The ROE to Nowhere
[by Mark Safranski, a.k.a. “zen“]
Many of you have seen the controversial NRO essay by David French on absurdly restrictive rules of engagement that enlisted men and their NCO’s and junior officers have been forced to wrestle with in Iraq, Afghanistan and miscellaneous conflict zones. This is a problem that began under the Bush II administration as the Army and Marine Corps wrestled with pop-centric COIN theory, but ROE became increasingly self-defeating under the Obama administration’s philosophy of micromanaging the world from the White House staff conference room. If you have not read the article yet, here it is with a blurb:
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….This evening, however, our troopers believed that the car ahead wasn’t full of civilians. The driver was too skilled, his tactics too knowing for a carload of shepherds. As the car disappeared into the night, the senior officer on the scene radioed for permission to fire. His request went to the TOC, the tactical operations center, which is the beating heart of command and control in the battlefield environment. There the “battle captain,” or the senior officer in the chain of command, would decide — shoot or don’t shoot.
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But first there was a call for the battle captain to make, all the way to brigade headquarters, where a JAG officer — an Army lawyer — was on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. His job was to analyze the request, apply the governing rules of engagement, and make a recommendation to the chain of command. While the commander made the ultimate decision, he rarely contradicted JAG recommendations. After all, if soldiers opened fire after a lawyer had deemed the attack outside the rules, they would risk discipline — even prosecution — if the engagement went awry.
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Acting on the best available information — including a description of the suspect vehicle, a description of its tactics, analysis of relevant intelligence, and any available video feeds — the JAG officer had to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of “hostile intent” to authorize the use of deadly force. He had to make a life-or-death decision in mere minutes. In this case, the lawyer said no — insufficient evidence. No deadly force. Move to detain rather than shoot to kill. The commander deferred. No shot. Move to detain..So the chase continued, across roads and open desert. The suspect vehicle did its best to shake free, but at last it was cornered by converging American forces. There was no escape. Four men emerged from the car. American soldiers dismounted from their MRAPs, and with one man in the lead, weapons raised, they ordered the Iraqis to surrender. Those who were in the TOC that night initially thought someone had stepped on a land mine. Watching on video feed, they saw the screen go white, then black. For several agonizing minutes, no one knew what had happened. Then the call came. Suicide bomber. One of the suspects had self-detonated, and Americans were hurt. One badly — very badly. Despite desperate efforts to save his life, he died just before he arrived at a functioning aid station. Another casualty of the rules of engagement.
If we are to take the premises of the domestic-politics driven ROE imposed on front-line troops by the Obama administration and a pliant senior leadership because they believe that our soldiers and Marines cannot be trusted with even the smallest decisions, the solution is obvious: we could field platoons composed entirely of lawyers. At least until robot soldiery becomes fully autonomous.
December 23rd, 2015 at 11:40 pm
“Winning” in Iraq and Afghanistan means installing a stable pro-American, and more or less pro-Israel lackey, one which can survive after US evacuation. You’d probably need a draft for that one, and the American masses wouldn’t like the “rules of engagement” emanating from the Elite in that regard.
Then rules of engagement with the citizenry might take a Vietnam era turn real quick.
December 24th, 2015 at 5:01 am
Afghanistan should have been handled as a punitive expedition with an “accidental” lurch into FATA and the ruins should have been turned over to the ex-Communist, Uzbek warlord Abdul “Heavy D” Dostum, who had every personal incentive to kill off the remainder of al Qaida and the Taliban. We’d be no worse off than we are now, neither would the Afghans and it would have been far cheaper. Instead we installed the mentally unstable Hamid Karzai because, well, Bush administration and capitol hill staffers liked the food in his family’s restaurant.
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Our elite sees the whole world through the politics of their insular Beltway and the courtier-media echo chamber, which is a piss-poor basis for making policy decisions on war or peace or strategy.
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No, the American people would not sit still for this ROE in a draftee Army. As it is, the administration seeks to keep it on the down low with a professional army.
