Taliban. Most who align with the Taliban do so for protection or reinforcement. They seek protection from abuse by government officials and ANSF, or from local militias, or from rival communities/tribes/etc. They may seek reinforcement as they plot the manner in which an old score will be settled against a neighboring community or an old rival.
.
Imposing religious ideology? Sorry, I just do not see evidence of that being a significant motivation.
.
Islam is a post-hoc justification, not a guiding principle. Note that among the first people that the Taliban assassinated in Kandahar, after 2001, were the members of the ulema who spoke out against them. Others were intimidated and either shut up or offered tacit support to the Taliban. Ulema sypathetic to the Taliban gained a greater voice when the dissenters were killed or shut up. But the Taliban did not seek to change the makeup of the ulema in order to receive guidance on how to act, when, and why. The Taliban appoints clerics to bolster its legitimacy, to justify the actions that the Taliban deems necessary to achieve objectives. The Taliban cloaks its control over the population by appeals to Islam, but is not guided by it.
.
We simply do not know why this attack on the lake resort happened. And while Thomas Ruttig, quoted in the original post, is a far more legit expert on Afghanistan than I will ever be, he is not infallible. He points out that, “Although it would go too far to draw the conclusion yet, that this was the Taleban’s ‘no’ to talks,” and I agree on that, but he continues, “it is definitely another concerning sign of diverging opinions and tactics within the movement.” I do not see adequate evidence to support his statement that.
.
I can advance an equally plausible motivation for this attack. And, by “equally plausible,” I mean informed speculation in the absence of evidence. My theory is below…
.
This attack on the lake resort was likely conducted in order to shape perceptions of the civilians and to lead ANSF to a decision favorable to the Taliban’s tactical situation. The civilian perception that is reinforced is that the government cannot provide adequate security. The decision that the Taliban may want the ANSF to make is to spread their forces out, in an attempt to provide more comprehensive security coverage. This would make the ANSF more vulnerable to Taliban attack. And, as we have seen over the last year, the Taliban is targeting ANSF more so than ISAF. Their goal is to undercut recruitment, demonstrate ANSF weakness, and reinforce the sense of inevitability of ISAF withdrawal and GIRoA collapse. This attack advances that goal.
June 29th, 2012 at 5:26 am
I am out of date on my understanding of the Taliban as it is currently constituted, just to acknowledge that upfront, so I will posit some questions that go both to Charles’ post and TJM’s comment:
.
How factionalized are the Taliban presently? We could have a mix of pragmatists and ideologues as provincial commanders (set aside quam/subtribe/localist network issues).
.
How much pull does the ISI have in “terror” type operations? I have previously read commentary from Talibs blaming Pakistanis for counterproductive tactics
.
To what degree does the Taliban’s religious ideology today in it’s pronouncements, songs etc. resemble the reified deobandism preached and imposed prior to 9/11?
June 29th, 2012 at 11:35 pm
TJM:
.
I just saw a tweet of yours to the effect that there were no spaces separating paragraphs in your comment above, and have added them. FTR, I am always happy to do that, time permitting, if asked. I hope I got them right.
.
My response to your comment is getting pretty long. I imagine I’ll be chopping it into “background” and “foreground” sections, or perhaps making a separate post of it. Either way, please be patient… it’s on its way.