Adam Elkus alerted me to an insightful op-ed by Dr. Antulio Echevarria of SSI:
Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really A Lost Art?
…. Instead, we need to rediscover the value of strategizing relative to the outcome, the product, an individual strategy. The hard truth is that policy does not always need strategy to get what it wants. We have used military force plenty of times in our history without the guiding logic of strategy, and—though critics do not like to admit it—we have made it work often enough for it to be taken seriously. Sometimes what policy wants most is not to be tied to something inflexible, particularly something as inflexible as our strategic process. It is the proverbial machine that goes of itself, and it takes, or almost does, the preparation for and direction of war out of policy’s hands. The question modern-day Clausewitzians really have to answer is whether war has its own logic after all, a logic provided by the dictates, the processes, and the dynamics of making strategy.
In all the online debates and blog sites concerning strategy, one theme is constant: we call strategy an art, but approach it as a science. We praise creative thinking, but assess our strategies with formulae: strategy = ends + ways + means (the ends we want to achieve + the ways or concepts + the availablemeans). This formula is as recognizable to modern strategists as Einstein’s equation E=mc2 is to physicists. Each defines its respective field. Like all good math, good strategies consist of balanced equations. As our variables change, we merely rebalance our strategy: scale down the ends, increase the means, or introduce new ways. Like any good equation, our strategy remains valid so long as we keep one half equal to the other. This is a far cry from when military strategy meant the “art of the general” and, by extension, grand strategy meant the “art of the head of state.”
. If the art of strategy is truly lost, perhaps it is because—despite our rhetoric to the contrary—we really wanted it to be a science all along.
Several comments….
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First, Echevarria is correct that it is certainly possible to win ugly, win lucky, win through the other side imploding for internal reasons that have nothing to do with us or to win by unimaginatively, but steadily bludgeoning a much weaker opponent to death while employing a bad strategy or no strategy at all. Finland’s
Marshal Mannerheim, for example, repeatedly humiliated
Stalin’s immensely larger but poorly led
Red Army in the
Winter War but the end was never in doubt if Stalin chose to press the issue. An effective strategy and a Red Army officer corps that were more than lackeys and thoroughly
terrorized purge survivors would have markedly improved the USSR’s abysmal military performance, but it would not have changed the longitudinal equation that Stalin had thousands of tanks and planes and potentially millions of soldiers and the Finns did not. The asymmetry between the Soviet Union and Finland was too great; Mannerheim played a weak hand with great skill against an enemy leader whose basic foreign policy outlook was opportunistic yet risk averse ( as Stalin understood the situation at least. He was also a great miscalculator).
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When however that Echevarria writes “Sometimes what policy wants most is not to be tied to something inflexible” he is certainly correct, but the real crux is that it is politicians who want and policy that bends to their desires. Flexibility can be a virtue when a situation is new, has not yet risen to open hostilities or a hedge is required against many dangers. Raised to systemic practice, “flexibility” -meaning a conscious avoidance of the “strategic process – really means that we have embraced an astrategic culture and accepted not just greater political behavior, but elevated the minutia of domestic politics and cynical careerism to displace strategy as the primary calculus for making decisions of war with
unsurprisingly poor results.
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Lastly, I see merit in Echevarria’s criticism of the tendency to view strategy in algebraic or scientific terms. He’s right that this is an arid reification of strategy from which all chance, passion, genius, stratagems, deception, novelty and
coup d’oeil have evaporated. Sometimes, the Czarina dies, the unsinkable ship sinks, the “rules” get broken and certain victory turns into utter defeat because leaders, with the intuitive mind that Einstein called ” a sacred gift”, seize the moment and do what should have been by rational calculation, impossible. We fail to look for such qualities in ourselves or allow room for their expression and worse, fail to discern them in the enemy.
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Strategy is rational, but people doing strategy and the circumstances in which strategy is done often are not.