December 24th, 2015 at 2:39 pm
I seem to remember Thomas PM Barnett advocating for crime-scene investigations after military engagements, whereby every shell casing would be tracked down to help build a picture of what happened. He said this would be required by so-called System Admin forces (Army and Marine Corps, writ large). This was described in “Blueprint for Action,” his 2nd book which was popular for a time in military circles.
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While a dumb idea, this appears to be the general azimuth we’re marching toward.
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But no matter. These things tend to work themselves out, by getting defeated in battle. While the nomenklatura move on to better things, and a few NCOs have died, somebody will figure out that all of this police work has no place on the battlefield.
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The other scary thing about this is that it makes GOFOs value their JAGs more than they should–not because they help the GOFOs win battles, but rather because it keeps them out of jail. Thus this can have the effect of dividing the higher headquarters from the NCOs and junior officers they are to provide direction to.
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This stuff also cuts in the other direction, too…with the militarization of police forces. This is also a horrible development.
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NTL
December 25th, 2015 at 1:29 am
“No, the American people would not sit still for this ROE in a draftee Army. As it is, the administration seeks to keep it on the down low with a professional army.”
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I am not sure the American people even know that we are still fighting in Afghanistan. I think you are thinking of a Vietnam type engagement, and that wouldn’t be happening, even with a draftee Army.
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75% of those draftees you are talking about in 1967, would be eliminated from the draft today simply because they are too sick and unhealthy. As such, I believe, as we are using mainly immigrants, our military would look pretty much the same now, as if it was the draftee military of the 60’s.
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Realistically speaking, those deployed in Afghanistan need to understand that war is carried out with the military we have, and not with the one we need.
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The one we have is, as Zen points out, political centric, and don’t believe the environment will change anytime soon. Because of resource constraints, neither a Democrat nor Republican is going to be your friend, in the position of leadership, in this hour of your need.
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If those deployed need to destroy something, such as a vehicle born improvised explosive device, and they are not structure to carry this out, then they need to re-structure. Realistically speaking, there is not much hope, no matter if a Republican or a Democrat takes over the White House, that things are going to change.
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There is a revolution taking place in the US and the insurgency, in place within the leadership of our country, is very close aligned to the insurgency.
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The insurgency wants to defund much of the institutions that our country is built on, so the war we are fighting in Afghanistan is going to be hard pressed to maintain the funds that it has, much less to increase those funds. And basically, working outside the ROE means the ecalation of operations. The ROE is a negotiation, and a negotiation can’t be changed without costs.
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I don’t see the Republican held congress as in a position to increase revenue to enact the changes those fighting in Afghanistan need, and I don’t see the culture existing inside the US today, as being in a position to change the orientation of congress.
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I mean, even those who profess that they support those fighting would not support a tax increase to those who can still afford it. At least in a way that would significantly increase the funding going towards the war in Afghanistan.
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Without that increase in funding to pay for the changes in negotiations, those fighting in Afghanistan are going to remain where they are.
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They are in a war the US hardly even sees.
December 25th, 2015 at 1:56 am
“I seem to remember Thomas PM Barnett advocating for crime-scene investigations after military engagements, whereby every shell casing would be tracked down to help build a picture of what happened. He said this would be required by so-called System Admin forces (Army and Marine Corps, writ large). This was described in “Blueprint for Action,” his 2nd book which was popular for a time in military circles.
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While a dumb idea, this appears to be the general azimuth we’re marching toward.”
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Not really. A System Admin Force takes funding to exist, and there are no funds to support such a force. What happened was that a civil war broke out, and a system admin force such as the one TPMB strategize, doesn’t work under those conditions.
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So now we have what we have.
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And what we have looks more like WWIII than anything else, and strategist thought WWIII would be fought with nuclear weapons.
December 27th, 2015 at 4:36 am
Hi Nate
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I don’t recall Tom arguing for that in BFA, though I think there was something like it on his blog related to CT/constabulary/MOOTW. If I didn’t catch that at the time and say something about it, I really should have.
