Saturday, June 3rd, 2006
CURRENTLY WATCHING

CREATING A CULTURE OF “MEDICIEXITY”

Lorenzo “The Magnificent” de Medici
At The Enterprise Resilience Management Blog, EnterraSolutions founder Steve DeAngelis has an artful post, tied together a conceptual tapestry of cognitive tools. Before we get into the specifics of Steve’s post, some quick definitions of terms for newer readers (click links for extended discussions):
Vertical Thinking:
“Modern society is organized around Vertical thinking… [and is ] completely dependent upon highly specialized experts, spending their time working within relatively narrow domains…[ who] keep the system running and try to advance the knowledge base of their specialty.
“Lateral thinking enhances the effectiveness of vertical thinking by offering it more to select from” – Edward DeBono
“Horizontal thinking can get the expert out of that mental cul-de-sac by setting aside analysis in favor of synthesis, intuitive pattern recognition, suspension of judgment, reversing/challenging premises, counterfactual thought experiments and brainstorming alternatives.”
“Complex thinkers tend to be transdisciplinary – and may be so from the get-go (i.e. childhood). The reason for this may be that their thinking is more pattern-related and iterative rather than logically related in a casual chain…It’s these folks you turn to when big decisions need to be made under complex and uncertain conditions“.
” The Medici Effect: Breakthrough Insights at the Intersection of Ideas, Concepts, and Cultures, Frans Johansson talks about the value of creating a space in which people from diverse fields of expertise can get together to exchange ideas. “
Steve had a number of observations and comments in regard to these terms and points in my pervious post and those at the The Eide Neurolearning Blog that I would like to highlight:
“We normally think of creating a Medici Effect by bringing vertical thinkers together in a group to generate innovative solutions to a particular problem or to generate entirely new thinking. I would be willing to bet that individuals who successfully facilitate those gatherings are, more often than not, horizontal thinkers. Most successful analysts are pattern recognizers. They see similarities, use analogies, and draw from every corner of the human experience to make their points. As a result, they are interesting people to be around. People pay just to hear the connections they make — and they are worth every penny. Horizontal thinkers see and understand horizontal scenarios better than other people. What does this have to do with resiliency? A lot.
If you know the history of Enterra Solutions, you know that I started it in the wake of 9/11 when a friend of mine told me that the government needed a way to “connect the dots,” meaning a way to tie disparate information into an actionable picture. As I looked at the problem, I realized that that macro-need was mirrored on a micro-level within businesses. Most businesses have intentionally set up vertical organizations. By that I mean they have separate siloed departments that deal with specific, specialized functions. As I have argued repeatedly, however, today’s paradigm requires horizontal sharing of information across department boundaries. “
The social cognitive skill Steve DeAngelis is describing in promoting horizontal collaboration within an organization is generally referred to in educational literature as Facilitation – I first heard it used in that way many years ago by education reform guru Dr. John Samara as part of his Curry-Samara model of integrating curriculum design and teaching methodology. Facilitation is not simply running a meeting or moderating a panel, though those actions may very well take place, but by acting as an intellectual catalyst for a group without dominating it or controlling it in a hierarchical sense.
It’s a rare skill but one that people who are already horizontal thinkers are best suited to master and, as Steve suggested, a role they often get paid very big bucks to fill. Articulating a vision of possibilities, motivating interest, enabling creativity and maintaining collective focus all the while not getting in the way is what facilitation comprises. It represents the acme of teaching and organizational leadership.
Steve continues:
“By no means does that denigrate the importance vertical thinking (which furthers knowledge), vertical organizations or industries (which promote efficiency), or vertical action (which responds to vertical scenarios), but it does underscore the fact that within and between organizations more (not less) horizontal interaction needs to take place. Every organization needs a horizontal thinker who can make sense of these relationships and help establish a proper balance between them. Why?