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September 17th, 2013 at 2:06 pm
So, strategy isn’t a lost art except that it is?
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Because that is the way that piece reads unless I am confusing things.
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And a lot of the “blog” critiques of strategy are the same critique he makes so I don’t understand how to tie the beginning to the end of the piece. Using specific examples of specific conflicts helps, as you have done in your post.
September 17th, 2013 at 2:09 pm
Iraq and Afghanistan and the weird mismash of colonial era counterinsurgency methods and post WWII modernization theories to reorder foreign societies probably accounts for the critics of American policy, strategy, strategic thought, and contextual or strategic understanding of late.
September 17th, 2013 at 2:12 pm
This:
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Have we really lost the art of strategy? One has to wonder. Critics have told us the American way of war is “astrategic.” Or that the “bridge” that links military actions to policy aims is failing. We have also heard that strategy has been consumed by operational art. Apparently, a black hole now exists where American strategy should be.
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Does not match this:
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In all the online debates and blog sites concerning strategy, one theme is constant: we call strategy an art, but approach it as a science. We praise creative thinking, but assess our strategies with formulae: strategy = ends + ways + means (the ends we want to achieve + the ways or concepts + the available means). This formula is as recognizable to modern strategists as Einstein’s equation E=mc2 is to physicists. Each defines its respective field. Like all good math, good strategies consist of balanced equations. As our variables change, we merely rebalance our strategy: scale down the ends, increase the means, or introduce new ways.
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So, we haven’t lost the art except that we don’t approach it as an art, but as engineering.
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I always enjoy Echevarria but I am confused?
September 17th, 2013 at 2:14 pm
This is nasty on my part, but I think I am beginning to understand how our tactically and technically magnificent military loses its way as it all goes to the top, how the system creates thinkers that are hugely ignorant of the world and how to extract some meaningful result from our actions.
September 17th, 2013 at 9:40 pm
“For better or worse, the war plan—not strategy—did the real bridging between policy aims and the use of force to achieve those aims. The war plan identified the “devil in the details”—it analyzed the situation and established specific military objectives, as well as tasks and sub-tasks pursuant to accomplishing the lofty aims of policy. In a word, the war plan became the practical face of strategy.”
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I think this is worse than confusing.
This is a defense of the ‘No-Strategy’ Strategy.
Because we can never be fully certain of a complex reality in an ever changing universe,
tactics and operations, because they exist on the small controllable scale (controllable to personal intuition and initiative),
are the only things we can really depend on. The best we can hope to do at the strategic level is react to the consequences of our actions in the field.
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If we’re only talking about an environment where strategy is reduced to formulas and operations are flexible and organic, then he has a point.
The problem is we’ve seen the opposite from our operations. The whole Pop-COIN approach is tactics institutionalized and bureaucratized. A what-the-hell-just-let-things-play-out mentality didn’t serve us well and hasn’t for the past decade.
Amateurs may be now debating strategy and theory, but only because the pros have given up on it.
And that’s because they sucked at it. Didn’t you cover this already?
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What’s good for the gander is also good for the goose. How about flexibility in grand stratgy? How about applying the dialectic engine on the macro scale? It’s sure working for our adversaries.
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One size fits all Containment during the Cold War was indeed hit and miss. It worked in W Europe, but not in SE Asia. It worked in Latin America with disastrous human rights consequences, but not so much in the Middle East when we tried appeasement more often than not.
In fact, things were always confused in the ME and answers were never easy to come by. We didn’t just throw up our hands and start shadow boxing. Much of what we tried was wrong and didn’t make sense, but we never abdicated. We created enough time and space to adapt.
Miles Copeland, the OSS/CIA agent/Businessman/Father of the drummer for The Police
was dealing with Egypt during the Suez Crisis.
Supposedly Nasser told him later,
“The genius of you Americans is that you never made clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them we were missing.”
