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[by J. Scott Shipman]

As promised in the original review, the following books and articles were recommended during the Boyd & Beyond 2011 event. Some of these titles are well-known in Boydian circles, others are new to me.

TEMPO Venkatesh Guru Rao [Zen reviewed this book here. Chet Richards here, and Fred Leland here. This is the most anticipated book in my anti-library, but I don’t want to read it until my book is finished and with the publisher.]

Sound Doctrine by Sid Heal

The Monks of War Esquire

The Mind of War Grant Hammond

The Talent Code Daniel Coyle [This was the lone book that I recommended this year. I read The Talent Code a few years ago and must say, Coyle makes a compelling case for the power of what he calls “deep practice.” His deep practice tracts nicely with Polanyi’s ideas of “indwelling” and tacit knowledge.

Strategic Intuition William Duggan

Unity of Mistakes Marianne Paget

Sensemaking Karl Weick

Sources of Power Gary Klein

Streetlights and Shadows Gary Klein

Heavy Matter Russell Glenn

On Combat Dave Grossman

Bond-Relationship Targeting Dr. Robert J. Bunker (this may not be the precise reference, the topic seems to be within an essay Higher Dimensional Warfare)

Blink Malcolm Gladwell

Descarte’s Bones Russell Shorto

Unrestricted Warfare Qiao Liang & Wang Xianqsui

How to Be Your Own Best Friend Berkowitz and Newman

The Logic of Failure Dietrich Dorner

The Psychology of Personal Constructs GA Kelly

The Unity of the Philosophical Experience, Etienne Gilson

Geography of Thought Richard Nisbett

The classes conducted by Edward Tufte were recommended for visualizing information.

I could not find the following references, so if you have them, please feel free to add a link in the comments or send an email and I’ll add.

1955 Hogenboom Report

Field Command

1970’s Urban Planning/Wicked Problems Rittel and Webbes

Swarming Cato

This is an excellent video series on US Strategic Nuclear Policy.

One closing note, Cameron Schaefer at his blog recommended a healthy dose of fiction for the strategic practitioner, and I agree—here is a link to his list of fiction.

UPDATE 10-29-2011

I did recommend Melanie Mitchell’s book Complexity A Guided Tour, but never managed to write it on the white board—best book I’ve read on the topic.

[ by Charles Cameron — Robb’s analysis, capitalism as religion metaphor, irony, warning ]
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— image source — btw, contact jonesharris [at] btinternet.com if interested

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Okay. The Church of England‘s own website, whose banner reads A Christian presence in every community, now hosts a list of, well,

which seems a rather unfortunate way to phrase things — but the point is, something called “secularism” is gnawing away at belief and church attendance, and I’m wondering if it may not be gnawing away at belief and bank attendance, too…

And since Mammon is the theological term for riches or material wealth personified, I’m asking, metaphorically speaking, whether Mammon is now facing its own “secularism” crisis…

Well, to be honest, I’m not the one doing the wondering, really — I’m borrowing the whole idea from the imperturbable John Robb, fighter pilot, entrepreneur and author of Brave New War, and spicing it up a bit with nice pictures of a church conversion to drive the irony of the whole thing home.

From two of Robb’s recent posts on his Global Guerrillas blog:

1.

Oct 5 JOURNAL: The Pope of the Church of Capitalism

The Chairman of the Federal Reserve is part:

• Religious figure. The Pope of the Church of Capitalism. The leader of the Church. Final arbiter on the meaning of scripture (arcane economic indicators and economic papers). Is trained in ancient mysteries (economics). Has a council of Cardinals (the Fed board). He also issues indulgences (bailouts and free loans) to banks that he likes.

2.

Oct 7 OCCUPY (Insert Your City Here): Protesting Capitalism’s Crisis

What Occupy is Really About The real reason we are seeing this movement right now is because

Capitalism, the last great ideological system, is in crisis.

