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[by J. Scott Shipman]

The Human Face of War by Jim Storr 

[Zen reviewed this book earlier here. I had forgotten that I wrote a rather long review at Amazon after finishing in January 2010. Perhaps Storr will gain a wider audience as a result.]

Mr. Storr’s The Human Face of War will be I predict, a book studied by military professionals (and smart policy makers) for years to come. Using straightforward prose, Mr. Storr seeks to provide a philosophical approach to war—as he says, “In practice we are concerned so much with war as with waging it.” Storr goes on to differentiate between war and warfare; where war is an “issue” with history and warfare dedicated to methods/methodology. Storr rejects notion that war is art or science, and prefers instead to embrace pragmatism and limited empiricism. He points out correctly: “Pragmatism has obvious application to warfare. A significant aspect of warfare is `a process of trial and error; seeing what wins and exploiting it.” Storr continues that “empiricism is not just trial and error: it is a logical process based on structuring observed facts.” What “works” will suggest a way ahead. 

Storr uses broad themes of what has worked and what has not worked in military history by explaining the nature of combat and tools and models available to the practitioner. He uses Clausewitz’s “dialectic of aims and means” in conjunction with Systems Theory to describe the holistic nature of military units; where effective/efficient output is dependent on input—where a good outcome is “winning” (as Storr repeatedly observes throughout the book, armies aren’t paid to come in second). Hence, organization of military units is fundamental; efficient/effective organizations are more likely to succeed. He observes: “Cohesion and collective performance indicate the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. There is a systemic effect, and we should see armed forces as systems.” 

Storr is a proponent of forcing decision making to the folks on the ground using brief and succinct communications. His chapter on Commanding the Battle is excellent. Storr advocates lean command staff’s and dispersed decision making. “We should employ the best brains in small groups, rather than try to assemble a collective brain.” He points out that “when staff numbers are reduced, the effectiveness of HQ improves.” “Reducing staff numbers would increase speed with which they could get things done.” [Amazingly, Storr quotes a work from 1998 that reports a typical Western division commander has 600 people supporting!—and that number has, I’m sure increased in 10 years.] He concludes this excellent chapter making a distinction between technology and the human factor: “…the future is not digital: it’s human. What is needed is things that bind talents together as a team, not more bandwidth…given time, resources, open minds and not much money we could revolutionize land tactical command. The key problems are human, cultural and institutional.” 

Storr asserts that successful modern commanders are most likely intuitive thinkers and possess the ability to learn from experience. He suggests further the “tendency to learn is more critical. It implies a tendency to reflect on experience and to learn from it, to maximize the benefit of the experience.” This tendency is key to the development of “skills”. He encourages a “permissive man-management regime that allows those who can learn rapidly from their experience to do so.” At the opposite end, Storr makes clear the unsuitability of many leaders who use bullying tactics and fear to motivate. 

Storr concludes by observing that “institutional conservatism” inhibits armed forces from improving significantly during times of peace; that “the current size and shape of Western armies reflect issues that are not primarily related to warfighting effectiveness.” He insists that doctrine should be explicit, relevant,(descriptive and where appropriate, prescriptive), coherent, and practical. The short tours common in western armies harm team integrity—which is “huge”. Innovation is vital, and in many cases military members aren’t with a unit long enough to have the experience necessary to truly innovate. Storr advocates “experience is the best way to achieve practical coordination and overcome the fog of war, as long as the experience gained is positive.” He discourages the common use of lieutenant-colonels in jobs where a captain or major could function/thrive/learn; as these junior officers will have less experience when they are promoted and will have probably developed the habit of “referring decisions upwards, and hence develop little initiative.” 

According the Storr, the “human” aspect of war should take prevalence over technology. He acknowledges the utility of technology, but asks the reader to “…pause and look for a moment at the Vietnam War, which suggests that superior technology is not always the deciding factor.” [9-11 is illustrative of this point on the “terror” side; determination and box cutters wreaked havoc.] 

My review does not do justice to the wealth of information, insight, and counsel in Storr’s book and I quote him frequently because his style is better than a summary. This book was aimed at a narrow audience, hence the high price. When I began, I was concerned about Storr’ opinions concerning John Boyd’s OODA loop; but in late 2009 I rejected Boyd’s deterministic underpinnings of OODA—Storr’s pragmatic and partial empiricism makes more sense. OODA remains, in my humble opinion, a valuable and versatile methodology in both the military/law enforcement and business arenas. 

