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Barnett at Battleland: “Right out of John Boyd’s strategy…”

Dr. Barnett is now a blogger for TIME Magazine’s Battleland

Right out of John Boyd’s strategy: disconnect, isolate & disempower your enemy

But Osama, looking far older than his 54 years, had none of that.  He was down to just a sad little entourage, and his comms were reduced to thumb drives smuggled in now and then. He is isolated, almost imprisoned, and he looks like a man sapped of all vitality.

…This is right out of American strategist John Boyd’s playbook:  you beat your enemy by isolating him, denying him allies, keeping him in the dark and – bit by bit – wearing down his energy: “Interaction permits vitality and growth, while isolation leads to decay and disintegration.” 

Read the rest here.

7 Responses to “Barnett at Battleland: “Right out of John Boyd’s strategy…””

  1. YNSN Says:

    I was speaking with someone about this and the point was made to me that it wasn’t exactly American strategy that isolated OBL.  That it was his strategy that morally isolated him. 

    Is it right to say that it was our strategy that out did his?  Is it even right to compare a National strategy to an individual’s strategy?  Wasn’t it our tactics that isolated him and our strategy that focused on emerging threats and evolving strategies elsewhere?

  2. zen Says:

    hi YNSN,

    .
    I don’t think that is wrong; strategy is always iterative ("the enemy gets a vote" ) and OBL’s tactical efforts to conceal himself for survival reasons suited us by creating lags in his decision time and greater "fog and friction". The Soviets isolated their system for their own strategic reasons but their doing so reinforced the effects of our Containment policy. We would have been very hard pressed to meet an attempt to engage them everywhere ( which is why Khrushchev’s support for "wars of national liberation" strained US foreign policy more than Stalin’s stark "iron curtain")
    .
    " Is it even right to compare a National strategy to an individual’s strategy?  "
    .
    Good theoretical question. Here’s my preliminary thoughts:
    .
    1. It depends if you consider OBL an individual or a leader of a network/commander, though in reality, I think we have to say "both".
    .
    2. Strategists will be divided on individual vs. nation-state. The other day, learned Clausewitzian, Seydlitz89 was in the comments section saying "No!" but I have heard other admirers of CvC note exceptions while generally saying "No!". My answer as an admier of Boyd and Sun tzu and an empiricist is a qualified "Yes!". Few individuals are ever going to have such a wherewithal, so it is definitely not an axiomatic assumption, but fundamentally the problem is not conceiving of a strategy, which is typically the task of a leader or a small in-group of the ruling class of a nation-state, but of having the means and ways as an individual to execute a strategy against a nation-state. If they can find leverage points to effectively act or mobilize others to do so on their behalf, then they are "doing strategy", even if the odds mitigate against their ultimate success
  3. Nathaniel T. Lauterbach Says:

    …except that we didn’t exactly deprive OBL of allies.  As I recall, one of our supposed "allies" was hiding him within their borders.  This is to say nothing of the links between Pakistan and the Taliban.
    .
    Furthermore, there’s quite a lot of anger inside Pakistan for having taken this action.  This tells me that given the two extremes, the people of Pakistan are more likely to sympathize with OBL than the US.  It seems that OBL had quite a number of allies on the streets of Pakistan.
    .
    It would seem that we didn’t really deprive him allies.  Rather, the raid to kill OBL speaks more to the occasional value of stetson-hat unilateralism to keep certain countries of the world honest and let them know that we’re not being played successfully.
    .
    As for the use of the quote, Barnett is just getting a bit euphoric, and in doing so, decided to credit POTUS with a Boydian grand-strategic genius.  It wasn’t that.  Rather, the raid was at best a tactical-operational gambit at best.
    .
    NTL

  4. seydlitz89 Says:

    Zen-

    That’s not really what I was arguing.  Rather my point was the inherent confusion of using the term "strategy" and applying the same approach to both individuals and communities (not limited to "nation states", or "states" for that matter).  If we are dealing with communities – as strategic theory does – then a whole different level of complexity is present, which is absent when dealing with individuals.  Concepts such as "attack" and "defense", "victory" and "defeat", "ends" and "means" all apply to collectives, in terms of strategic theory, not to individuals.  This is not to say that they cannot, but then we are’t talking strategic theory from a Clausewitzian perspective, which for me is the only strategic theory perspective . . .

    Connecting the individual to strategic effect is difficult, althougth there are instances from history as I mentioned before, these requiring "legitimacy" (Weber’s useful concept).  How successful was OBL in this regard?  Not very imo, rather what seems to have provided him with whatever limited legitimacy he enjoyed was due more to our responses than to his actions . . . 

  5. zen Says:

    Hi Nate,
    .
    I’m not sure Tom was trying to give Obama personally that kind of credit, per se as  US pressure on AQ goes back to the early Bush II. administration. Pakistan is, in my view, basically an enemy state ruled by a corrupt elite that prefers to take bribes and hates us but needs us in their mad rivalry with India.
    .
    I agree with you that the operational was mostly operational tactical except to the hard-core jihadi set who are deflated that the US took out OBL, it’s a defeat for them, morally and literally. Must Muslims though, do not care about OBL and never admired him.
    .
    Hi Seydlitz,
    .
    Thank you for clarifying – helpful!
    .
    "This is not to say that they cannot, but then we are’t talking strategic theory from a Clausewitzian perspective, which for me is the only strategic theory perspective . . "
    .
    Theories are cognitive tools. I like a full tool kit. 🙂

  6. seydlitz89 Says:

    Zen-

    The question imo is whether the "tools" are compatible, one doesn’t use a screwdriver to hammer a nail . . .

  7. zen Says:

    Seydlitz,
    .
    Very much in agreement. Wisdom is knowing which tool is best in what circumstance.


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