Breaking the Legions
Fabius Maximus makes waves with a powerful and controversial post:
The Army and Marines are breaking, but we don’t care
Summary: The US Army and Marines are breaking. It’s a slow inexorable process resulting from fighting 4GWs around the world too long with too few men. Neocon war-mongers, national leaders, and the general public remain blind to the evidence, so they can express surprise when the results eventually become too severe to ignore. It took a decade to repair the damage after Vietnam, under more favorable social and economic circumstance than likely in early 21st century America. Here we see another warning from a senior officer, and revisit data from the lastest Army report about this slow-growth crisis, another in a string of similar reports. See the links at the end to other articles on this topic.
Update: The “we” in the title refers (as always on this website) to the American people. As the shown in previous posts and the report described here, the military quickly recognized these problems and strongly responded with measures to mitigate the damage. Unfortunately, solutions lie beyond the state of the medical and social sciences. Perhaps these ills result inexorably result from war.
Before the data, here’s a brief on the situation, from “Dark Hour“, Katherine McIntire Peters, Government Executive, 1 October 2010 (red emphasis added):
“This report literally whistles past the graveyard,” says retired Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, who served as commandant of the Army War College in 2000 and authored a number of books on military strategy and leadership. Suggesting that officers and NCOs or garrison staffs are responsible for a rising suicide rate because of lax leadership, as Scales reads the Army’s report, is “irresponsible,” he says. “This report basically allows people off the hook for the inability to resource these two wars with the people necessary to do it. It’s got nothing to do with politics. It’s got to do with the lack of perception of what land warfare does to a ground force,” he says. “Rarely have I ever read anything that so badly misses the mark. It’s trying to find little nooks and crannies in the Army’s management of these two wars and it absolutely misses the point of what’s been going on.”
Scales says too few troops have been carrying too heavy a burden for too long. “I don’t care if you’ve got an army of Robert E. Lees, the anecdotal evidence clearly shows the ground forces are going through an unprecedented realm of emotional stress,” he says.
Read the rest here.
ADDENDUM:
More at Wings Over Iraq:
Enough complaining, what do we actually do about suicides?
2.) Reduce the Separation Authority. I think it’s time to admit that we face a mounting discipline problem which will require years to fix. The instances of misdemeanor activity among soldiers has nearly doubled over the past five years. In almost a third of those cases, no disciplinary action was taken whatsoever.
Certainly, company commanders need to take action to either rehabilitate or get rid of problem troops. But this is easier said than done. For example, the Army has seen a precipitous decline in the number of soldiers chaptered out for obesity in recent years.
Don’t think for a moment it’s because we have fewer obese soldiers, either.?
Part of the problem, in my humble opinion, lies with the fact that separation authority has been taken from battalion commanders and raised to the “special court-martial convening authority” (in many cases, a two-star general)–a full two levels of command. Why? Because commanders were doing exactly what they should have been doing–kicking sub-par first-term soldiers out of the Army….
October 12th, 2010 at 3:05 am
Why is this controversial?
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We can only hope that some way can be found to mitigate these ills (more successful than the measures tried so far), or that these trends stabilize — or even reverse. Fortunately the military’s leadership has reacted quickly, doing pretty much what can be done.
October 12th, 2010 at 4:00 am
Hi FM,
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I agree with you, it is not controversial to me but some of the rhetoric may have been misinterpreted. Will add your update.
October 12th, 2010 at 4:03 am
Done!
October 12th, 2010 at 4:46 am
I’ve been hitting upon the topic with my last two posts.The Army’s senior leadership is well aware of the trends, but they’re not publicly admitting to some of the more disturbing aspects of it. Namely, in an effort to increase retention, the Army took away the power of commanders to kick out sub-par first-term soldiers, including those caught for drug or alcohol abuse.
October 12th, 2010 at 5:50 am
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Well that’s the crux of it, isn’t it? I’m not for disassembling our armed forces — 3GW & even 2GW may well be necessary endeavors in the future — but otoh, how best to respond to the 4GW, particularly if its incidence grows? Add in some GG in new locations, and it becomes even worse.
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I mean, this goes even beyond the question of "Which xGW to use?" and into the questions of 1) "Who will do it?" and 2) "How many will we need to do it?"