This book is highly recommended; particularly for junior officers and NCO’s—the price is high, but what you will gain will be worth the cost.

UPDATE 11.17.2011: Jim Storr contacted me and confirmed the issue of a paperback for about $40.

 [by J. Scott Shipman]

Steve Jobs by Walter Isaacson

Walter Isaacson, the acclaimed author of biographies of Benjamin Franklin and Albert Einstein, has produced a definitive and up-close biography of Steve Jobs. The book is a very readable 571 pages that took only a couple of days to read. Jobs approached Isaacson to write his bio in 2004, but Isaacson resisted until 2009 when  Jobs’ wife Laurene Powell “said bluntly, “If you’re ever going to do a book on Steve, you’d better do it now.”” Isaacson insists no restrictions were placed on him, in fact, Jobs and his wife facilitated access to many people who do did not hold Jobs in high regard—the man excited passions good and bad. I found it ironic that Jobs, a man who obsessed with control would willingly relinquish control in what will probably be the definitive biography of his life.

Isaacson offered early that his book is really about innovation. He offers: “At a time when the United States is seeking ways to sustain its innovative edge, and when societies around the world are trying to build creative digital-age economies, Jobs stands as the ultimate icon of inventiveness, imagination, and sustained innovation.” Given Apple’s growth, his point is well taken.

Isaacson clearly admires Jobs, but he does not spare the reader of Jobs volatile and brutal out-bursts directed at just about anyone he considered a “bozo” or worse. From the beginning, Jobs was a very difficult person to work with. He did not tolerate mediocrity and punished what he thought was mediocre thinking, often publicly. Isaacson offers some insights and ideas as to the cause of Jobs distinctly caustic personality, but most ring hollow. Jobs was a driven and passionate man, with very little empathy—even for family members. Isaacson suggests “people who were not crushed ended up being stronger” and many of the folks interviewed agreed—Jobs drove people to do things they didn’t know they could do. As one of Jobs colleagues Debi Coleman said, “You did the impossible, because you didn’t realize it was impossible.” So the folks he didn’t scare off, appear to have been inspired. Tim Cook, Jobs’ successor offered, “What I learned about Steve was that people mistook some of his comments as ranting or negativism, but it was really just the way he showed passion. So that’s how I processed it, and I never took issue personally.”

My favorite parts of the book were Isaacson’s liberal use of quotes from Jobs. Some quotes bristle with passion, and a few were profound. This one appealed to my notions on pattern cognition:

Your thoughts construct patterns like scaffolding in your mind. You are really etching chemical patterns. In most cases,  people get stuck in those patterns, just like grooves in a record, and they never get out of them.

Isaacson covers Jobs journey at Apple, NeXT, Pixar, and his triumphant return to Apple. I did not know much about Jobs at Pixar and found it interesting that Jobs was CEO at both companies simultaneously—and both companies had a “different” versions of Jobs. Isaacson says, “Pixar was a haven where Jobs could escape the intensity of Cupertino. At Apple, the managers often excitable and exhausted, Jobs tended to be volatile, and people felt nervous about where they stood with him….It was a Pixar that he learned to let other creative people flourish and take the lead.” Jobs was more hands-on at Apple I sense because he considered it his creation—essentially an extension of his person. I suspect Jobs viewed his role at Pixar as more that of a steward in comparison.

Jobs hated slide presentations (I agree—one great thing about Boyd & Beyond is the general ban on PowerPoint) and said, “People who know what they’re talking about don’t need PowerPoint.” There is a poignant passage towards the end where Jobs was meeting with his team of doctors and the doctor had a PowerPoint presentation. Jobs gently suggested the Apple Keynote program was better.

Jobs, despite his bristly exterior, reached deep in his Zen training and life experience (particularly after his cancer diagnosis) when he spoke at the 2005 Stanford commencement:

Remembering that I’ll be dead soon is the most important tool I’ve ever encountered to help me make the big choices of life. Because almost everything—all external expectations, all pride, all fear of embarrassment or failure—these things just fall away in the face of death, leaving only what is truly important. Remembering that you are going to die is the best way I know to avoid the trap of thinking you have something to lose. You are already naked. There is no reason not to follow your heart.  