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” But no matter. These things tend to work themselves out, by getting defeated in battle. While the nomenklatura move on to better things, and a few NCOs have died, somebody will figure out that all of this police work has no place on the battlefield.”
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It doesn’t but our nomenklatura are solidly anti-reality when reality means changing their ideological beliefs about, say, women functioning equally well as men in combat infantry, the virtues of standardized testing in education, the implications of genetics on human behavior or capacities, the efficacy of punishments and rewards or any number of similar topics that undergird their worldview. These ppl have lost two wars and almost destroyed the global economy in 15 years and they can’t figure out why much of the electorate loathes them. They don’t care if our military personnel die due to stupid ROE; its not their kids or relatives who labor under these undue burdens.
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The creeping lawyerization of the military , like other areas of life is a real problem but it is being driven less by JAGs than by lawyer-appointees and lawyer-legislators going to what the know best and can manipulate effectively. Its is their go-to frame of reference for problem solving. The GO are reacting in CYA fashion with careerist priorities to what comes down from DoD and Capitol Hill
December 27th, 2015 at 3:33 pm
The anecdote that forms the basis of the NRO piece must be several years old and it likely comes from a time when US forces were either assisting the host government or acting as the occupation force. This ROE did not exist during the major combat operations of OIF.
Even so, the larger point of the piece is mistaken – the path to strategic success is not achieved through less restrictive ROE. This notion that the difference between victory and defeat is letting our troops “off the leash” is one that should be continually challenged. Of all the problems with the ways and means that America fights wars, overly-restrictive ROE is not a top concern
December 28th, 2015 at 12:02 am
Amen, Andy.
December 28th, 2015 at 4:29 pm
Recently wrote this as an editorial:
Why the United States cannot put Boots on the Ground to Fight ISIS
The expression “boots on the ground” basically means we need to send in ground troops, grunts, warriors, dog-faces, jarheads, combatants…those shifty eyed fowl mouth two fisted go for broke Soldiers and Marines that close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to kill the enemy. These are the folks that must place the front site post of their rifle on an enemy, center mass, and pull the trigger. These are warriors brave enough to step through the doorway of an enemy occupied house, detect and disarmed an IED, engage a treacherous enemy that does not take prisoners and an enemy that does not hesitate to torturer and murder innocents. Our warriors are the sons, daughters, sisters, brothers, fathers, mothers, neighbors, and acquaintances from every community, town, city and state across this country and one of the greatest representative cross sections of patriotic American citizens in existence.
They are now a different generation but these warriors possess the same spirt America’s warriors have establish and exhibited since the Revolutionary War. For over 240 years these folks have never let us down and have volunteer for the nasty, dirty, immoral, brutalizing effects of combat. You can say we lost in Viet Nam, Somali, Iraq and Afghanistan but the scary truth is we lost those wars strategically after we won them tactically. The unfortunate reality is that the strategic always trumps the tactical. Tactical is all about the troops; strategy is all about the generals.
The other scary fact is that since 2003, we have seen an unprecedented number of courts martial that the media labels “war crimes” … more “war crime” legal cases since 2003 than in all the battle history of all the United States war’s combined. How can this be possible when we have fielded to today’s battles the best trained, best equipped, smartest warriors in this country’s history?
The issue is not the troops, the issue here is the senior military leadership, the general officers that have forgotten they are warriors and exhibit the traits and leadership characteristics of politicians. Today’s general officers understand careerism but do not understand the Laws of War that should be their stock and trade. They hid behind lawyers and Rule of Law equivocations that cannot co-exist on a battlefield.