…Tom Kelly in his best-seller The Art of Innovation calls these kind of people “crossdressers.” Don Cohen and Laurence Prusak (In Good Company) call them “boundary-spanners.” Malcolm Gladwell (The Tipping Point) calls them “connectors.” You get the idea. These people recognize patterns and then make connections that others don’t generally see. They give us “wow” moments…Much of what Enterra is pursuing involves this latter type of thinking — helping take complex problems, finding the patterns, understanding the rules, and then automating those rules in horizontal processes to make organizations more resilient. It is the marriage of pattern recognition and solution simplification.”
When an organization establishes an ongoing facilitation relationship between itself and a horizontal thinking ” catalyst” in an information-rich, dynamic, environment and that relationship is successful at generating insights and new applications, then the organization has entered a state that I term “ Mediciexity“. Mediciexity is the enjoyment of an institutional renaissance moment as a result of the positive, constructive, nonzero sum interactions of social complexity. In mediciexity there is a patron present (the organization or a
” Lorenzo” figure in it) sponsoring the process; an agent, ( or agents, several are better) to act as a catalyst and a complex system of people, information and technology with which to interact. Mediciexity could be viewed as the creative, adaptive, ” growth” element in organizational resilience.
Enterra by way of its focus on building resilience helps initiate mediciexity in its clients with the services of Dr. Barnett ( and of course, Steve himself, probably one of many hats he wears). Critt Jarvis is constructing a bold new entity through a mediciexity enabled by the recent advances in technology – the web, blogs, wikis, mashups. The Institute for Advanced Study was originally created decades ago with this purpose in mind, as were many other public and private think tanks that have emerged since then. It is a highly creative spirit environmentl that our schools and universities should foster but all too often do not.
Is mediciexity a permanent condition ? No. Like the historical Renaissance it is a moment in time that emerges, is enjoyed and then passes, hopefully leaving a legacy in its wake. However, an organization can build a resilient, institutional culture that nurtures and encourages moments of mediciexity and helps them to come to fruition repeatedly. How ? By embracing change; by honest and regular self-reflection; by a steady engagement of horizontal thinking; by welcoming a regular flow of ” new blood” or at least ideas; finally – and this is absolutely critical in my view – by investing in the time and space for ” unproductive” intellectual free play that is to human creativity what air is to the body.
Mediciexity is what we need to aspire for to thrive in the 21st century.
COMPLEXITY AND SIMPLIFICATION IN COGNITION
Inspired by two superb posts at The Eide Neurolearning Blog, and with a pointer or two from Critt, I have made my maiden post at Newsvine on “Complexity and Simplification in Cognition“.
A sample quote:
“Furthermore, complex thinkers are also well placed to propose solutions or plans of action in a chaotic environment as their “transdiciplinary” perspective is essentially a bias toward horizontal thinking, looking across multiple domains to see the interconnections, parallels, analogies and symmetries. Organizations that emphasize promoting individuals of this type will be likely to be more resilient and creative in adapting to change.
At the other end of the spectrum, thinkers who are adept at simplification will also prove highly useful. I queried the Eides for a neuroscientific follow-up along these lines and they obliged: “
Read the whole thing here.
On the subject of Newsvine:
It is not as user friendly a format as Blogger and writing that post was probably about 25 % more time consuming than it would be here. On the other hand, it exposes my writings to a different online audience and posseses some features that Blogger does not have ( most of which I have yet to explore). I’ve dipped my toe into Newsvine at Critt’s urging, and given his impressive track record, I thought that his recommendation might pique the interest of the more computer literate folks out there.
So if Sean, Younghusband or Dan would like to give me their informed opinion, fire away !
RECOMMENDED READING ON IRAN
Following up on the post by Dr. Barnett, a sampling of other recent views on dealing with Teheran:
praktike at American Footprints
Bruce Kesler ( Interesting Stuff # 62)
Dr. Judith Klinghoffer
Dr. William Polk
OPFOR
Sic Semper Tyrannis
That’s it !
IS AHMADINEJAD THE “NEW NIXON”?
Dr. Barnett posted one his more intriguing examples of strategic analysis with “Only Ahmadinejad can go to Washington“, where he gamed the complex and dangerous diplomatic minuet between Teheran and Washington. It’s a great post which should be read in full and Tom’s interpretation of events raised in my mind all kinds of questions and ideas. More on that in a bit.