September 17th, 2013 at 9:55 pm
“So, we haven’t lost the art except that we don’t approach it as an art, but as engineering.”
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I think your confusion is in the outcome of operations. We reward engineering, but worship art.
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But then again I am always wrong, but never completely wrong 🙂
September 19th, 2013 at 2:34 am
Hi Mark.
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I think that Echevarria is dead wrong here, basically on two counts.
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First, I think that there is a thread of truth when he says that we approach strategy like a science, he overplays his hand. In truth, strategy is neither art nor science. Yet it is both. It must cope with aspects of the irrational and unknowable (art), and there is undoubtedly a creative aspect to strategy (art). But there is also a process to it (science, perhaps?), and there is undoubtedly technique involved (likely a science). To use an analogy, most art has a technique that’s required to execute it properly, or to use as a point of deviation against. Potters do things in specific orders to produce specific effects. Yet nobody would deny the artistry involved in pottery. Likewise with photography, painting, culinary arts, even pure mathematics (Fermat’s Theorem, and the proof of the Fermat’s Theorem cannot be described in any terms other than an artistic endeavor!) Just because we ascribe a method (whether it’s a good or a poor method is a different discussion) doesn’t mean there’s not artistry involved.
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My second critique is that he’s attempting to make a virtue of the utter lack of strategy that we’re using. Tom Ricks has done the same thing. Rick’s argument is that the military has essentially re-tooled itself to cope with uncertainty, bad policy, etc., and therefore, doing poorly-thought missions shouldn’t be an issue. I fervently disagree. Just because we have a military that’s capable of handling tactical uncertainty and is able to muddle through horrible policy doesn’t mean that we should seek out such situations, or that bad/no policy/strategy is an acceptable position to take at the outset, or during fighting. Likewise, I think Echevarria here is trying to make virtue of the fact that there is no real policy, and no evidence of an actual strategic calculation. Admitting that there is no such calculation does not make virtue of the fact that strategy is an art–it just means there is no strategic calculation, and hence no strategic art nor science.
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When will we be honest with ourselves about the state of our leaders? Furthermore, we don’t need to rationalize strategic stupidity–our leaders do that anyways. No need to do that for them.
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Nate
September 19th, 2013 at 4:05 pm
@larrydunbar – that makes sense. I really am confused, btw, I’m not doing my usual jerky “I am intellectually better than you” schtick.
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@Nate: that an interesting point about technique and art. They go hand in hand. Your points made me think of Matisse cutouts. The story is that he began doing the cutouts after he became ill, he couldn’t paint anymore so he made a different artistic choice based on what he was able to do. It freed him, he said, and was his “true” artistic self. His cutouts are among my favorites and I’m not the only one to judge by their popularity, obviously.
September 19th, 2013 at 4:37 pm
@ grurray: “For better or worse, the war plan—not strategy—did the real bridging between policy aims and the use of force to achieve those aims. The war plan identified the “devil in the details”—it analyzed the situation and established specific military objectives, as well as tasks and sub-tasks pursuant to accomplishing the lofty aims of policy. In a word, the war plan became the practical face of strategy.”
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But what’s the difference between using the word war plan, operations, or campaign strategy? Everyone is complaining about the same thing but thinking that they aren’t because of this constant focus on terminology. I personally find it irritating but then I am by nature irritable.
September 19th, 2013 at 4:39 pm
In a word, the war plan became the practical face of strategy.”
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But isn’t the critique of strategy that the practical face of strategy is wanting which is a problem with strategy because how can you help but have a practical face of strategy on the ground? The world is not all words typed on paper. Seriously, this sort of round-and-round seems arguing for agument’s sake.
September 19th, 2013 at 4:42 pm
And, I promise I’ll let it go for the time being, how does this focus on terminology (now I am not talking about Echevarria but my own hobby horse) affect the education of military thinkers, leaders and planners? There are only so many hours in the day and really digging into the reasons for a particular conflict is a never ending and complicated business, intellectually, emotionally and practically fraught.
