Mao ZeDong and 4GW
A part of a comment from Jay@Soob:
“This was likely compounded by the chronological assignment (that Mao was the first to conceptualize 4GW is an assertion that Ethan Allen might have something to swear and swing fists about)”
The frequent and casual association of Chairman Mao with 4GW is something that has always puzzled me as well ( though, if memory serves, William Lind was always careful to explain that 4GW isn’t simply guerilla warfare). I think it can be attributed to the likelihood that most people who are somewhat familiar with 4GW theory tend to think first of guerillas and Mao is regarded as a great innovator there. However, is there merit in placing Mao in the “4GW pantheon” (if there is such a thing)?
In the ” yes” column I’d offer the following observations:
Mao, whose actual positive leadership contribution to Communist victory in the civil war was primarily political and strategic rather than operational and tactical ( his military command decisions were often the cause of disaster, retreat and defeat for Communist armies) had a perfect genius – I think that word would be an accurate description here – for operating at the mental and moral levels of warfare. 
Partly this was skillful playing of a weak hand on Mao’s part; the Communists were not a match on the battlefield for the better Nationalist divisions until the last year or so of the long civil war but Mao regularly outclassed Chiang Kai-shek in propaganda and diplomacy – turning military defeats at Chiang’s hands into moral victories and portraying Communist inaction in the face of Japanese invasion as revolutionary heroism. Yenan might have be a weird, totalitarian, nightmare fiefdom but Mao made certain that foreign journalists, emissaries and intelligence liasons reported fairy tales to the rest of the world.
In the “maybe” column:
Regardless of one’s opinion of Mao ZeDong, China’s civil war, running from the collapse of the Q’ing dynasty in 1911 to the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, is a historical laboratory for 4GW and COIN theory. The complexity of China in this era was akin to that of Lebanon’s worst years in the 1980’s but it lasted for decades. In a given province of China ( many of which were as large or larger than major European nations) then there might have been operating simultaneously: several warlord armies, Communist guerillas, Nationalist armies, the Green Gang syndicate, White Russian mercenaries, Mongol Bannermen, rival Kuomintang factions, common bandit groups and military forces of European states, Japan and the United States. Disorder and ever-shifting alliances and fighting was the norm and Mao was the ultimate victor in this era.
In the “no ” column:
Mao ZeDong, whatever his contributions to the art of guerilla warfare, intended, quite firmly, to build a strong state in China, albeit a Communist one in his own image. He was never interested in carving out a sphere of influence or an autonomous zone in China except as a stepping stone to final victory. Moreover, the Red Army’s lack of conventional fighting ability for most of the civil war related to a lack of means, not motive on Mao’s part. When material was available, particularly after 1945, when Stalin turned over equipment from the defeated Kwangtung army and began supplying a more generous amount of Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists, Mao tried to shift to conventional warfare. When in power, he sent the PLA’s 5-6 crack divisions into the Korean War to face American troops in 2GW-style attrition warfare, not guerilla infiltrators behind MacArthur’s lines.
Finally, Mao’s personal political philosophy of governance, taken from Marxism-Leninism and Qin dynasty Legalism, are about as radically hierarchical and alien to 4GW thinking as it is possible to be.
In sum, Mao is and should be regarded as a major figure in the history of the 20th century and that century’s military history but he isn’t the grandfather of fourth generation warfare.
ADDENDUM:
Congratulations to 4GW theorist and blogger Fabius Maximus for being picked up by the BBC.
June 18th, 2008 at 3:36 pm
"China’s civil war, running from the collapse of the Q’ing dynasty in 1911 to the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, is a historical laboratory for 4GW and COIN theory. "
Am I wrong, or is there no fat, scholarly, reliable history in English of the period? If I’m wrong, what book or books should I have on my list for this era? It seems that this complicated period is probably saturated with lessons which will be relevant in the decades ahead, yet it is virtually unknown to Americans.
"… he sent the PLA’s 5-6 crack divisions into the Korean War to face American troops in 2GW-style attrition warfare, not guerilla infiltrators behind MacArthur’s lines."
Not strictly correct. In the early, "open warfare" phase, Mao did precisely that. He had whole divisions marching at night and hiding during the day, seeping in behind the UN forces. At least one of John Poole’s books talk about the Chinese infiltration tactics, and summarizes various scholarship on it. Once the entrenchments stretched across the whole peninsula, you had the imposition of 1914-1918 warfare, not because Mao’s generals chose not to use more subtle tactics, but because they couldn’t.
June 18th, 2008 at 4:53 pm
Hi Lex,
I have not read Poole but you are right that advance units of US-UN forces reported encountering Chinese in small groups well before being hit by the main Chinese force en masse and being forced to retreat. Is that indicative of a guerilla strategy by Mao or of preliminary recon/bolstering DPRK forces or just poor planning in sending what local provincial forces were available ahead of the PLA regulars ? I don’t know but the record of the Mao-Stalin talks on how each Communist giant were to support the North Koreans indicated that China was going to make a massive manpower commitment to the war ( which they did, at terrible cost).
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I am not aware of that kind of truly comprehesive work in English ( which hardly means one does not exist) both the Jung Chang Mao bio and the Fenby bio of Chiang have substantial military info on China’s civil war, as do works on Japanese intervention in China like Soldiers of the Sun. A historian trying to do a comprehensive book would be looking at working in archives in Chinese, Japanese, Russian, English and German ( Chiang used serially Bolshevik, Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and American military advisers). Plus, on the Communist side there is an access problem to PLA and Party archives.
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If any readers out there have any suggestions as to what Lex is looking for, please offer them up.
June 18th, 2008 at 6:44 pm
I think, following Poole’s synoptic discussion, as well as other works, that the PLA was using infiltration tactics intentionally, at the tactical and operational level, throughout the early phase of its intervention. I think Mao hoped to literally annihilate the UN forces in a single blow, and the PLA came scarily close to doing so. US and Allied material superiority staved off disaster.
Right, a truly comprehensive book would require a gigantic scholarly effort. Too bad it does not exist. 1911-49 in China is a database of experience we would greatly benefit from having in digestible form. I’ve got Fenby, as well as Soldiers of the Sun. Grey knowledge.
"… Bolshevik, Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and American military advisers …" I wonder if there are any memoirs?
June 19th, 2008 at 10:48 am
[…] for the Great Helmsman himself, zenpundit takes a look at his reputation for being an innovator in military doctrine and says he was most […]
June 19th, 2008 at 3:08 pm
One great NF Historical Chinese book for anyone interested in the intricacies of politics in the Chinese way, pick up "Return to Middle Kingdom", by Yuan-tsung Chen. A magisterial portrait of intrigue and politics in Peking as China emerged into the 20th century. I highly recommend it.
June 19th, 2008 at 10:23 pm
Thanks much for a detailed and engaging response!
"He was never interested in carving out a sphere of influence or an autonomous zone in China except as a stepping stone to final victory. Moreover, the Red Army’s lack of conventional fighting ability for most of the civil war related to a lack of means, not motive on Mao’s part."
Specifically the last part, I’m not sure this qualifies as a "no" in terms of 4GW. I can’t think of many organizations that would qualify as 4GW that intentionally remain nebulous and don’t strive for some semblance of political realization. Al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf come to mind as examples of those that relish in a liquid existence. Others like Hamas, Hezbollah, the PKK etc. would seem to be striving in the same fashion as Mao for a semblance of statehood and utilize the 4GW method because they cannot fight on 3GW (or otherwise) terms.