The post also elicited some interesting comments from T.M. Lutas, Tangurena and Porphyrogenitus, the last of whom brought up the issue of Kremlinology, an example of a kind of scholarly discipline you must adopt if you choose to analyze secretive, hostile, dysfunctional, regimes that govern against their own society and are ridden by factions and conspiracies. Opacity makes analyzing these kinds of states more art than science. Iran as a whole is not as closed a society as the old U.S.S.R. but its upper reaches of government are probably far less well understood by American experts on Iran today than the politburo once was by CIA sovietologists.
I’m not certain if Dr. Barnett would consider himself an ex-kremlinologist or sovietologist, but as he was taught by some of the best who were, you can see Tom applying those skills here:
“Ahmadinejad is irrelevant on the nuclear issue. It began long before he took power and reflects a concerted ayatollah-led bid for both national prestige and protection from U.S. invasion. Ahmadinejad’s agenda overlaps on that issue only to the extent that he discovered, early in his administration, that it’s faltering stature could be instantly improved with a very impatient and demanding public, if he chose to align himself with that strategy. In this move, Ahmadinejad has proven himself to be a very clever politician and a superb propagandist who plays the Americans, and especially the American-Jewish community, like a banjo (he plucks, we sing).
Our myopic focus on that nuclear bid (still several years off, but no matter to the propagandists on their side or the Chicken-Littles on ours) has obscured what is truly powerful and useful about Ahmadinejad’s administration. As this article argues very well, the mullahs realize that having themselves represent the nation abroad isn’t working, thus the apparent compliance in letting Ahmadinejad move in the direction of creating a political party powerbase that is, despite his personal religion, basically secular and more traditional…
…Ahmadinejad is pursuing a revamp of both economics and politics in Iran that is of almost Gorbachevian-level ambitions. In effect, to save the theocratic regime, he believes a separate political party needs to be built outside of the mullahs for regime legitimacy: in effect, handing us, out of his sense of political desperation in the face of the “challenges buffeting Iran” (“economy is in shambles, unemployment is soaring, and the new president has so far failed to deliver on his promise of economic relief for the poor”; “Ethnic tensions are rising around the country, with protests and terrorist strikes in the north and the souhhd, and students have been staging protests at universities around the country”), that which we seek–the marginalization of the mullahs or de-theocratification of the regime.
In short, we’re so much closer, due to Iran’s internal problems, in achieving that which we need most to achieve with Iran, a development that would make the achievement of nuclear capacity irrelevant (Iran having nukes isn’t the problem–we can deter; Iran giving nukes to terrorists is).
Many of Ahmadinejad’s critics inside Iran believe he will fail. This article gives us real pause for hoping for that outcome. He may well end up being our “Nixon” who can, on the basis of his unassailable rhetoric and staunch, anti-Israel reputation, the exact tool we need for our strategic purposes.”
I found Tom’s choice of Nixon as an analogy for Ahmadinejad fascinating yet also inexact. The subtle diplomatic signalling is reminiscient of 1969 -1972, as is the potential for secret realpolitik between ideological adveraries.
Obviously, there is some analogical traction in the two situations. “It takes a Nixon to go to China” is now a cliche, but at one time, the idea of Richard Nixon shaking hands with Chairman Mao in ” Red China” would have provoked gales of laughter. Moreso, than the idea of Ahmadinejad shaking hands with Bush would today – the two leaders are, for example, respectfully juxtaposed on Ahmadinejad’s own website. It is hard to imagine hyperideological Chinese Red Guards entertaining something similar in the advent of Nixon’s trip to Beijing.
