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More Afghanistan 2050 Roundtable Posts

Colonel Gian P. Gentile –  2050: Newly Published History of the American Army’s Disaster in 2016

….Then in early 2016 the war started between the United States and Turkey and Iran over the fate of Kurdistan. Both Turkey and Iran had become fed up with the constant attacks and concomitant separatist movements of their Kurdish populations and decided to ally together and act once and for all to crush Kurdish desires for independence. The Iraqi government requested American assistance and only a short while after pulling its remaining brigades out of Iraq sent in Brigades from the 101st and 82nd Airborne, 1st Cavalry and 4th Infantry Divisions; many of these Brigades had just returned from deployments to either Iraq or Afghanistan. The outcome was not pretty. American commanders, so long accustomed to training and operational deployments that involved stability and counterinsurgency operations were unable to perform the most basic tasks of combined arms synchronization. The Army’s soldiers too lacked essential individual skills of fire and movement; artillery battalions were unable to mass fires, and even though the Navy and Air Force had substantial amounts of airpower in the region the Army on the ground was unable to coordinate it against an enemy who stood and fought. Operational level logistics quickly collapsed due to the fact that a majority of it had been conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan by contractors, and those contractors refused to deploy again to Iraq to fight the Turks and Iranians. The Army under the zeitgeist of counterinsurgency had bought into Lawrence’s quip and had come to place priority for its senior commanders to be able to build trusting relationships with local populations instead of how to conduct combined arms maneuver….

Historyguy99 – Afghanistan:2050

….An Afghanistan confederation sponsored by the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the United States, survives today, in the old territory of the Northern Alliance and in the enclaves of Tajik, Baluchi, and Hazara. This area encompassed most of the oil and gas reserves and where many discoveries of lithium deposits were found. The foundation for this confederation came from the efforts of the United States to provide what some had dubbed, “Diplomacy by cruise missile.” This strategy is the threat of conventionally assured destruction via missiles and bombs if the Pashtun government violates the rules of the armistice, by undermining or attacking the non-Pashtun areas or sponsoring any kind of global terrorist camps.

The only caveat to this arraignment was that it gave an enormous boost to those elements who believed that they had defeated the infidels. Within two years of the brokered armistice other pan-Islamic fundamentalist groups taking heart in the perceived defeat of modernity, began to strike at the more moderate Gulf States and across Africa. The United States had entered into a period of isolationism brought on by extended long term unemployment and falling revenues that caused a drastic cutback in military spending after the collapse of the dollar as the foreign reserve currency.

4 Responses to “More Afghanistan 2050 Roundtable Posts”

  1. Russ Greene Says:

    In my opinion, the main limitation for the U.S. with a war over Kurdistan would not be the US Army’s ground capabilities, but the relatively weak strategic significance of Kurdistan to the U.S.  How much of a sacrifice would the US be willing to make for Kurdistan?

    Also, Gentile presumes that Turkey and Iran would choose conventional warfare to confront the US.  Iran has plentiful unconventional options, to choose from as well, with Hezbollah deployed all over the world, and its small boats in the Gulf.

  2. zen Says:

    hi Russ,
    .
    I think there are two levels in Gian’s essay, political-diplomatic and military.
    .
    I agree that Kurdistan, oil or no, does not have much intrinsic vale to the US. The interest we have there is purely political, our "credibility", to use a Vietnam/Nixon era term. We screwed over Barzani, Sr. ( father of the current Kurdish leader) with the Shah in the 70’s,  stayed silent when Saddam did a democide with gas in the 80’s, then dropped the ball in the mid-90’s when the Peshmerga came down from the hills and tried to slug it out with the Republican Guard at the CIA’s instigation. Having midwifed a de facto autonomous Kurdistan after 2003, Gian’s scenario of the US coming to the aid of the Kurds is plausible to me.
    .
    Militarily, Gian is using his 2050 essay for hammering at his theme that an excessive emphasis on COIN is eroding traditional military skills. Yes, he’s stretching the capabilities of the Turks and Iranians as a literary device to do so. That said, there’s a lot of folks in the DoD who agree with him, note the big push to get the USMC to return to their amphibious skill-set, the focus of the Navy and USAF on China. I’m not sure how he views the famous Millenium Challenge wargame or 4GW or hybrid war as I’ve never discuussed it with him  directly but I think Gian’s primary strategic focus is major conventional warfare.

  3. Larry Dunbar Says:

    "I agree that Kurdistan, oil or no, does not have much intrinsic vale to the US."

    *
    WTF? No intrinsic value? You got to be kidding me. Your trip to Israel must have plugged your brain for a second.

    *
    Let me guess, what is between Turkey and Iran?

  4. Larry Dunbar Says:

    There is a front all across Iraq, but the intrinsic value is that kurdistan is a center of gravity.


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