September 19th, 2013 at 7:25 pm
Tactics is eating a man’s heart, strategy puts where you eat the heart, politics lets you eat the heart, and culture is whether it’s more polite to eat the heart on video or off. Everything else is window dressing.
September 20th, 2013 at 1:45 am
One note about technique to remember; more often than not, technique is tacit. The tacit is not easily taught, as it requires more time (modern day: bandwidth) than most policy makers and policy makers-in-making have/will spend. In keeping with NTL’s comment, too many of our “strategist” have chosen the short attention span method—AE seems to be giving them cover. As I often hear, “who has the time?” Apparently no one. Find a reflecting mind in or out of Washington—go ahead, give it try. Everyone reacts these days, rarely considering first order effects, much less second/third.
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Lynn’s definition is a good working start for the simplicity and directness. We live in an age that places style over substance—Lynn’s window dressing….
September 20th, 2013 at 11:28 am
I think Echevarria is using what used to be known in the USSR as “aesopian language”. For instance, “the question modern-day Clausewitzians really have to answer is whether war has its own logic after all, a logic provided by the dictates, the processes, and the dynamics of making strategy.”
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For war to have its own logic would mean that subordination to politics/policy has ceased and that the political community in question “sees” war as its normal relation with other political communities which is unsustainable over the long term. I would classify this as a collapse of strategic thought within the community in question and the result of dysfunctional political relations present in a dissolving political community, but that’s me . . .
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I’ve written elsewhere that Echevarria is perhaps the best Clausewitzian methodologist writing today, his “Clausewitz and Contemporary War” attests to that. But what exactly is he saying here in this article? I agree with his points in general, but he leaves much unsaid, thus the “aesopian” label. I would also consider the political context that calls for an aesopian approach.
September 20th, 2013 at 12:47 pm
I would classify this as a collapse of strategic thought within the community in question and the result of dysfunctional political relations present in a dissolving political community, but that’s me . . .
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Good comment, seydlitz89. That is helpful.
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My disagreement with the piece (and confusion) is on two basic points:
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First, as others have stated, I think there is evidence of the collapse of strategic thought. Second, the piece as I read it is logically inconsistent based on its own premises, if there is no problem with strategy than whether it is approached as art versus engineering shouldn’t really be a problem.
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And now look at all the time we have spent dissecting the piece instead of discussing other things that might be important. I can’t help but imagine this scene plays itself out in parts of the military establishment meant to create great thinkers. Pat Lang has this funny bit on his site:
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About five years ago I ran a conference on tribalism as a factor in warfare in the modern age. Among the guests was a young army brigadier general who had a staff job in which he was responsible for thinking great thoughts about the future. He was rebuked by several attendees for the slowness of army adaptation to counter-guerrilla operations in Iraq. He replied that “they” had been working on this problem from a doctrinal point of view for six years and that they could not be expected to proceed more rapidly than that. Most successful army officers are by nature not good at the “vision thing.” They are intelligent but not able by temperament to deal with futures that they have not seen. – Pat Lang
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Is that why so many articles I read seem to be guys or gals trying out the “vision thing” or coming up with some grand all encompassing vision of war? While their foreign military buddies they met in some war college conference run circles around us?
September 20th, 2013 at 12:50 pm
Oh, I’m not being fair. It’s not all terrible. I am trying to work on the skepticism bit, I am now almost too skeptical. (Is that even possible?)
September 20th, 2013 at 1:03 pm
Aesopian Language is communications that convey an innocent meaning to outsiders but hold a concealed meaning to informed members of a conspiracy or underground movement. For instance, Person X is known for exposing secrets in an organization, so the organization leaders announce, “any members who have dirty talking habits will be dealt with”, warning Person X. It is based in reference to Aesop. It is referred to by Herbert Marcuse in his book One-Dimensional Man where it is used somewhat interchangeably with Orwellian language. – wiki
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And this is exactly my critique about some of the writing on strategy. What’ is the point of writing like this given the topic?
