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Oliver Stone is to History what Roman Polanski is to Children.

My amigo Adam Elkus has an excellently constructed and well researched article up at OpenSecurity where he advances a Boydian critique for what ails us:

Science, defence and strategy

…Contemporary American strategic problems flow from the fact that we cannot adjust the ossified thinking of Washington D.C. to the constantly shifting observed reality of the outside world. A failure to match concepts to observed reality has amplified the already formidable entropy of the American political system. The corresponding failure to make strategy results in a search further inward towards the “science” of war.  Better strategy will come about only when the process by which strategy is made becomes supple, flexible, and less dominated by sacred cows and special interests.

Critics of American foreign policy often undermine their own case with conspiracy theorizing about the “military-industrial complex.” The real problem, however, is not James Bond villain-style secret plans and hidden agendas but basic human frailty. A largely homogenous group of people is not going to have all the answers to questions of war and peace because they are necessarily limited by their experience, specialization, and biases.

Nice work by Adam, read the whole thing here.

We face a number of problems when it comes to formulating strategy and grand strategy. Not least is that, whatever the shortcomings on that score within America’s officer corps, there is a yawning gap of comprehension between the senior brass and most of the civilian “influencer” elite in and out of government. Most of the latter tend to think in terms of a few simple paradigms into which they force-fit each new foreign policy problem – generally, everything is conceived either as appeasement at Munich or the quagmire of Vietnam. This tiresome dichotomy is the strategizing of simpletons.

The arch-Clausewitzians in the national security community fall down here. It is not enough to think of strategy in purely military terms. America is not Sparta or even the Roman Republic where politicians vied for a chance field command. The civilians here are masters of policy and the military are its servants – and are but one kind of servant among many in the DIME spectrum. Statesmen and general officers need to be speaking with a common vocabulary and have a shared understanding of what strategy is if we are to formulate effective ones.

There is a deficit of knowledge among the class of officials and staff members with the authority to make or not make the most critical decisions in matters of peace and war. It cannot be remediated by an uncertain and unhealthy dependency on the Pentagon’s advice and a frustrating dialogue where civilian and soldier talk past one another.

ADDENDUM:

Adam gets a nod from our friends on the Left at Newshoggers.com

A great guest post at War Historian.org.

Why Military History Matters: Another Perspective

….Those unsympathetic to military history sometimes grumble that military historians simply posit the importance of military history as its own sub-discipline, with its own internal standards of scholarly value, depending in part on a mastery of distinct forms of military knowledge – defined around “operational” issues (i.e. historical topics that focus either directly on the fighting and violence that occurs in war, or issues closely related to that violence, as opposed to other topics such as the social composition of armies, gender views among combatants, etc.).  First off, military historians have in the past made attempts to argue for the importance of events such as battles – for example, James McPherson’s argument for important turning points during the American Civil War, which argue that certain battles could have turned out differently, leading to significantly different historical outcomes.  This is a classic counterfactual argument, and one also used by allied (and increasingly scarce) practitioners of political and diplomatic history.

While sympathetic to this argument, I would like to add another one to the mix.  Military history must by necessity remain a distinct sub-field, with its own distinctive body of knowledge and methods to master, because war itself represents a peculiar and distinctive form of human activity, focused above all else on a socially abnormal use of violence that larger societies both glorify and condemn

Top Billing! Matt Armstrong – Hybrid Threats Require a Hybrid Government

….The focus on improving the operational elements of national power, while necessary, ignores a critical national security actor that has received little to no attention or pressure to adapt to the new and emerging requirements: Congress. Blended threats require blended authorities and budgets to support the necessary hybridization of executive agencies. Congressional committees must have a common understanding of current capabilities, problems, and requirements. They should communicate among themselves, just as they are increasingly demanding of the executive branch, but the reality is something else.Congress must adapt otherwise many of the reforms suggested, required, and even implemented may face unnecessary delays and suffer from uninformed oversight. The Congressional committee system is a valuable scheme providing checks and balances and intentionally dilutes power. In practice, the lack of communication and coordination can create confusion and limit support, oversight, and understanding the requirements of various programs.

Steven Pressfield – COIN in a Tribal Society: an interview with William S. “Mac” McCallister and Shame and Honor, not Hearts and Minds: an interview with William S. “MAC” McCallister, #2

William McCallister is a former military officer, defense consultant, deep thinker and a provocative voice at SWJ and the Warlord Loop. Well worth your time.

Schmedlap – The Graduate Level of Warfare

….Ironically, the reason that some assert COIN to be some higher level of warfare is because those people misunderstand the root of our difficulty with it. They see inadequate training and conclude that our skills have been focused on a specific level of (less) complexity, rather than recognizing that our skills have been focused on one specific set of missions. If two grapplers prepare for a bout, but one bows out before the fight and a stand-up fighter replaces him, we do not say that the remaining grappler failed to prepare for the “higher level” of fighting. He simply prepared for the wrong type of fight. Likewise, our training thus far has been in preparation for the wrong type of operation.