This isn’t merely a crisis of outcomes (economic depression, financial panic, etc.), it’s a crisis of BELIEF. While people generally believe in the idea of capitalism, a critical mass of people now think that the global capitalist system we currently have is so badly run, so corrupt, so terrible at delivering results that it needs either a) a complete overhaul or b) we need to build something new.

In short, in its tiny way, this protest may be the start of a reformation of the church of capitalism.

A splintering that may change everything…. For better or worse depending on how well you did in the old, corrupt system.

3.

So, anyway — is it time for capitalism to rid itself of the sale of indulgences?

The religious metaphor is, of course, what fascinates me.

But there’s a warning here, too, about the dangers of radically polarized populations and mobs and their heated passions, as Robb quietly implies with his “for better or worse” — are we ready to go through another (networked, and no doubt accelerated) Thirty Years War?

That is something I devoutly hope we can avoid.

An research-based look at human motivation by Dan Pink:

Interestingly, the direction of corporate/billionaire driven Education Reform runs counter to most of this, being centered in strongly Taylorist ethos of micromanagement and continuous quantitative measurement, rote and synchronized usage of teaching scripts and routines, with the intention of erasing autonomy of both teachers and students. Standardized competence, set at a level of basic skills, is their systemic learning objective rather than mastery – for which they wish to charge the taxpayers a boatload of money. #EpicFail.

A fascinating online discussion between US Army intellectuals Colonel Gian Gentile, Colonel Paul Yingling and journalist and Iraq War veteran Carl Prine:

Paul Yingling  A Failure in Generalship  –AFJ

….Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America’s generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America’s generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as “Fiasco” and “Cobra II.” However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Gian Gentile A Few Questions for Colonel Paul Yingling on Failures in Generalship – Small Wars Journal

….Perhaps you see it differently, but the failure that I see in American generalship in both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (with precedence in Vietnam) is the idea that tactical and operational excellence through a certain brand of counterinsurgency (or any other form of tactical innovation) can rescue wars that ultimately are failures of strategy, or as Schlesinger more harshly puts it “national stupidity.”

In light of how you respond to these questions might you consider writing “A Failure of Generalship, Version 2” for Afghanistan?

If not, might you spell out the differences between what you saw as the failure of American generalship in Iraq from 2003-2006 with the past two years plus in Afghanistan.  In other words, how has American generalship been a failure in Iraq and not in Afghanistan?

Paul Yingling The Gentile-Yingling Dialogue: ISAF Exit Strategy – Neither International nor an Exit nor a Strategy – Small Wars Journal

….Those of us charged with strategic thinking ought to heed this example.  Imagine a failed Pakistan that results in a terrorist organization acquiring one or more nuclear weapons.  What would our response be in the aftermath of such a crisis?  What intelligence capabilities do we need to locate compromised nuclear materials?  What civil security and law enforcement measures might disrupt or minimize the impacts of such a threat?  What counter-proliferation capabilities are required to seize and render safe compromised nuclear weapons or materials?  Imagine further the capabilities required to avoid such a crisis.  What diplomatic measures might change the Pakistani strategic calculus that lends support to extremism?  What broader engagement with Pakistani civil society might render this troubled country less amenable to radical ideology?  Now imagine still further back to the institutional arrangements that generate national security capabilities.  Do we have the right priorities?  Are we buying the right equipment?  Are we selecting the right leaders?  Are we making the best use of increasingly scarce tax payer dollars?

Too often, what passes for strategic thought in the United States is actually a struggle among self-interested elites seeking political, commercial or bureaucratic advantage.  Such behavior is the privilege of a country that is both rich and safe.  However, a pattern of such behavior is self-correcting: no country that behaves this way will stay rich or safe for long.

