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THE BIG NAVY AND SMALL WARS:BFA AND THE FDNF

Eddie at Live from The FDNF forsees big changes coming for the fleet, changes inspired by the the PNM theory of Dr. Thomas Barnett. An excerpt:

“As the USMC (United States Marine Corps) has largely become a separate entity (you’re more likely to see a Marine jet squadron onboard an aircraft carrier than you are a Marine standing the once traditional role of a sentry on the ship) from the US Navy, the Navy’s new CNO,Admiral Mullen, has decided to return the service to its “go-ashore” essence with a daring plan to establish a naval infantry. While details are not yet fully available, the “Expeditionary Combat Battalion” will likely consist of infantry elements that can project power ashore and support forces (like hospital corpsmen) that back them up. There are other interesting proposals floating around to go along with this; like a civil affairs augment to Seabee battalions, special warfare combat helicopter squadrons and extensive foreign language training for some if not most of the ECG forces.

…Admiral Mullen must have read “Pentagon’s New Map”, as he’s incorporating PNM related ideas into his new strategy for the Fleet with this Leviathan/Sys Admin force in the making. The “Leviathan” force, the ECG, can go ashore and launch raids (like punitive expeditions or counterterrorism operations) or incorporate the use of lethal force to stabilize the situation (like in a war-ravaged coastal city in a place like Liberia, Indonesia or Mexico) to prepare for the deployment of the larger Sys Admin force (corpsmen, Seabees, logistics types (SKs-storekeepers), master at arms (the military police of the Navy) to begin humanitarian aid or short-term peacekeeping. The scope of the Navy’s operations overseas in the future will increasingly call for a Navy that is able to conduct brown-water ops (requiring vessels capable of traversing coastal waterways with relative ease as well as on occasion certain in-land waterways) as well as ashore operations. “

An excellent and timely post.

The U.S. Navy has a mixed record, historically speaking, entering into such operations which occurred often in the 19th century as commanders on the scene improvised with ad hoc expeditionary uses of sailors in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The caveat of course was that these were spontaneous reactions to circumstances and that the sailors were being used for a kind of warfare for which they had not been trained.

The WWII Seabees, of course, were often almost as formidible at combat as they were at engineering ( or doing both simultaneously). They were never crack combat units but ” tough” is not inaccurate as a descriptor.

This will be interesting to see if these Navy proposals shape up to run with or against the ” Jointness” philosophy.

RECOMMENDED READING

Distracted by a project in the works today that ultimately I think will please Zenpundit readers a great deal but it is still in the formative stage. Therefore, let the recommendations begin:

Dan of tdaxp, on his second grad degree, is being inundated by all kinds of academic, au courant, rad-crit theorizing. Never fear for Dan being unmasked by the Big Cheese however, as he knows how to walk without rhythm.

Homer Simpson as a Sheikh ?

Lord Curzon at Coming Anarchy discusses Ninjas in the Congo.

Horizontal thinkers may be biologically more efficient

That’s it !

SUN TZU ON THE SLING AND THE STONE

It is with great pleasure that I draw your attention to the review of Colonel Thomas X. Hammes widely acclaimed The Sling and The Stone by Sam Crane, a professional academic who can be found at The Useless Tree, a blog devoted to looking at the world through the eyes of classical Chinese philosophy. An excerpt:

“I won’t explicate the text any further. As they say: read the whole thing. Rather, I want to turn this toward Sun Tzu.

There is another important connection between Hammes’s fourth generation warfare and Sun Tzu: the importance of the political goal. Hammes argues that conflicts like the current Iraqi insurgency (which he believes we should have seen coming and should have prepared for more effectively) are all about politics. They do not need to win on the battlefield but just not lose, to stay in the fight to draw attention to the American occupation and inflame the public against the US and the current government. At times the US plays right into this strategy by emphasizing military responses over political perceptions. The recent bombing of Ramadi, for example, does not advance US political goals in Iraq. Military force has to be disciplined more tightly to shape the political context. In this sense, we should not respond to the enemy’s tactics, but try to undermine his strategy. Which is just what Sun Tzu said:

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.Thus what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.’

It is unsurprising that Sam found resonance between The Sling and The Stone and SunTzu as 4GW theory is rooted in the ideas of Colonel John Boyd, the genius fighter pilot and military theorist who was in turn deeply influenced by Sun Tzu. ( Incidently, DNI recently ran a stellar interview with Martin van Creveld commenting on Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz). I have found a similar resonance while reading Unrestricted Warfare, in comparison a somewhat mediocre treatise but one punctuated with bursts of strategic insights that make the 228 pages worth wading through.

Sam’s take was of particular interest to me because unlike most of us he has more than a mere passing familiarity with The Art of War. All 4GW conflicts have their origin in faulty or inept statesmanship and in remedying that it is helpful to refresh ourselves with Sun Tzu, the consumate statesman of all times.

HIGH STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINE ARE ALSO A FORM OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Details are sketchy but some American soldiers are being accused today of having violated the Geneva Convention in Afghanistan by having desecrated the bodies of enemy combatants. While mutilation of the enemy dead is traditionally considered a provocative act in military history, the issue is of particular sensitivity among Muslims because Islam, like Judaism, has specific and strict religious rules regarding the burial of the dead.

CENTCOM in Afghanistan and at HQ has taken a very hard line on this incident, pro-actively reaching out to the press to announce the criminal investigation and the serious nature of the charges:

“U.S. INVESTIGATES ALLEGATION OF LAW OF WAR VIOLATION, BAGRAM AIRFIELD,

Afghanistan – The Army Criminal Investigation Division has initiated an investigation into alleged misconduct by U.S. service members, including the burning of dead enemy combatant bodies under inappropriate circumstances.”This command takes all allegations of misconduct or inappropriate behavior seriously and has directed an investigation into circumstances surrounding this allegation,” said Maj. Gen. Jason Kamiya, Combined Joint Task Force-76 Commander. “If the allegation is substantiated, the appropriate course of action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and corrective action will be taken.” Service members are expected to abide by the highest standards of behavior and the law, he said. “This command does not condone the mistreatment of enemy combatants or the desecration of their religious and cultural beliefs,” Kamiya said. “This alleged action is repugnant to our common values, is contrary to our commands approved tactical operating procedures, and is not sanctioned by this command. Our efforts to thoroughly investigate this allegation are a reflection of our commitment to the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people.”

American intervention in Afghanistan has by and large been far more successful than in Iraq in part because, relatively speaking, the ” footprint” has always been light. Moreover, the light presence was combined with serious and ongoing attempts to win over Afghans of all ethnic, tribal and sectarian backgrounds including Pushtun Deobandis, most of whom ( though by no means all) were once the core supporters of the Taliban. Public desecration of dead Afghans or even foreign Muslims by U.S. troops is less than helpful in that regard and escalates the risk for all American personnel. The original jihad against the Communist government in Kabul that resulted in the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the ten year war was triggered by Parcham-Khalq Marxist secret police goons going into the villages and roughing up the local mullahs and generally stomping on the religious sensibilities of rural Afghans.

Quick action by American authorities, as commanders seem to be taking, is more likely to defuse the situation and avoid handing al Qaida and Taliban die-hards a propaganda coup.

CRASH!

Massive computer crash today. IT had to rebuild it, hence my inactivity. More later after I catch up on everything I could not do in the interim…..