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[by Pauline Kaurin]

In Book III, we find ourselves facing a classic ethical question in warfare: How ought one treat the enemy? Should one show mercy and follow the rules and customs of war? Or should one be cruel and show no mercy, because that is what the enemy deserves and the harsh example may deter others?

In this case, the Athenians are trying to decide whether to put the Mytilenians to death. (3.36/7) Cleon notes in his speech,

“Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and necessary foes… Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death” (3.40)

Diodotus rebuts the argument by noting that in war hope, greed, fortune and a whole host of other non-rational motivators are operant, in ways that make deterrence ineffective,

“ In short, it is impossible to prevent….human nature doing what it has once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent whatsoever.” (3.45)

His point here, is that punishing the adversary is not in the interest of the Athenians and is unlikely to be effective in any case, especially since it would involve violating a the idea of discrimination, that is punishment can only be visited on the guilty, not the guilty and innocent alike; the lack of discrimination, he argues involves ‘senseless force’ and will only show that the Athenians have no interest in guilt versus innocence.

This debate, echoing contemporary arguments about whether to use waterboarding in interrogation and whether and when to accord POW status (with all its legal protections) to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, is a familiar one in the ethics of war. Since at least Vietnam, there have been regular calls to abandon or modify the jus in bello restrictions and  Geneva and Hague Conventions; the argument being that our enemies do not always follow these and following them requires our forced to fight ‘with one hand tied behind their back’ – that is, at a strategic and tactical disadvantage.

It’s hard not to hear in these calls a familiar version of a Realist argument about the lack of reciprocity, appearing weak in the eyes of the enemy or potential enemies (deterrence) and failing to serve the State interest.  The idea here is that State interest is best served by military victory and using every means at one’s disposal, if militarily required, ought to be done. Cleon actually seems to be making the Realist argument here even though it is cloaked in moral terms, while Diodotus, despite invoking State interest and effectiveness, is actually making the ethicist’s argument, especially at the end in reminding the Athenians that they actually do care about discriminating between the guilty and the innocent.

Before addressing this question of which side we ought to take in this debate, I would also turn our attention to Thucydides’ discussion of the moral erosion caused by revolution and war, which began with the Corcyraeans, but eventually spread to the whole Hellenic world. (3.82ff)  Now one could read this section purely as a tangential conversation on the problems with civil war and revolution, but I read it much more broadly as a discussion related to the earlier one about how to treat the enemy, as a discourse on moral erosion in war.  Does war blunt and erode our moral sensibilities and standards, making possible and reasonable actions that would have never been considered before?  Could a discussion of waterboarding have taken place in the same way and with such public support absent the context of 9/11?

The question of moral erosion has certain obvious implications for the moral injury debate (which I cannot pursue here), but it also has important implications for the debate about how we treat our enemy.  The Realist Deterrence in War argument becomes more and more attractive, I think, the more moral erosion has taken place, the more extreme the circumstances seem to be. But I rather agree with Diodotus that especially in such extreme circumstances, it does not work.  Why?

Any kind of deterrence view (whether in the strategy realm related to war and foreign policy or punishment theory) relies on the assumption that people are making rational judgments and weighing risk and cost in making their decisions about whether to embark on a particular course of action. The more extreme the circumstances, the more moral erosion has taken place, the less this is the case, I’d argue. In these circumstances, it is not rational judgement about self or State interest that are operating, but all the non-rational elements noted before; these are much less amenable to influence.

We might think about the brutal tactics that ISIS uses (torture, beheadings, etc.) which are designed to produce certain kinds of reactions when broadcast to the intended audience. It seems logical that in response to such brutality, the West and other opponents ought to up the ante and use even more brutal tactics to make the case that we are strong, will persevere and also to deter ISIS and other actors from such behavior in future due to the costs of such behavior. Sounds good! If anything seems like Hobbes classic State of Nature this seems it, so logically the brutality should produce accommodation in behavior.

But of course, there is a problem here. Brutality, as evidenced by scores of torture testimonies, does not produce much rooted in logic. It produces fear, fight or flight, anger, a desire for revenge or to defend one’s honor (which seems particularly apt for a group like ISIS). These are not things that lend themselves to rational thinking (think of your last serious and extended fight with a spouse or family member), but rather lends itself to retaliation and escalation of force with little concern for whether it is effective or not.

So on one of many ironies produced by Thucydides (Melian Dialogue anyone?),  we have the foundation for an argument that Realists should, in fact, uphold moral principles in war – both in the short and long term – because moral erosion undermines and accurate and rational assessment of State interest and good decision making. Deterrence will not work in war, because cruelty produces anger, offends honor and creates a desire for revenge – frequently the opposite effect that it is intended to have. Realists ought not abandon moral principles and legal restrictions in war, because that causes moral erosion which makes it much harder to win and bring the conflict to the desired End State. They may do so for non-moral reasons (as opposed to the ethicist), but I think a consistent Realist must reject Cleon’s argument as short term thinking, motivated by a anger and revenge, not rooted in rational State interest.

So we should uphold jus in bello requirements, maintain Geneva and Hague conventions and perhaps (as I argued in an article on Guantanamo Bay) extend mercy even when it is not required. Moral erosion, as Thucydides notes, is as contagious as the plague and perhaps more damaging, especially in the long term.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, November 1st, 2016 at 7:10 pm and is filed under Thucydides Roundtable, Thucydides Roundtable, Book III. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.