We are a Apple/MacBook Pro family, we have iPhones, iPods, and the iPad on our wish list. Isaacson discusses one thing I’ve noticed with every Apple purchase; the thought put into packaging of the product. Apple packaging is patented and it shows. Jobs alter ego and head Apple designer Jonathan Ive, said, “Steve and I spend a lot of time on the packaging…I love the process of unpacking something. You design a ritual of unpacking to make the product feel special. Packaging can be theater, it can create a story.” I believe we have kept every box our Apple products arrived in—they are works of art.

This book will elicit the spectrum of emotions, there are parts where I was embarrassed or appalled at Jobs poor behavior, there were tender moments towards the end of his storied life that brought a tear to my eye. Isaacson has given us a valuable portrait of a man mathematician Mark Kac “called a magician genius, someone whose insights came out of the blue and require intuition more than mere mental processing power.”

Isaacson’s Steve Jobs comes with my highest recommendation.

NOTE: This is admittedly a different book review for this site. I’ll admit up front that I’m a fan of Jobs and his products—and I know many people hate him passionately and with good reason. I’m sharing this review because Jobs was an iconoclast very similar to John Boyd: people either loved him or hated him. Both men were driven, had poor people skills, and both left rich legacies in completely different areas, and are eminently interesting figures.

[by J. Scott Shipman]

As promised in the original review, the following books and articles were recommended during the Boyd & Beyond 2011 event. Some of these titles are well-known in Boydian circles, others are new to me.

TEMPO Venkatesh Guru Rao [Zen reviewed this book here. Chet Richards here, and Fred Leland here. This is the most anticipated book in my anti-library, but I don’t want to read it until my book is finished and with the publisher.]

Sound Doctrine by Sid Heal

The Monks of War Esquire

The Mind of War Grant Hammond

The Talent Code Daniel Coyle [This was the lone book that I recommended this year. I read The Talent Code a few years ago and must say, Coyle makes a compelling case for the power of what he calls “deep practice.” His deep practice tracts nicely with Polanyi’s ideas of “indwelling” and tacit knowledge.

Strategic Intuition William Duggan

Unity of Mistakes Marianne Paget

Sensemaking Karl Weick

Sources of Power Gary Klein

Streetlights and Shadows Gary Klein

Heavy Matter Russell Glenn

On Combat Dave Grossman

Bond-Relationship Targeting Dr. Robert J. Bunker (this may not be the precise reference, the topic seems to be within an essay Higher Dimensional Warfare)

Blink Malcolm Gladwell

Descarte’s Bones Russell Shorto

Unrestricted Warfare Qiao Liang & Wang Xianqsui

How to Be Your Own Best Friend Berkowitz and Newman

The Logic of Failure Dietrich Dorner

The Psychology of Personal Constructs GA Kelly

The Unity of the Philosophical Experience, Etienne Gilson

Geography of Thought Richard Nisbett

The classes conducted by Edward Tufte were recommended for visualizing information.

I could not find the following references, so if you have them, please feel free to add a link in the comments or send an email and I’ll add.

1955 Hogenboom Report

Field Command

1970’s Urban Planning/Wicked Problems Rittel and Webbes

Swarming Cato

This is an excellent video series on US Strategic Nuclear Policy.

One closing note, Cameron Schaefer at his blog recommended a healthy dose of fiction for the strategic practitioner, and I agree—here is a link to his list of fiction.

UPDATE 10-29-2011

I did recommend Melanie Mitchell’s book Complexity A Guided Tour, but never managed to write it on the white board—best book I’ve read on the topic.

 [by J. Scott Shipman]

Following the remarkable enthusiasm of the participants of Boyd & Beyond 2010, the expectations with respect to this years’ second annual event were high and in my estimation, no one was disappointed. Both days began at 0800 and went until 1800, with large groups of participants meeting after the meeting over food and beverages to continue the conversations. For me, the adrenaline was running so high, I got less than 8 hours sleep in the two days; as winding down was easier said than done.

Through the good offices of Mr. Stan Coerr, GS-15 and Colonel of the USMCR, our group met at the USMC Command and Staff college for the two day, no-PowerPoint event. Unlike last year, there were no initial retrospectives on John Boyd’s life. Instead, our agenda moved directly to broad themes derived from Boyd’s work and legacy. After lunch on Friday, the 29th Commandant of the USMC, General Al Gray made a surprise visit and spoke for two hours on his friendship and association with Boyd and the period when the USMC was integrating Boyd’s ideas on maneuver warfare. Those two hours went by in a flash, and I believe our group would agree, Gen Gray could have kept our attention for the remainder of the afternoon.