Carl Prine A Colonel of Truth – Line of Departure

….Gentile and I agreed nevertheless that Yingling failed to seal the deal by naming names, something that would’ve allowed readers the chance to test empirically whether the LTC’s overall thesis had merit.  Here’s Yingling’s nutgraf, words scribbled during the worst days in Iraq when Gentile commanded a cavalry squadron in Baghdad and I was stuck in Anbar as a lowly infantry SPC:

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

….Perhaps because it was so brief, Yingling’s essay lacked subtlety.  It’s not true that America’s generals in Vietnam saw the conflict merely in terms of conventional warfare, although some surely did.  He spun a dubious bit of scholarship on Malaya by John Nagl into a larger argument about Cold War generals choosing to orient American arms toward highly kinetic campaigns – as if the threat of Soviet arms in Europe had nothing to do with that.  And he peppered his analysis with bromides that remain unproven, perhaps my favorite being the chestnut that “?opulation security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency.”

That read better in 2007 than it does today. But Yingling’s larger point held true:  America’s generals failed to adapt our shrinking forces to how policymakers might direct their use, even if there was a re-emphasis on operations other than conventional war both in practice (Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Haiti, Somalia, Kovoso, Bosnia, Timor, Cambodia) and theory.

This is an important discussion because the failure of generalship is merely part of a larger paradigm of leadership by abdication and moral evasion that is corroding the fabric of American society to a degree not seen since the 1970’s. Or perhaps since the 1870’s. Colonel John Boyd once chided his brother officers for being willing to take a bullet for their country but not willing to risk their careers for their country. How much worse then is an elite civilian political class that grabs the largesse of government contracts with great gusto but is chronically unable to do the hard work of providing strategic leadership when in office?

Truman’s famous desk sign that indicated the buck stopped at his desk. To update the sign to fit the spirit of the times would require replacing it with a dead fish rotting from the head.

 [by J. Scott Shipman]

Following the remarkable enthusiasm of the participants of Boyd & Beyond 2010, the expectations with respect to this years’ second annual event were high and in my estimation, no one was disappointed. Both days began at 0800 and went until 1800, with large groups of participants meeting after the meeting over food and beverages to continue the conversations. For me, the adrenaline was running so high, I got less than 8 hours sleep in the two days; as winding down was easier said than done.

Through the good offices of Mr. Stan Coerr, GS-15 and Colonel of the USMCR, our group met at the USMC Command and Staff college for the two day, no-PowerPoint event. Unlike last year, there were no initial retrospectives on John Boyd’s life. Instead, our agenda moved directly to broad themes derived from Boyd’s work and legacy. After lunch on Friday, the 29th Commandant of the USMC, General Al Gray made a surprise visit and spoke for two hours on his friendship and association with Boyd and the period when the USMC was integrating Boyd’s ideas on maneuver warfare. Those two hours went by in a flash, and I believe our group would agree, Gen Gray could have kept our attention for the remainder of the afternoon.

The morning began with speakers discussing Boyd’s legacy to the military services. Don Vandergriff lead off with an excellent review of methods he has adopted to help train leaders in adaptive decision making. Picking up where he left off last year, Don demonstrated the power of his methods. Don was followed by a presentation that challenged our group on the power of context and relationships between law enforcement and the community. Using a vehicle of an evolving story narrative of a historic event, our group was provided facts in a method akin to peeling an onion—after all the facts of the story had been shared, opinons were solicited; not surprisingly the conclusion was a surprise, but illustrative of a leader who “sees” (think: the Observe of OODA).

We were very fortunate to have uniformed representatives of Boyd’s US Air Force, and a representative from the US Navy. Speaking separately on different topics, these three bright young men provided observations from within their respective services on leadership, learning, and organizational adaptability. They reviewed the perils of a zero-defect culture where metrics and hardware are more important than people. [Reminded of Boyd’s famous quote: People, ideas, hardware: in that order!”]

Marcus Mainz, Major USMC, followed-up and extended on his observations made last year with respect to Boyd’s continuing influence on professional military education in the Marine Corps. He emphasized time and fighting on the three levels of the physical, mental, and moral, and the importance of deception in the disruption of any enemy’s OODA. He also provided an excellent quote:

“Training is for the known, education is for the unknowns.”

Maj Mainz was followed by Mark Williams in a discussion on the epistemology and ontology of Boyd’s OODA, and the implications for warrior training. Mark is a former fighter pilot and spoke with passion about the importance of continuous learning and adaptability. Using riveting example from his experience in the cockpit, Mark illustrated the need for fluidity between the Observe and Orient.

