Tools vs. Strategies: Or, Why “An” Alternative to COIN is Not “THE” Alternative
Dr. Bernard I. Finel has an important and provocative article in AFJ challenging the current operational primacy of COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq that has stirred a great deal of backchannel and listserv discussion, but not nearly enough open commentary in the blogosphere. I checked an unscientific sampling of COIN blogs and did not find much discussion of Dr. Finel’s article, except one comment at SWJ Blog by respected SWC member Ken White, who called it a “well stated and logical essay” with a “valid premise”. Finel’s article merits greater attention and debate:
The U.S. military is a dominant fighting force, capable of rapid global power projection and able to defeat state adversaries quickly and at relatively low cost in American lives and treasure. Unfortunately, American leaders are
increasingly trying to transform this force into one optimized for counterinsurgency missions and long-term military occupations. A fundamental problem with the adoption of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as an organizing principle for American military operations is that it systematically fails to take advantage of the real strengths of the U.S. military.
It is true that not all political goals are achievable through the use of conventional military capabilities. However, “victory” in war is not dichotomous, and the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan – often seen as proving the necessity for COIN-capable forces as well as a commitment to nation-building – demonstrate in reality that the vast majority of goals can be accomplished through quick, decisive military operations. Not all political goals are achievable this way, but most are and those that cannot be achieved through conventional operations likely cannot be achieved by the application of even the most sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine either.
As a consequence, I believe the U.S. should adopt a national military strategy that heavily leverages the core capability to break states and target and destroy fixed assets, iteratively if necessary. Such a strategy – which might loosely be termed “repetitive raiding” – could defeat and disrupt most potential threats the U.S. faces. While America’s adversaries may prefer to engage the U.S. using asymmetric strategies, there is no reason that the U.S. should agree to fight on these terms.
This essay argues the U.S. can largely defeat threats using conventional capabilities, and that what encourages a desire to engage in long-drawn-out asymmetric conflicts is not the elimination of threats, but rather the unattainable goal of trying to prevent threats from emerging in the future.
Read the rest here.
First, I have some sympathy with Finel’s position that COIN operations generally do not maximize the utility of America’s military comparative advantages and extended nation-building via COIN is a costly investment. Dr. Finel is correct here. I’m certain even David Kilcullen would agree with Finel that America trying to do heavy footprint, pop-centric COIN everywhere and anywhere is unwise and too expensive. We need to sync our military might with our political will as well as our wallet.
Secondly, I have no problem with punitive expeditions, or what Finel euphemistically calls “repetitive raiding”. Such “Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead!” tinged operations are as old as warfare itself and a state’s demonstrated willingness to carry them out serves a useful deterrent purpose. William Lind has been advocating a combination of punitive expeditions and containment/isolation for years in his writings on 4GW. This is an option we should definitely consider first in a cost-benefit fashion prior to committing sizable deployments of troops to a long-term nation building adventure.
That said, exchanging one operatiuonal emphasis (COIN) for another (punitive expeditions) does not change our strategic situation much, it just represents a different kind of hammer, a mallet instead of a ball peen. Under Finel’s prospective doctrine, the US military will be greenlighted to fight only the wars it likes best because some foes are more targetable than others, resembling a drunkard looking for his car keys under a street lamp because that is where the light is good. If we can just convince all of our enemies to oblige us by becoming states with flags, armies and capitols, then I’d say junk COIN.
Unfortunately, they won’t and the days when only states can cause damage are long past. A well-trained, paramilitary, insurgency can wreck one hell of a lot of damage, especially when it is striking first with the element of surprise. This is why, even in the state-centric days of the Cold War, that the Soviet Union invested heavily in SPETSNAZ, OSNAZ and various GRU sleeper units to wreck havoc behind NATO lines with terrorism, assassination and sabotage in the run up to WWIII. The Soviets expected at least major tactical, if not strategic, results from such units.
Operational tools are not strategies. This was my prior complaint about COIN being oversold in Afghanistan and punitive expeditions likewise do not fit every geopolitical situation and work best with particular circumstances. The fact is, where we have a real national interest in friendly states with legitimate governments beating back insurgents, COIN is a better choice. Many problems will require a response that is altogether different from either. The enemy, when there is an enemy, has to be dealt with as they are and not as we’d really like them to be in our ten year procurement schedule. We have to select the tools that best fit operational conditions, our policy objectives and our resources.
Strategy must conform to reality and not the reverse.