The morning began with speakers discussing Boyd’s legacy to the military services. Don Vandergriff lead off with an excellent review of methods he has adopted to help train leaders in adaptive decision making. Picking up where he left off last year, Don demonstrated the power of his methods. Don was followed by a presentation that challenged our group on the power of context and relationships between law enforcement and the community. Using a vehicle of an evolving story narrative of a historic event, our group was provided facts in a method akin to peeling an onion—after all the facts of the story had been shared, opinons were solicited; not surprisingly the conclusion was a surprise, but illustrative of a leader who “sees” (think: the Observe of OODA).

We were very fortunate to have uniformed representatives of Boyd’s US Air Force, and a representative from the US Navy. Speaking separately on different topics, these three bright young men provided observations from within their respective services on leadership, learning, and organizational adaptability. They reviewed the perils of a zero-defect culture where metrics and hardware are more important than people. [Reminded of Boyd’s famous quote: People, ideas, hardware: in that order!”]

Marcus Mainz, Major USMC, followed-up and extended on his observations made last year with respect to Boyd’s continuing influence on professional military education in the Marine Corps. He emphasized time and fighting on the three levels of the physical, mental, and moral, and the importance of deception in the disruption of any enemy’s OODA. He also provided an excellent quote:

“Training is for the known, education is for the unknowns.”

Maj Mainz was followed by Mark Williams in a discussion on the epistemology and ontology of Boyd’s OODA, and the implications for warrior training. Mark is a former fighter pilot and spoke with passion about the importance of continuous learning and adaptability. Using riveting example from his experience in the cockpit, Mark illustrated the need for fluidity between the Observe and Orient.

Bruce Greene, Major, USMC, presented on the topic of unmanned vs manned aircraft in relation to Boyd’s theories. This presentation provoked a lively discussion on the both the moral and practical aspects of unmanned vehicles—particularly in light of fratricidal events involving UUVs and US ground troops. Major Greene emphasized the “morality of attitude” with respect to decisions in this arena.

Day two had a lively start requiring our group to orient on the fly. We arrived to find power was out in the Command & Staff College building. Maj Mainz, in a deft move of Boydian orientation, suggested we decamp to the Expeditionary Warfare School, about a mile away. We moved coffee, bagels, coolers, books, bags and people in about half an hour and picked up where we left off.

Dr. Terry Barnhart led off with a remarkable exercise using questions to determine real needs. Terry contends that questions elicit more information and buy-in than statements, and with this exercise proved his point. Terry divided participants into two groups to tackle two problems ad hoc using a simple and straight-forward process. This robust exercise worked quite well and many remarked they were taking the experience and example back to their respective organizations.

World-renowned law enforcement expert and combat Marine, Sid Heal used a rare-for-B&B PowerPoint presentation to discuss Forecasting With Density. Sid’s presentation was engaging and informative and covered how law enforcement can use density in nature, urban areas, and data for law enforcement—particularly riot control. The presentation was rare in that the slides truly complimented the topic. Sid also offered a notable quote:

“All human understanding can be boiled down to comparison and metaphor.” {Regular zenpundit readers perhaps know the appeal to me of patterns, metaphors and analogies, so this quote will be remembered and used.}

Fred Leland, longtime user of Boyd’s ideas, offered a riveting presentation on interaction and isolation in police operational art. During his talk Fred reiterated the hazards of a culture driven by policies and procedures at the expense of thinking and common sense.

Chip Pearson, owner of a software company in Minnesota, spoke again this year, providing updates from last years’ presentation and insight into the evolution of his company. Chip made a distinction between those “in business to make money, or those in business to satisfy customer needs.” This comment reminded me of Boyd’s “to be or to do” challenge. During his talk, Chip emphasized the importance of common understanding for organizational harmony. It was also during Chip’s talk that Sid Heal offered another quote to remember:

“Mediocrity and controversy cannot peacefully coexist.”

