Reader Response – On Leadership
From time to time, an email or comment by a reader is so good it deserves a post of it’s own. The following is by Seerov, a regular commenter, who was responding to the new JFCOM insights doc post. He hits all the right notes, in my view:
Some of you have brought up the very important point of what happens when the networks go down or the censers stop working. This is correct to point out, and military personal will still need to train on “the basics” in case this happens.
But networks or not, the most important aspect of any kind of military organization is leadership. We need leaders who can make decisions and accomplish the mission no matter what situation they face. Instead of a network-centric military, we need a leader-centric military.
During OIF I we had terrible intelligence and really had no idea of the real enemy situation during most of the war. During the train up in Kuwait, we were preparing to fight a mechanized force with tanks and APCs. While some units did face this kind of force, most engagements were against small teams of infantry and militias.
I thought this lack of information was just how it was at the small unit level. But after reading the book “Take-down: The 3rd Infantry Division Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad” I realized that no-one really knew what waited for them the next town over. In Al Samawah, there was literally a parade planned for the unit moving there (This information came from a CIA officer that was in country weeks before the war). When the unit got there, it found itself in one of the fiercest battles of the war.
And this is how it was during the whole run to Baghdad. We would receive a FRAGO on the next objective and no-one had any idea what kind of enemy we would face. There were some units in 3rd ID that were literally minutes away from being over-run. The Iraqis were more than willing to die and had no problem throwing waves of men and trucks at 3rd ID. Despite what some might think, air support isn’t always available.
While we did have the technological edge, what stuck out in the book was the decision making and leadership of the officers and NCO’s. This was especially true of the Company Commanders, Battalion Commanders, and Senior NCOs. Because I seen the war at such a micro-level, this book literally opened my eyes at how important leadership was for our success. Many people have said our success was due to technology. But these same people forget that US forces were literally out numbered at least 5 to 1 on the ground and even more important, we were fighting on the Iraqis “home turf.” Its also important to remember that we held the technological edge in Vietnam and it didn’t really matter.
While it may sound cliche, I just can’t emphasize enough how important it is for our military to have well trained leaders. And this is especially true since small unit leaders will be expected to do more and more. Today, a squad is counted on to do what a platoon did in Vietnam and what a company did in WWII. Because of this, we need squad leaders who are as competent as company commanders were 70 years ago.
Major Vandergriff has probably done the most to address the quality of leadership in the Army in the last 10 years. Most of his ideas are geared towards officers so we also need to think about NCO’s and solders. The military needs to attract the best talent this country has, and this isn’t going to be done by paying privates $900.00 a month. Attracting the best talent, and then giving them the best training possible is much more important than any weapon system we have. There’s no reason why an E6 squad leader in the Army shouldn’t be making $60.000-$70,000 a year? Right now, the military has dropped its standards and my connections on Sand Hill (Infantry Basic Training) are telling me that it shows.
I could go on but I think you get my point. I’m not saying we shouldn’t go net-centric but we need a leadership-centric force first. Remember what John Boyd said:
“Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their brains to do it.”
September 5th, 2008 at 6:39 am
Zen, thank you for your kind words. I did make several spelling and grammatical mistakes. Had I known you were going to post this, I would have edited it more carefully. Thanks again…..
September 5th, 2008 at 11:44 am
The military isn’t going to attract the best talent in the country because it has become a self-selecting organization.
I’ve heard numerous GO’s state that 70% of the American youth are unfit for military service because of health, fitness, physical, mental, emotional, educational and moral shortcomings. The remaining 30% are being wooed by colleges. The vast majority are going to college.
The Army is dropping requirements because the personnel system equates faces with spaces, and the spaces need to be filled. The Army is short 4,000 Majors. Think about it.
Training suffers because the Army is one a 1:1 deployment cycle, and when soldiers get home, they have to go to NCOES and OES, they PCS, they ETS, they get promoted and have to learn new skills and jobs, and most importantly, they want to spend time with the family.
The war is driving all of this within the Army. While your goals are admirable and desirable, they are also out of reach at the moment. Perhaps in a few years when the war settles down (which I doubt), but the short term promises more flux within the system, not less.
I am all for leadership driven organizations, with training as the base, and the very best being recruited and more importantly retained. I’ve known Don Vandergriff for a decade and have provided input to a few of his books. Don will be the first to tell you that without a new personnel system in place that eliminates the current Industrial Age system, all of this is for naught.
September 5th, 2008 at 12:46 pm
Ski-
You think that the remaining 30% are being woo’d by colleges. I disagree. Most college students, IMHO, are unfit for service too.
September 5th, 2008 at 6:44 pm
Ski, you bring up a very important point regarding the personnel system. I have argued in the past for a British-like Regimental (or UOA for the US) that keep soldiers at the same units for most of the careers. This would make things easier on the family, but most important, would allow soldiers to work with the same people for long periods of time.
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As for the 30% "wooed by colleges," these are the people the military should be trying to "woo" as well. At one time, police forces didn’t require a college degree. Today, most major police forces require at least an AS or AA, and in the case of cities like Chicago, they require a BA. The military could offer to pay off ALL students loans, as well as paying a good wage (How about $35-40 for a incoming private?). Its also important to point out that universities are sometime hostile to the military. In this case, if universities want to be anti-military, then they will also find themselves to be "anti-federal funding."