February 12th, 2010 at 7:48 am
OK, but a military must train for something. And I’m not sure "be ready for anything" is possible? My grand strategy/force structure is simple, its 3 main forces are as follows:
The first is the high tech "big war" force that ensures the US can dominate the air, sea, and space. This force ensures America’s ability to defeat other states by bombing military and "duel use" assets like we did to Serbia. If States don’t do as we wish, we keep bombing their infrastructure/assets until it gets too costly to continue their course of action. This force must also allow us to blockade anyone by sea. Our dominance of space will allow us to build solar panels on the moon which will send energy back to earth via microwave technology or even a big cable. This could potentially make us the biggest energy provider on earth.
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The 2nd force is the special operations centric man-tracking force. This is the force that searches for individuals or small groups. It will also use 4gw tactics on other states (ex..,blowing up oil pipelines in Russia). This force will also blend the line between human intelligence/covert action (A CIA function) and direct action missions (Delta Force, Seal team six function). This force is the anti-terror force.
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The 3rd force in the advisory force. This is the nation building and COIN force. It is not a big "sysadmin" force. Instead, its a force that trains forign fighters and works with tribes as described by Maj Jim Gant in his paper "One Tribe at a Time." This force will have the most contact with civilian aid organzations, contractors, and goverment agancies.
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A small ground force will exist that can "fill in the gaps" within all 3 force structures.
February 12th, 2010 at 8:11 am
The actual grand strategy is simple. Never allow one or a coalition of states to gain enough power where it can challange the influence of the United States. The biggest factor in maintaining our influence in to remain the center or global innovation. Remaining the center of innovation and economic growth will require an overhaul of the education and immigration system.
.The education system must change focus from an indoctrination program of multicultural garbage and transition to a system that leads the world in math and science education. Social studies curriculum must present American children a positive narrative and be a celebration of American mythology.
.The immigration system will accept 50,000 people a year who will apply to come to this country. These people will take IQ tests and physical exams. Any excess labor needs will be filled by guest-workers who come here to work WITHOUT THEIR FAMILIES. These people will receive no benefits from the government except basic medical needs..
Our homeland security grand strategy will be based on building resilience (see John Robb’s blog).
February 12th, 2010 at 8:30 am
Its important to remember that this strategy can only bear fruit if all aspects are implemented. I should point out that I think very little about "grand strategy," becuase I believe the biggest challange this country will face in the future will be over its own identity. I suppose my grand strategy is a best case scenario? I see America as the Rome of the modern day. I’m just not sure if its Rome in 150AD or Rome in 450 AD?
February 12th, 2010 at 11:57 am
DoD needs to relearn how the Soviets supported communist revolutions. The governments of Iraq and Afghanistan were the insurgents prior to U.S intervention. Once the revolutionary narrative is corrected maybe we can make some sort of substantial progress, not just bell curve charts on violence trends.
The U.S. military is searching for its raison d’etre for the 21st century; something it has struggled with since the end of the Cold War. At first, spearheading the "global war on terror" emerged as the top priority until political attention shifted to the two "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defending the nation from terrorism became the role of DHS and FBI with chaotic and ad hoc assistance from other DC-based acronyms and three letter agencies.
The modern COIN doctrine itself is first to point out that there cannot be a military solution to political problems. Should the Defense department truly wish to change its primary mission to COIN, it should propose merging itself with the CIA and State department. Otherwise it should remain focused on mastering the art of destroying an enemy’s conventional forces and leave the rest in more capable hands.
February 12th, 2010 at 1:40 pm
What I find interesting in Finel’s article is how it aligns with the previous pieces by airpower advocates, such as MGen Charles Dunlap USAF, who argued that the US strategy should match our strengths–which is application of airpower. We can’t always choose the character of the wars we end up engaging in, and there’s an obvious chicken/egg relationship about how the way we prepare for a war affects the ultimate character of any conflict we end up within. Strategy, or campaign design (I’m starting to shy away from the term "operational level of war") is ultimately a pragmatic affair of solving a problem, or attempting to change an environment/situation. Good "doctrine" or theory at this level should be the basis to ensure we ask the right questions in a situation, not to provide us with the answers. Phil Ridderhof
February 12th, 2010 at 4:59 pm
Seerov – LOL. Good luck with that. Maximal rule sets = setting up the conditions for catastrophic failure.
On the broader question –
Can the military become as agile as needed to respond to anything? Yes.