Michael Moore gave his much anticipated presentation on his Win Bowl concept. Michael’s ideas tie directly to Sun Tzu’s:

“Military actions are like water, flowing from high to low points…And just as water adapts to the ground it flows over, so a successful soldier adapts his victories to the specific foe he faces.”

(Section 6:29, 31)

Michael demonstrated how his Win Bowl concept captures the fluidity of tracking goals. He says the model has been used in the learning environment and demonstrated the simplicity and approachability of the model. Michael suggested his outline offers a “”mental tapestry” metaphor Boyd was seeking in military strategy” and I believe he he is right.

Longtime friend of this blog, Adam Elkus followed with a powerful talk on Boyd’s influence on campaign planning and the influence of design theory. Adam emphasized the importance of simplicity in the development of strategy and the avoidance of tools, jargons, and excuses that more often than not decrease clarity of purpose.

Katya Drozdova of Seattle Pacific University was our concluding speaker. She offered her expert insight into alternative strategies in the Afghan theater that would be revolutionary in scope and a significant change to current US government policy. For instance, she offered the US should consider granting autonomy to those areas of Afghanistan that have demonstrated a capability to sustain and secure themselves.

This review did not include all of the speakers. Last year I took over five pages of notes, however for this event my notes were more sketchy, so my apologies in advance for the speakers and topics not covered. I would encourage those who attended to fill in blanks that I no doubt missed or neglected. Also, last year I published the reading list recommended by participants. I will do this in a update to this post in the days to come, so stay tuned.

We have every intention of having another event the same weekend in October next year, so stay tuned and keep the dates open on your calendar for Boyd & Beyond 2012.

[by J. Scott Shipman]

To have an executable strategy, a nation needs the wherewithal to pay for it. This applies the United States, too. 

As the United States heads into an election year with rising unemployment, a double-dip recession threatening, and deep cuts to defense on the horizon (even as we continue to prosecute the war on terror) a controversy continues to brew in the South China Sea. China has increasingly heated up the rhetoric. On 30 September the Taipei Times reported on an opinion article in the Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times (the original article is here), calling on the Chinese to declare war on Vietnam and the Philippines over their intransigence with respect to China’s claim of the South China Sea as being part of China proper. While this tantrum might be a saber-rattling “fire for effect” exercise aimed at intimidation, the writer surmised the position of the United States:

“The US has not withdrawn from the war on terrorism and the Middle East … so it cannot afford to open a second front in the South China Sea,” he wrote…“[Military] action by a big country in the international arena may result in initial shock, but in the long run, regional stability can be achieved through great power strategic reconciliation.”

“It cannot afford” is writ large. What, indeed, would the US do if China followed the advice of this hot-headed pundit? The US Navy is operating at about 283 ships, and the op-tempo is wearing out both ships and crews—fast. A recent article in the Atlanta Constitution reported the USN is investigating extending the typical six month deployment for fast-attack submarines. As I wrote earlier, we are retiring our submarines faster than we’re replacing them. With the US defense budget under the axe for even further cuts, what is the proper course of action? And do we have a strategy supported by an adequate budget? Are we strengthening our relationships among allies, or are we neglecting relationships that will be vital if hostilities break out? I would submit the US refusal to Taiwan’s request to purchase modern F-16 C/D variants, offering instead upgrades for A/B sends a message of waning US resolve to honor the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). (A rumor within the Beltway is the upgrades were a first step, with what the administration hopes will be a request by Taiwan for the troubled and increasingly costly F-35.) The TRA requires the United States “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”, and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” We may have that “capacity” today, but what are we doing to insure we sustain the capacity to maintain open sea lines of communications? Can we afford it?

Our friends in the South China Sea environs aren’t feeling the love. India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam have all expressed concern about China’s increasingly belligerent actions with respect to the South China Sea areas. All of these nations rely ultimately on the USN to keep the sea lanes of communication open. Most have modest defense budgets, but they’re beginning to realize the new reality and are acting and good for them—we could learn something in the reality department. Vietnam has ordered six Russian Kilo Class diesel boats (very good subs, btw), and the Philippines are shopping. Singapore has a pretty impressive sub fleet (six reasonably modern hulls) and national defense given her size. Taiwan has two 20-plus year old subs and two WWII era US boats that are 60 years old!