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But regardless of the personnel system or the current crop of recruits, there must be things that the military can do NOW to create a leadership-centric military? On example which I’d like to see is just something as simple as encouraging small unit leaders and their subordinates to read military history (especially small unit history). Team leaders and squad leaders should read examples of small unit leaders making decisions in combat. They could read one situation where a small unit leader is faced with a tough decision. They would be encouraged to think about how they would handle the situation (But wouldn’t know how the leader in the story handled it). During the discussion, they would talk about how they’d each handle the situation. After doing this, the leader leading the discussion would then explain how the leader in the story handled the situation and compare what they thought of with what happened in the story. This would get small unit leaders to think about ways to overcome combat problems by using history as a guide. The Army should pay some historians to create a workbook intended for these study sessions. Maybe its a stupid idea but I’ve been thinking about this for awhile?
September 5th, 2008 at 8:30 pm
"On example which I’d like to see is just something as simple as encouraging small unit leaders and their subordinates to read military history (especially small unit history). "
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This sounds like an excellent idea, far indeed from a stupid one.
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This sounds like the "staff ride" but at the smallest unit level. It also sounds like "case method" used in business schools.
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There are many, many unit histories and memoirs which could be used. It would take some effort and resources to turn them into study sessions like you describe into a workbook. But there is limitless material to draw from.
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Taking it a step further, the cases could also be "played out" in the field or on "sets" which replicate the original setting, e.g. a mountain setting to play out Rommel’s attack during the battle of Caporetto, or an urban setting for a scenario from the capture of Hue or Manila or Berlin. Units could take turns being Red and Blue.
September 6th, 2008 at 1:05 am
"This sounds like an excellent idea, far indeed from a stupid one."(LG)
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Thank you for your kind words, and also for your ideas. Another thing to think about is video games. All of us who were born in the late 70’s and on, grew up with exposure to video games. These games would be of the strategy variety (as apposed to games that require hand-eye coordination), and soldiers would be faced with decisions. The game would focus on giving scenarios, and soldiers would be given different options to choose from. When faced with these options, the soldiers would have limited time to make a decision. If they wait too long, they would fail the mission (i.e. their unit would be overran in the game). This time limit would create a sense of urgency, to make the game more life-like.
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"There are many, many unit histories and memoirs which could be used. It would take some effort and resources to turn them into study sessions like you describe into a workbook. But there is limitless material to draw from."
(LG)
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Right! Think about how many officers in the Army/Marines have studied military history in college and still do so? All this would require is forming a team of officers, SNCO’s, and maybe some historians, and they could easily complete this project. It really wouldn’t be all that expensive to do either.
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Everyone whose served in the military probably remembers the down-time in the barracks? Instead of being on their necks, soldiers could do this kind of training. Many times we played video games anyway, might as well get some benefit from it.
September 6th, 2008 at 6:31 am
I do not play any video games, so I am not qualified to say what might be done with them. That is probably a good approach to take, assuming they could be rigorous. I do think reading, thinking and discussing have a value all their own. But I am old-fashioned.
This project should get funded and put into place immediately.
It is one of things that makes you wonder, why hasn’t this been done all along?
September 6th, 2008 at 7:19 am
"It is one of things that makes you wonder, why hasn’t this been done all along?" (LG)
Like I said here: https://zenpundit.com/?p=2848#comment-8757
Building a leadership-centric military cannot be done in every Congressional district in America. So becuase of this, there isn’t much interest in pushing these kinds of projects. You would think that war might be something that wouldn’t be politicized? Unfortunately its big bucks, and political leaders are not the only ones to blame. There are flag level officers who dream of post military careers of lobbying and consulting. If they help push this or that weapon system while they’re in the military, someone "pays them back" later with a "good" job. These people should be referred to as: SWINE.
But who knows, this blog is somewhat popular among military personnel and foreign policy makers, so maybe someone will read this and pass the idea on?
If you people are out-there, feel free to use this idea. You can even say that you made it up yourself.
September 7th, 2008 at 12:42 am
The average cost for an American soldier, on an annual basis, is $120,000. This is averaged across all ranks, and includes, housing, pay and allowance, retirement and medical benefits.
So while a PV2 with a year of service only makes about $18,000 a year in Base Pay, he also has free housing, free food (for the most part), full medical and dental (this is becoming more expensive by the day), and a portion of his potential retirement is paid as well (he never sees it, but it’s budgeted for). If the soldier is deployed, he also gets tax free money, so that’s another 25-30% into his pockets. He’ll also get $150 a month in hostile duty pay, potentially up to $200 in hardship pay, and if he has dependents, he gets another $8.33 day in family seperation pay. All of that is tax free as well.
So he’s probably getting close to $50K a year if everything is added up and accounted for, and that’s not even including the massive recruiting bonuses (up to 40K for the initial enlistment alone).
Now where else in the American economy can a single man or woman at the ripe age of 18, with no experience at all, get these kinds of pay, allowances and benefits? I submit there is no place, and newly enlisted soldiers are getting paid better than any enlisted soldier in the history of warfare.