Two big fixes can do a lot in that regard – information and procurement systems. Arquilla wrote a good book on that topic, and him and Ronfeldt have spent a lot of time working on lean, networked, modular, swarm warfare. It can happen, and it would be the optimal solution.
Will it? Probably not, too much political garbage in the way.
(This approach works because its a minimalist rule set – that harnesses human innovation.)
February 12th, 2010 at 5:47 pm
Mark, everything you say here is right on, and I think this clarifies the falsity of the pro-COIN/anti-COIN debate. Shlok is also right: minimal rules work not maximal ones. People won’t these because they will interpret as imperialism and ultimately will compete with you in terms of grand strategy and not cooperate.
February 12th, 2010 at 6:31 pm
"People won’t these because they will interpret as imperialism and ultimately will compete with you in terms of grand strategy and not cooperate. " (Stephen P)
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I got some news for you: The world already "interprets" our actions as imperialism. Remember what Al Capone said: "Its easier to get what you want with a gun and smile than a smile alone."
February 12th, 2010 at 7:23 pm
I’d argue that strategy is a two way street. It’s true that strategy must react to reality but it is under no automatic obligation to conform to reality. Indeed, an essential part of strategy is to make reality conform to strategy. Admittedly, the decks are stacked in favor of reality and any attempt to reverse this tilt is an uphill climb. Most of the time the very definition of a successful strategy will be one that successfully adapts to reality. But an essential part of being human is the power to shape the world around us according to our own conception of how the world should be. That power will form no small part of how strategy is formulated and applied. Strategy can shape reality as well as conform to it. The process is interactively complex.
February 12th, 2010 at 9:25 pm
Of course I’m on record as taking pretty much the same position as Bernard. And I think it does reflect sound strategic thinking. The objective is to prevent enemies from damaging us or our vital national interests. Re-engineering and transforming backward societies–which is the essence of our current version of counterinsurgency–is an effective way of doing that but is unaffordably inefficient. A strategy based on spoiling attacks is less effective but is affordable and sustainable.
February 13th, 2010 at 4:03 am
Zen,
"The fact is, where we have a real national interest in friendly states with legitimate governments beating back insurgents, COIN is a better choice."
I suggest that the vast majority of those situations can be handled by an SF style foreign internal defense capability, rather than "COIN," which at this point is tantamount to saying "massive amounts of troops, massive amounts of expenditures."
I can think of only one geopolitical situation that would legitimately call for an Iraq style COIN mission, and that is a Mexican failed state scenario like you delineated a few days ago.
Certainly, you must hedge against such a situation, and the COIN renaissance will be useful there. That said, I think that future US military activity will primarily consist of punitive expeditions and short term HA/DR type missions.
SF,
February 13th, 2010 at 4:03 am
Zen,
"The fact is, where we have a real national interest in friendly states with legitimate governments beating back insurgents, COIN is a better choice."
I suggest that the vast majority of those situations can be handled by an SF style foreign internal defense capability, rather than "COIN," which at this point is tantamount to saying "massive amounts of troops, massive amounts of expenditures."
I can think of only one geopolitical situation that would legitimately call for an Iraq style COIN mission, and that is a Mexican failed state scenario like you delineated a few days ago.
Certainly, you must hedge against such a situation, and the COIN renaissance will be useful there. That said, I think that future US military activity will primarily consist of punitive expeditions and short term HA/DR type missions.
SF,
February 13th, 2010 at 4:43 am
Hi Gents,
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Excellent comments!
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Seerov – Institutionalizing an advisory corps is not a bad idea. Most COIN operations should be geared toward light footprint improvement of an already legitimate government’s capacity to wage COIN rather than creating governments from scratch in completely broken societies. The latter is a burden that needs to be widely shared and not taken up by the US alone. The EU, Japan, China, the Gulf states need to be carrying proportionate costs on such projects, if they are undertaken.
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Abu Nasr – As a a guy who started by specializing in US-Soviet diplo history, I have to agree with you. We figured it out in the late 80’s just prior to the Soviet collapse but in the next ten years a large amount of .mil/IC/diplo talent walked out the USG door. Or was pushed. However you want to describe it, the CIA is not able to take up that mission on its own or even in conjunction with the rest of the IC. You would would basically need to merge the CIA with SOCOM or let the CIA build it’s own miniature army. If the task needs to be done, someone has to own it and be accountable for doing it properly.