Bruce Greene, Major, USMC, presented on the topic of unmanned vs manned aircraft in relation to Boyd’s theories. This presentation provoked a lively discussion on the both the moral and practical aspects of unmanned vehicles—particularly in light of fratricidal events involving UUVs and US ground troops. Major Greene emphasized the “morality of attitude” with respect to decisions in this arena.

Day two had a lively start requiring our group to orient on the fly. We arrived to find power was out in the Command & Staff College building. Maj Mainz, in a deft move of Boydian orientation, suggested we decamp to the Expeditionary Warfare School, about a mile away. We moved coffee, bagels, coolers, books, bags and people in about half an hour and picked up where we left off.

Dr. Terry Barnhart led off with a remarkable exercise using questions to determine real needs. Terry contends that questions elicit more information and buy-in than statements, and with this exercise proved his point. Terry divided participants into two groups to tackle two problems ad hoc using a simple and straight-forward process. This robust exercise worked quite well and many remarked they were taking the experience and example back to their respective organizations.

World-renowned law enforcement expert and combat Marine, Sid Heal used a rare-for-B&B PowerPoint presentation to discuss Forecasting With Density. Sid’s presentation was engaging and informative and covered how law enforcement can use density in nature, urban areas, and data for law enforcement—particularly riot control. The presentation was rare in that the slides truly complimented the topic. Sid also offered a notable quote:

“All human understanding can be boiled down to comparison and metaphor.” {Regular zenpundit readers perhaps know the appeal to me of patterns, metaphors and analogies, so this quote will be remembered and used.}

Fred Leland, longtime user of Boyd’s ideas, offered a riveting presentation on interaction and isolation in police operational art. During his talk Fred reiterated the hazards of a culture driven by policies and procedures at the expense of thinking and common sense.

Chip Pearson, owner of a software company in Minnesota, spoke again this year, providing updates from last years’ presentation and insight into the evolution of his company. Chip made a distinction between those “in business to make money, or those in business to satisfy customer needs.” This comment reminded me of Boyd’s “to be or to do” challenge. During his talk, Chip emphasized the importance of common understanding for organizational harmony. It was also during Chip’s talk that Sid Heal offered another quote to remember:

“Mediocrity and controversy cannot peacefully coexist.”

Michael Moore gave his much anticipated presentation on his Win Bowl concept. Michael’s ideas tie directly to Sun Tzu’s:

“Military actions are like water, flowing from high to low points…And just as water adapts to the ground it flows over, so a successful soldier adapts his victories to the specific foe he faces.”

(Section 6:29, 31)

Michael demonstrated how his Win Bowl concept captures the fluidity of tracking goals. He says the model has been used in the learning environment and demonstrated the simplicity and approachability of the model. Michael suggested his outline offers a “”mental tapestry” metaphor Boyd was seeking in military strategy” and I believe he he is right.

Longtime friend of this blog, Adam Elkus followed with a powerful talk on Boyd’s influence on campaign planning and the influence of design theory. Adam emphasized the importance of simplicity in the development of strategy and the avoidance of tools, jargons, and excuses that more often than not decrease clarity of purpose.

Katya Drozdova of Seattle Pacific University was our concluding speaker. She offered her expert insight into alternative strategies in the Afghan theater that would be revolutionary in scope and a significant change to current US government policy. For instance, she offered the US should consider granting autonomy to those areas of Afghanistan that have demonstrated a capability to sustain and secure themselves.

This review did not include all of the speakers. Last year I took over five pages of notes, however for this event my notes were more sketchy, so my apologies in advance for the speakers and topics not covered. I would encourage those who attended to fill in blanks that I no doubt missed or neglected. Also, last year I published the reading list recommended by participants. I will do this in a update to this post in the days to come, so stay tuned.

We have every intention of having another event the same weekend in October next year, so stay tuned and keep the dates open on your calendar for Boyd & Beyond 2012.