September 20th, 2013 at 1:13 pm
@ Seydlitz – I had to look up aesopian. That made me even more uncomfortable with the discussion and the paper.
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For instance, “the question modern-day Clausewitzians really have to answer is whether war has its own logic after all, a logic provided by the dictates, the processes, and the dynamics of making strategy.”
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Look, it’s all circular and unhelpful either way you look at it.
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The critics of strategy are saying that the processes and the dynamics of making strategy are messed up. And to use logic in such a way when we are talking about, well, humaness, is obtuse. It’s even aesopian.
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Oh, I give up.
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I once encounted this old schizophrenic patient in medical school, schizophrenia can kind of “burn” itself out sometimes. He had cognitive impairments because of it but I thought if I spoke to him and brought him back to concrete there might be some use to it.
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Our conversations always went like this:
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What are you thinking today?
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Oh, I’m thinking about that day.
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What day?
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The day that I am thinking about.
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Okay, not exactly like that but it went round and round in circles, it existed for itself, it went in one door and out the other, there was no “there, there” except in the abstract but it was his own abstract mind and not the concrete abstractness of the philosophical treatise. It was just all locked up in a cognition, battered and turned in on itself.
September 20th, 2013 at 1:22 pm
And, I rest my case. I check in at War on the Rocks and find this posted by Ryan Evans (great site, btw).
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In 25 words or less, give your thumbnail version of the “American Way of War.”
That is the challenge that of the Command and General Staff College gives his students and that is the challenge I present to you, dear WOTR readers.
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LOL, I think I am beginning to understand. How much of this goes on versus really understanding a strategic context? And for that you all have professors or think tankers that don’t always break the mold on status quo thought?
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I took out the name from the excerpt because this isnt’ personal, I’m just observing the system as an outsider. Like a jerk too, I know.
September 21st, 2013 at 5:55 pm
“But what’s the difference between using the word war plan, operations, or campaign strategy?” Madhu.
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The difference is in the details.
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There is winning and losing strategy, but what they have in common is that both are flawed. When we look into the details of strategy, both winning and losing strategy is flawed, because both deal with a reality that is not completely transparent. Transparency is lacking, because the strategist works between two ends. One end is in the past and the other is a moment in the future. The flaw is in the observance of both ends. The past and future is observed through the lens of the winner, so you might say that, in a winning strategy, when looking through the lens of the artist, the artist is worshiped for the flaws (winning when something is flawed takes a certain amount of artistry). The scientist on the other hand is rewarded for what is not flawed. It is hard to worship these scientists, but it is not hard giving them their just rewards.
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A plan is a line drawn between two “ends”. The length of the line is determined by time, which, through good planning, it is fairly easy to determine its length, especially if you are a scientist. On the other hand that line is just as easily drawn by an artist as a scientist, which if the artist gets the details of the line more correct than the scientist, it can still be a very good plan. Neither is worshiped for a bad plan, but both are usually rewarded for even a bad plan.
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Operations are the “way” the “means” of war is displaced between both “ends”. It basically follows the “line”, but there are two components that are perpendicular to each other, as well as two networks in the displacement. In all operations there is a component of command and a component of control. The networks are either decentralized or distributed. I have heard of a third type that combines the edges and nodes of both networks, but I am not so sure how that all works. Again, when an artist is in charge of command and control, I believe there is some worshiping going on, but then both the artist and scientist are usually heavily rewarded. It is the command and control components that give operations its structure.
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I am sure this will help immensely 🙂
September 21st, 2013 at 7:42 pm
“I believe there is some worshiping going on, but then both the artist and scientist are usually heavily rewarded. It is the command and control components that give operations its structure.”
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I should have added that both the artist and scientist are usually heavily rewarded for “good” structure.