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Colonel Phil – "Good "doctrine" or theory at this level should be the basis to ensure we ask the right questions in a situation, not to provide us with the answers." Wish I had said that! Very true – and interesting; because that statement supooses that good doctrine either teaches or habituates leaders to practice skepticism/curiousity. I need to think about that……
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Shlok – You know, the US Army went "modular", or their version of it without gaining *any* or at least very little of the benefits of modularity as a network theorist/physicist would understand the term. From what I can see -admittedly, I may be wrong – army units are more like lego blocs now for war planners. That’s not modularity.The reason is that the "modules" lack sufficient autonomy to gain the benefits of functioning as a network or harnessing synergy. If they had that then the Arquilla/Ronfeldt "swarming" and the agility would follow. Agree also on minimalist rule-sets – accepting simplicity is hard for bureaucractic-political entities because simplicity=transparency.
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Stephen – Yes, the COIN/anti-COIN is a false dichotomy which I think will sound weird to ppl in as early as 20 years. If Big War advocates are deeply concerned about the systemic costs imposed by COIN, there effort would be far better spent reforming the procurement process and eliminating the cost overruns that starve the Pentagon of planes and ships by making them ridiculously expensive per unit.
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Joseph Fouche – you’re right. It would have been more accurate for me to have said that the long term goal of strategy is to shape reality or the battlespace. At the inception though, the strategy has to correlate with the conditions tha texist in order to acquire the leverage to change the situation to our advantage.
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Dr. Steve – Agree with you on the economics. We have a limited ability to transform unwilling societies, except destructively ( that’s a kind of transformation) and even societies that are willing/compliant ( say Japan after WWII) keep their core values while adopting superficial or cosmetic changes. That said, there will be times when we will deem that our interests require keeping certain allies afloat in the face of insurgency. Greece in the late 1940’s, El Salvador in the 1980’s are classic examples.
February 13th, 2010 at 5:33 am
Hi Chris,
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I agree with you that COIN as it is presently interpreted, has gotten out of hand, particularly the Holbrooke vision of COIN, resembling a Roman proconsulate during the Late Republic. When I think of "COIN" I think of the historic spectrum that fits under that rubric and not just the Surge period of Iraq. Very few situations, as you aptly pointed out, merit an Iraq style COIN commitment by the United States. Most of the time, we should be erring toward the training contingent and military aid end of the spectrum or by sponoring irregular proxies.
February 13th, 2010 at 5:52 am
I’m straying way outside of my tactical realm by pondering a strategic thing, but is it accurate to describe this as an operational tool, rather than a strategy? It seems to me that he is advocating how to apply ways (military power), means (short-term endeavors that are not economic burdens), and ends (realistic goals for damage to our enemies) in pursuit of national security, not advocating the specific mechanics (COIN, FID, SOSO, etc) of how they will be use once committed. It seems that Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm fit the mold of what he proposes.
February 13th, 2010 at 6:37 am
Hi Schmedlap,
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" It seems that Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm fit the mold of what he proposes."
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Agreed. They are indeed. The first two are examples of reactive and tactical military responses in the context of global geopolitics. The third has a strategic element of creating a precedent of waging limited war to support abstract rules of international law that the Bush administration wanted states to adhere to in the future but the Bush administration evolved up to waging a war against Saddam.
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Urgent Fury wqas not something the Pentagon desired or was prepared for – essentially, Grenada caught the Reagan administration by surprise and there happened to be a small number of NSC officials, including Constantine Menges for whom Grenada’s New Jewel movement was already a hot button issue prior to the coup by Hudson Austin and Bernard Coard. Likewise, the invasion of Panama was not a Bismarckian master-plan but an end-game when other methods failed.
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I have a high respect for President Bush the Elder but as a statesman he was a natural tactician and a pretty damn good one. Strategy and overarching "vision thing" though, were not his primary interests. He liked to handle problems, not chart a course.
February 13th, 2010 at 7:43 am
I think there is a lot of terminological confusion over what "strategy" necessarily is, although I find the taxonomy (derived from doctrine) in Joe Collins’ NDU textbook on military strategy to be useful.
February 13th, 2010 at 7:57 am
Amazon link, forgot to add in previous post.
February 13th, 2010 at 1:19 pm
@ZenIt wasn’t just the Warsaw Pact (who, lets remember, also funded and harboured the Baader-Meinhoff kids) that had sleeper units. NATO forces had a variety of sleeper forces, of which the most famous was GLADIUS in Italy. Further to Grenada, we have to remember that small actions can have big effects. Grenada was a Commonwealth island and the invasion led to a communications spike as the UK started demanding answers from the US authorities (Gee, you’d have thought the US might have thought about telling the Queen it was only going to invade her island before they actually did it). Combined with KGB paranoia and Exercise Able Archer this led to the 1983 crisis that nearly ended in the Cold War going hot.