If we look at numbers, our strategy seems pretty puny. As our fleet continues to atrophy in numbers, the Chinese continue to build. An inventory of submarines in the area shows that between China and North Korea there are about 128 hulls compared to a total of 42 among the aforementioned nations. Our friends in the area will continue to need US submarine support in the area for the foreseeable future as subs are long lead time platforms.

In this theater alone, cutting our defenses seems nuts. Rather than cut line units, perhaps DoD should begin to improve/streamline our antiquated procurement and acquisition processes. Our acquisition process is so complicated we have a Defense Acquisition University (DAU)! At an estimated $124M for FY012, perhaps we should cut DAU first. Last year at Boyd & Beyond 2010, Dr. Ray Leopold shared the contrasts in commercial contracting versus government contracting. Commercial contracts are built on the presumption of trust, government contracts are written on the presumption of distrust. Rather than use normal legal remedies to hold mischievous and unscrupulous contractors to account, DoD has erected mind-numbing processes that attempt to eliminate any risk a contractor could successfully rip-off the government. And when a contractor does rip-off the government, the contractor pays a fine and continues to do business with the Pentagon. If someone steals from you, do you continue to do business with them? Not me. This would be a good place for DoD to begin true accountability—you can bet one defense company out of the market would send a message to the others. The sad truth is the revolving door between the military and the contractor community has created a incestuous and inbred swamp of rules and processes only the participants understand that are so impenetrable DoD has no idea how much money it is spending (never mind tracking waste)—so fiscal irresponsibility continues in an increasingly dangerous world with budget cuts guaranteed. What’s the strategy again? This madness is fast becoming an issue of national security. On our current track we could well be incapable of defending ourselves, much less our allies.

Here are few other ideas for consideration before touching a single line unit:

• DoD should lay-off every nonessential employee. Whenever there is a snowstorm in the DC area, nonessential personell are instructed to stay home or “liberal leave” is in effect. We need to disabuse ourselves of the luxury of the nonessential employee. Regular businesses don’t operate like this, neither should DoD. Every employee should be integral, essential, and necessary; if they’re not essential, we can’t afford them—not while we have troops in harm’s way.
• Stop double-dipping on 1 January. If a member retires from the military, they shouldn’t be able work for the government (often in the same office where they separated from service) and draw two salaries. If the member wants to work for the government,  pick one, but not both. We can’t afford it and this contributes to the ongoing inbreeding in defense. And here’s a cruel truth: why should we pay a member who could not continue advancing in the military a military pension and a government civil service salary?
• Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Service should have a minimum five year ban on working in the defense or defense lobbying industry. Stop the revolving door. Our current mess was created by many of these folks (even if well-intentioned), they should take a five-year time out and give others a chance to fix the mess they’ve helped create.
• Abandon the current acquisition process and close DAU. Hire commercial attorneys at a commercial rate to write contracts based on trust, but contracts with teeth. This would be cheaper than the bloated and incestuous bureaucracy we now carry.  If a contractor defrauds the government, ban that company for 10 years from doing business with the government, and put the offending members in jail. Word will get around, and folks will behave.
• Allow contractors to earn 8-10% on their work and stop nickel-diming them on fee. Businesses are in business to make money.
• The government should assume more technical oversight/intimacy in procurement programs. We have too many generalist contracting officers who can be misled by an unscrupulous contractor, or perhaps worse, have no idea “what” they’re buying. The government needs to get engaged and informed and know “what” they are buying and know real costs.
• Develop a promotion system based on merit, not time in grade. Our promotion system breeds risk averse officers who focus on punching career tickets instead of doing. Following John Boyd’s “to be or to do” maxim, the promotion system should reward officers who think and take risks, not poster-boy/cookie cutter conformists. “We’re warriors, dammit!” was a phrase my old CO used—let warriors be warriors! Scrap time in grade and promote based on performance, and if folks don’t perform well enough to be promoted, separate them from service.

Robert Frost said good fences make good neighbors; well a good deterrent makes good neighbors, too—but fences and deterrence costs money. DoD can and must do better; business as usual is becoming a death of a thousand paper cuts for us, and our allies. We need a real strategy and the budget to make it happen—that won’t happen with our current acquisition rules. The axe should fall on the Pentagon procurement bureaucracy before it touches a single line unit.

America is better than this, we must raise the standard by bringing DoD into the real world of fiscal responsibility and contract law, so whatever our strategy it can have a sound fiscal and legal foundation.