I started reading Schmedlap after seeing his pragmatic and informed comments at SWJ Blog and recommend that you do as well.

WIRED – Top Scientific Breakthroughs of 2009 

Thomas P.M. Barnett – The New Rules: The Naughties Were Plenty Nice

Tom would have made a good “Open Door” diplo historian as befits an alum of Wisconsin ( home of William Appleman Williams) 

Pundita –Whaddya mean there was no smoking gun, Mr Brennan? More nonsense from Abdulmutallab terror case

…..ABC ferreted out the truth behind news reports that Umar Abdulmutallab’s father alerted the U.S. Embassy about his concern that his son had gotten involved with radicals. The way such reports were worded conveyed the idea that the CIA didn’t have a smoking gun to work with. Actually, the CIA had a smoking cannon handed to them.ABC learned that what really happened is that Umar phoned his father to say he was calling for the last time because the people he was with in Yemen were going to destroy his SIM card. That would make his phone unusable. And that was as much telling his father he was entering the final phase of training for a terrorist suicide mission.His father immediately alerted Nigerian intelligence officials that he was afraid his son was preparing for a terrorist mission in Yemen. The officials then brought him directly into the presence of the CIA station chief in Abuja on November 19.So it’s not as if some worried father wandered in off the street to unburden himself to a clerk at a U.S. embassy. And note that the Nigerian intelligence officials didn’t run the risk of getting trapped in voice mail hell or hearing, ‘I’m sorry your email got lost in the shuffle.’ They made Double Dutch sure the station chief heard the father’s statement and understood its import and urgency.

That’s it!

There have been some thoughtful posts on visual thinking lately which (according to Wikipedia) is the dominant form of thought for 60-70% of the population. I am somewhat skeptical of that unsupported figure because many people report thinking in a combination of words, images and other nonverbal prompts but I can accept that the percentage, whatever it may be precisely, is significant. Here are the posts:

Drs. Eide – Writing for Visual Thinkers , Mind Over Matter: Imagery at Work and in the Classroom

Dr. Von – Importance of Imagery for Memory & Learning

Austin Kleon – VISUAL THINKING FOR WRITERS: NOTES AND SLIDES 

Gerald Grow – The writing problems of visual thinkers

On a related note, a while back, Dave Schuler and I, along with Dave Davison, had some exchanges on “visualcy” that are also worth consideration:

Dave Schuler – “I Can Read a Passage in a Book 20 Times and It Doesn’t Click”, More On Visualcy, The Visual Imagery Society, cognitive reliance on visual media:

ZP – On the Virtues and Vices of “Visualcy”, Visualcy and the Human Terrain

Dave Davison – MuralCasting – Improving ROA (Return on attention) -corrected 2.8.08 , Logic + Emotion: Developing an Experience Strategy in 4 Parts, Too many ripples in the pond?

Visual imagery is exceedingly powerful on a neurocognitive level, even with populations that are highly educated and predisposed to think in words and therefore, lends itself well to disinformation, propaganda, IO, advertising and mundane distraction and wastage of time. “Surfing the web” is a visual activity, albeit one that can involve a good deal of reading but ultimately sites like youtube have a definite advantage in attracting and holding attention. Usually to no productive purpose.

On the other hand, I would like to suggest that visual imagery or thinking in pictures is a critical component of insight. We like to use the term “visionary” to describe a trailblazing genius in some field and it is an apt description. Many an empire or artistic acheivement or intellectual discovery was crystalized as a hazy image that served as a template within which many future problems, known and unknown, could be addressed successfully. Or be refined and extrapolated in a tinkering, tweaking manner by trial and error by individuals or groups over time. Imagery can also be a useful starting point for strategic thinking in the form of brainstorming conceptual outcomes.

Furthermore imagery can be used as a “bridge” to improve the comprehension of difficult concepts and make learning more efficient. Dr. Von explains:

….For readers, 60% of 5th graders report naturally using some imagery during ‘think aloud’ breaks in reading stories. It appears to be a natural reaction, even for children, to try and ‘see’ the scenes that words are trying to convey in order to develop memories of a story that we, ourselves, are not part of in reality. Humans are more visual creatures, as I like to tell my own students, and it is important to remind and also teach students how to visualize physical events and experiences. In fact, in problem solving in physics, I try and teach as an essential part of every single problem to draw a picture and mentally ‘see’ what is happening in the problem. We use a technique that requires making pictures and labeling all forces on the picture, and then use the picture to actually set up the math (for F = ma problems). So science and imagery are naturally connected, just as reading, writing and imagery are connected. Memory improves when visualization and imagery are used for stories or for how physical events play out in reality. The experimental finding that a good majority of the brain used for the physical activity is used in imagery, too, begins to explain why this process works.

This is a great example of using imagery as a tool toward a calculated end rather than having imagery overrule or hijack the rational faculties ( which may be the majority of the time when imagery is involved). We should respect the power of visual imagery in cognition when considering the impact on our own thinking but we should not fail to exploit the opportunities the use of imagery can provide.