February 13th, 2010 at 9:16 pm
"The EU, Japan, China, the Gulf states need to be carrying proportionate costs on such projects, if they are undertaken." (ZenP)
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What if their projects end up being opposite of our projects? At the very least, they might not have an interest in many of our projects. Any future force we have must be a J.I.T (Just in time) force (as opposed to the old Fordist model of getting "boots on the ground"). If there is one thing I hope America has learned in 9 years of insurgency wars is that the locals must be the "boots on the ground." We just support and mentor (while they teach, support, and mentor us).
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Imagine in 2003 if we had done OIF I and then applied all we know now about the counter insurgency in Iraq? My point is we can still do COIN but with a force that builds resilient networks with the locals. It will also be politically difficult to put together large American ground formations in the future. The Europeans and Japanese will have similar problems (even the Chinese to some degree). .Any grand strategy must be built around the people’s demographic characteristics. And as I alluded to earlier, the trend lines I observe indicate that the very concept of “grand strategy” may be blurry in the near future (because of these very demographic characteristics).
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Maybe the most important question is: Who’s grand-strategy are we talking about?
February 14th, 2010 at 3:27 am
To continue……
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AE – Yep. "Strategy" is used differently by different ppl. Is the author you are talking about Col. John Collins or Col. Joe Collins, PhD though? They both write on military strategy.
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Guy – You are correct. NATO had a "stay behind" org in the advent of a Warsaw Pact invasion that was pretty sizable . I once reviewed, privately for an editor who did not have a background in mil or intel history, an enormous submission on operation gladio by a foreign leftist poli sci type who dug up a lot of interesting info but married it to very weird pet conspiracy theories ( weirder than the actual Italian political conspiracies related to gladio). The editor eventually published it at about 2/3 the original size and the author’s career was better off for the redactions.
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Seerov – "What if their projects end up being opposite of our projects?"
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In that instance we will not be involved, except to stick a stick in their spokes.
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" I hope America has learned in 9 years of insurgency wars is that the locals must be the "boots on the ground." We just support and mentor (while they teach, support, and mentor us). "
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That was one reason I liked the Reagan Doctrine. It’s a lot more fun to be on the winning side, to paraphrase John Boyd.
February 14th, 2010 at 7:51 pm
Col. John M. Collins:
One of his better articles is the Principles of Deterrence:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/nov-dec/jcollins.html
February 15th, 2010 at 2:08 am
My response is here: http://www.bernardfinel.com/?p=1137
Short version, the idea is not that we only fight convenient wars. It is that we need to be clearer about the kinds of situations that constitute real threats. My argument is not, for instance, that we should not have gone into Afghanistan after 9/11. Rather it is that we accomplished most of what could be accomplished within six months, and that ever since we’ve been facing diminishing returns on our investment there.
Also, I should not that you are overestimating the power projection capabilities of poorly armed insurgencies. The Taliban is a threat to the government in Kabul, it is not a threat to the United States, the actions of 19 thugs with boxcutters on 9/11 notwithstanding.
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February 26th, 2010 at 2:18 am
The current emphasis on COIN is not just for foreign occupations but quelling domestic rebellions the system has created in the political and economic disenfranchment of the traditional American people.
March 2nd, 2010 at 7:34 pm
Excellent, Zen. Late comer to this – regretably.
On modularity, I think your response above is correct. A lego block is not modularity. The closest thing one can find to true modularity would be various configurations of (or even some sub-units of) a Marine Expeditionary Force. It’s a bigger chunk than planners may wish to chew on, but if they are going to use the term ‘modularity,’ then be true to it.
I think the most valuable point in this whole conversation – and to be taken from a read of Dr. Finel’s article – is the need to be as ambidextrous as possible. For me, your conclusion is spot on.
"The enemy, when there is an enemy, has to be dealt with as they are and not as we’d really like them to be in our ten year procurement schedule. We have to select the tools that best fit operational conditions, our policy objectives and our resources.
Strategy must conform to reality and not the reverse."
Here, Here….
March 2nd, 2010 at 7:46 pm
Much thanks Steve! It’s been remarkably difficult to persuade ppl that there isn’t a "one best way" to approach all situations. The cookie cutters are not relinquished easily by USG employees. 🙁