Like Ahmadinejad’s reputation for Islamist militancy today, Richard Nixon’s anticommuninst credentials were more than secure in 1969. Having ” made his bones” with the Alger Hiss case, his hardline foreign policy positions as Vice-President, his role as Eisenhower’s emissary to the right wing and a record of redbaiting of Democratic opponents, Nixon did not feel a need to even emphasize the issue when running against Hubert Humphrey. The only elections Nixon ever lost, in fact, were the time an opponent outflanked him to the right ( JFK, 1960 ) and in the 1962 gubernatorial race, where anticommunism had less salience as an issue.
Nixon’s political confidence was such that he was always far more concerned about keeping the
” liberal” State Department in the dark about his China policy than he was about the inevitable reaction of the GOP far right, whom he had effectively isolated. With my albeit very limited insight into Iranian political affairs, there does not appear to be anyone in Iran today to ” the political right” of Ahmadinejad; he has the support of the Pasdaran commanders and the most extreme senior Ayatollahs. Supreme Guide Khameini is actually marginally more moderate, as is the powerful former president Rafsanjani.
On the other hand, there some very substantive differences between the two situations as well, strategically as well as in terms of politics or biography. First the strategic differences:
First, the hard ” triangular” relationship of the United States, Soviet Union and China positioned in rivalry to one another is lacking today with Iran. Nixon’s ” China Card ” was a geopolitical Ace of Spades coming up with two aces showing; it caused an earthquake in international relations.
While there is an ” EU card”, an “IAEA card” a “Russia card” and various China, UNSC, India and Iraq ” cards” today in the face-off with Iran, these cards are all more like pairs of threes or twos as far as both players are concerned. None of them help all that much. Like it or not, this issue will be decided bilaterally and the only “ace in the hole” is if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb sooner rather than later.
And most importantly, globalization, with the subsequent diffusion of power and the erosion of old international relations rule sets, have given Iran and the United States more options, fewer restraints and less downstream control over events than statesmen faced in Nixon’s day. Nor is Iran a power on par with China in 1972 or as isolated a state as China was under Mao. These factors probably make miscalculation far more likely with Iran even if the stakes, thankfully, are far lower than during the Cold War.
Now for the politics, Iran’s and Ahmadinejad’s. Dr. Barnett writes:
“Now, the idealists will say, “This is horrible. We trade the mullahs for a real strong man.”
But first things first. We have to kill the revolution and that will a trusted agent (not by us, but by the mullahs). To survive this process, Ahmadinejad needs to deliver. And since we know what he needs to deliver, we finally have some real influence and power over the situation, when we have neither now. Knowing what he needs to survive and knowing it is within our power to grant that, we begin a dialogue that can serve our purposes in Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, Islamabad–all over the dial.
…And the fear-mongers on our side want to have you believe that Ahmadinejad is JUST a nutcase whose irrationality means we must pre-empt and pre-empt now.
We have consistently misread and underestimated the complexity of Iranian domestic politics.
In reality, we have Iran right where we want it and need it to be: needing help from us to survive. If we had any diplomats of Kissingerian brilliance, we’d seize this opportunity and dismantle the mullahs’ rule by 2010 (my prediction going back to PNM). Our biggest problem right now is the lack of strategic imagination and skill among the senior ranks of this administration.”
This is where Iranian ” kremlinology” gets exceedingly tricky.
Dr. Barnett has the call right that Iran’s leadership, for the first time since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, is speaking with one voice and is asking for negotiatons with the United States. Unfortunately, their mouthpiece also gives regular and frequent examples of disturbing nuttiness, including veiled threats of nuclear genocide and ethnic cleansing. Something that Israel at least finds difficult to disregard. Nukes are not Saddam’s Scuds.
So the question here is this Iranian rhetoric simply high octane ideological vapors like Mao’s regime was churning out in public even as Zhou Enlai hosted Henry Kissinger in private ? Or is Ahmadinejad sincere in his wackier beliefs but is bending to the will of the unified clerical establishment until he can make himself their master ? Both ? Neither ?
I can’t answer those questions but I think we have nothing to fear from negotiations so long as we keep our powder dry. One useful aspect about Iraq is that the world pretty much believes now that uncontrollable consequences won’t stop the Bush administration from making a major military move on Iran. The Iranian leadership seems to believe that.
And they should.