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I have 3 potential solutions, or at least 3 tenuous hypotheses good for further brainstorming, but I’m not going to write them right now, hah.
October 12th, 2010 at 7:40 pm
" 1) "Who will do it?" and 2) "How many will we need to do it?"" We only need 1 generation to stand-up for what it believes in, but then again, I guess that is ‘who’ also.
October 12th, 2010 at 9:14 pm
"I’m not going to write them right now, hah."
Curtis gets the gold star for NOT squandering his best ideas in a blog comment, even on so esteemed a site as Zenpundit.
October 12th, 2010 at 9:16 pm
"Curtis gets the gold star for NOT squandering his best ideas in a blog comment, even on so esteemed a site as Zenpundit." Isn’t it better to give than receive?
October 13th, 2010 at 12:34 am
The addendum is telling and dangerous. Line commanders know best who is an is not suitable. Whoever made the decision to remove the authority up the chain of command should be fired for cause. CGW, I’ve a couple of ideas, too—but good luck selling to the American public, and more importantly, American politicians of both stripes.
October 13th, 2010 at 12:56 am
Figure 6 that Fabius Maximus includes in the linked post is interesting. Around 2007, there was a sharp upturn above the civilian baseline for the Army and Marines. Take out the civilian baseline, and it is 2004 and 2006 where the upturns take place.
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Because I am so very ignorant on the subject – do those dates have any kind of significance in terms of changes in admission criteria, etc? As FM states, this is a topic that requires humility. These are complicated phenomena.
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– Madhu
October 13th, 2010 at 1:00 am
From FM’s post:
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Of the 120 active duty suicides thru 30 June 2010, 59% (71) involved Soldiers within their first five years of service. Of these 71, 96% (68) involved Soldiers who never deployed or deployed just once.
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Does this relate to Starbuck’s point? Did they not deploy because they were seen as having problems or because their were troublesome behaviors noted? Continuity of care, so to speak, seems to be an issue from what Starbuck is saying?
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– Madhu
October 13th, 2010 at 7:04 pm
I occasionally do contract work with a small start-up that is working on a solution to effectively identify suicide prone military personnel. The technology is effective and definitely should be pursued in order to prevent these events (i.e. suicides) from occurring, however this is curing the symptom and not the cause. As has been stated already, the problem seems to be (I say seems because I am a military outsider) that the military is spread too thin. If that is the case the solution seems to be rather clear, bring the boys home. If I am wrong, why I am wrong?
Regards,
TDL
October 14th, 2010 at 12:57 am
"If I am wrong, why I am wrong?" You are not wrong. Those in command are.
October 14th, 2010 at 10:39 am
I’ve seen much focus on the way the US Army is faring with the 9+ years of warfare it’s been conducting. Certainly our Marine Corps has been under stress, and some of that stress is showing. But there are many legitimate aspects of the current state of the Corps that I can personally attest to that run counter to the thesis that the American ground forces are cracking.
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1) Enlistment quotas are being met, generally.
2) Re-enlistment rates remain high, and are generally highest among front-line combat units.
3) Bonuses, which are frequently used to entice people to join, or to re-enlist, are generally decreasing from their peak years ago.
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These things are true in the Marines. I cannot speak for the Army.
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Furthermore, there are significant differences in how the Marines and how the Army deploy their troops. Army units generally deploy for a year, or longer. Marine units generally deploy for shorter periods of 6-7 months. This probably pays dividends in a reduced psychological burden on troops. Others (Bing West especially) have noted that the shorter, yet more frequent deployments often result in deployed units that are more vigorous (which translates into more patrolling, more vigorous attempts at pursuing the enemy, etc). I understand that this may ruffle some Army feathers, yet I think my statements are justified.
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There are other solutions to the problem posed by psychological stresses of deployment than "not deploying" or "not fighting." I think shorter, more frequent deployments for my Army brothers and sisters might be a good answer. There are other approaches as well:
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1) Take a more progressive look at the Active/Reserve split. It should be easier for a soldier to rotate between Active/Reserve units. Perhaps "Active" units could be rotated into "Reserve" status as part of the deployment cycle.
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2) Trim the fat. There are many soldiers and Marines who never deploy because their MOS or their billet is not required. Furthermore, there are many who do deploy, but provide none-to-negative combat power because they are also unneeded. These people also increase the strain on those carrying the fighting load.
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There are other proposals out there. Any of these could be implemented to reduce combat stress–if only our bureaucracy that administers the Army and Marines is agile enough. Ironically, I think organizational and doctrinal agility are something that our military has excelled at in recent years–especially given the stresses it’s been under, as well as it’s immense size. Yet more can be expected.
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Semper Fidelis,
Nathaniel T. Lauterbach
October 15th, 2010 at 1:05 am
Enlistment and re-enlistment rates might depend more on the state of the economy than the condition of the armed forces.
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The DoD report discusses this. Esp note figure 7 on page 17, unemployment rates for vets vs. non-veterans: 22% vs. 16% in the key 18-24 age group. Those unemployment rates make re-enlistment look attractive to many people.
October 15th, 2010 at 4:33 am
Nate wrote:
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"There are other solutions to the problem posed by psychological stresses of deployment than "not deploying" or "not fighting." I think shorter, more frequent deployments for my Army brothers and sisters might be a good answer. There are other approaches as well:
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1) Take a more progressive look at the Active/Reserve split. It should be easier for a soldier to rotate between Active/Reserve units. Perhaps "Active" units could be rotated into "Reserve" status as part of the deployment cycle.
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2) Trim the fat. There are many soldiers and Marines who never deploy because their MOS or their billet is not required. Furthermore, there are many who do deploy, but provide none-to-negative combat power because they are also unneeded. These people also increase the strain on those carrying the fighting load.
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Sounds very reasonable. Question: in WWII they reclassified ppl when a crisis arose and changed draft rules on an emergency basis to scrape up manpower – ex. the Battle of the Bulge . Is there a UCMJ/statutory legal bar to doing that now?
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FM – what are minority reenlistment rates? Same or higher?
October 15th, 2010 at 3:10 pm
Zen — Good question, to which I’ve not found a clear answer.
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For a good discussion of the issue see this article at the Marine Corps Gazette: "The Marine Corps is losing its diversity" by Capt Tito M. Jones.
URL:
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/are-black-officers-becoming-extinct-today%E2%80%99s-corps
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Esp note the confusing numbers cited in the MCRC response (at the bottom of the screen). AfroAmericans, minorities. Aare they consistently defined over time? Is it useful to speak of minorities, assuming the problems of various ethnic and racial groups are similar.
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It’s complex, and I wonder if MCRC wants to make the situation clear.
October 16th, 2010 at 7:14 pm
In reality, no one in the US military has any faith in the top civilian leadership of the US — for good reason. Unless the civilian leadership changes, morale will continue to decline. This is far more important than the reasons stated above.
October 16th, 2010 at 10:51 pm
Re: civilian leadership, reality and mythology
Is our civilian leadership better than in the past? Such as that in the period between Lincoln and Teddy R? Presidents and Congress openly owned by special interests. Used to break strikes and crush upstart local interests (unlike in the movie Chisim, in the Lincoln Country War the Cavalry crushed the good guys).
Or, for example, during Camelot? Real history, such as Seymour Hersh’s The Dark Side of Camelot (perhaps his best documented work), paint a depressing picture of that period. As does The Pentagon Papers of the Kennedy-Johnson era.
Whatever one thinks of the Bush/Obama period (with its remarkable continuity despite change of party control), it compares well with the average of American history. Which is quite low, but was good enough (which is all that mattered, in the end). Only time can tell if "average" is good enough for our needs today.
October 16th, 2010 at 11:28 pm
I am still waiting to see if this will be a consistent feature for the foreseeable future. Y’know, as if outside circumstances — the world at large — have a greater influence on events than the centralized planning committee. 😉
October 17th, 2010 at 12:25 am
"I am still waiting to see if this will be a consistent feature for the foreseeable future"
It depends on your frame of reference. The remarkable continuity of the Bush-Obama period has extended from broad policy objectives to specific measures to implement them. The former might continue for generations, as it did during the Cold War. The latter might continue for years, but probably not a decade — as both people and conditions change.