For this reason, we cannot put combat boots on the ground because the troops are being used as legal cannon fodder. Over and over again we see American combatants thrown under the bus for the sake of justifying a policy objective of executing a bad military strategy. Names like Lt Ilario Pantano, Sgt Larry Hutchins, SSgt Frank Wuterich, Sgt Michael Williams, Sgt Jose Nazario, 1Sgt John Hatley, Sgt Derrick Miller, Capt Roger Hill, Lt Michael Behenna, Major Fred Galvin, Major Matt Goldsteyn, PFC Corey Clayett, GySgt Timothy Hogan, SPC Franklin Dunn, SSgt Osee Fagan, SPC Michael Wagnon, and Lt Clint Lorance are the more notable cases. You can be certain that the list will continue to grow not only with the recent Afghanistan Kunduz Hospital Airstrike but also any combat actions against the terrorist in Iraq and Syria.
Military campaigns are always based on a “kill or capture” strategy, however, our leadership does not believe in a kill strategy nor do they believe in a capture strategy. Our military leadership believes that our Soldiers and Marines are in combat to die for the “greater good”. Instead of capture, we have a “catch and release” program that continually frees known enemy combatants and terrorist to again kill, not only our service members, but also civilians. “Catch and release” is nothing more than a treachery award program for the enemy. Our generals believe that our combatants have no right to self-defense on the battlefield. The idea that our warriors are there to make the enemy die for their cause is a lost priority in our general officer’s politically correct minds.
We cannot put boots on the ground because our generals do not trust our Soldiers and Marines to show the initiative necessary for successful combat operations. The generals have forgotten how to fight and win. They have forgotten how to support our warriors by setting the correct strategic policies to allow them to fight. We no longer have combat commanders. The Washington DC political cronies continue to dedicate failed policies that undermine and kill our warriors in order to acquire political curry and favoritism.
War is not a moral exercise. There is no morality that can justify the slaughter of war. War is the ultimate competition that is won by killing the bad guys and bringing our warriors home alive. Collateral damage is an unescapable reality. Yes, collateral damage considerations are important but collateral damage must be weighed against military necessity. Military necessity allows for a rigoristic war; a rigoristic war is a short war; and a short war minimizes civilian casualties. Mixed into military necessity is the idea that field commanders have a responsibility to bring home alive as many of our warriors as possible. Sending them to Leavenworth is not part of the “bringing them home” equation.
Bob Weimann is a retired USMC LtCol. Bob is on the Board of Directors of UAP (United American Patriots) and a contributing editor to http://www.defendourmarines.com . UAP is a non-profit charity that aids military service members to help defray expenses for an adequate and fair legal defense. See What UAP Believes here: http://www.unitedpatriots.org/ . See what the UAP Defend the Defender Fund is about here: http://www.unitedpatriots.org/news/what-united-american-patriots-uap-warrior-defend-the-defenders-fund-is-about/ .
December 29th, 2015 at 2:50 am
Hi Andy
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Yes, the ROE are a tactical issue, not strategic and in an occupation there should be an economy of force and not a free-fire zone. That is fair. I think however, the pendulum swung to the far end where it was Catch-22 unreasonable and compromised the ability of units to defend themselves in what would be common sense situations( we were proving our good intentions by adding restrictions on already tight ROE down the chain of command, not to Afghans or Iraqis, but to ourselves) . Combined with micromanagement of plans – Michael Waltz listed something like 14 stages of approval with powerpoint briefings for a patrol – the normal function of units was impaired by a de facto need for hand holding by HQ.
December 31st, 2015 at 8:04 am
Zen:
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Your prescription for what should have been done in Afghanistan probably would have worked. But it would have required the people inside the beltway to be decisive, discerning and respectful of reality; probably anything people like that came up with would have worked. But we don’t have people like that. And we won’t, until the Americans suffer such a dramatic, disastrous and catastrophic series of military defeats that the current crew is discredited to the extent they are booted out.
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(I was going to say “the current crew is discredited and shamed” but the current crew is impervious to shame so that wouldn’t have done.)
January 3rd, 2016 at 2:47 am
“These are warriors brave enough to step through the doorway of an enemy occupied house, detect and disarmed an IED, engage a treacherous enemy that does not take prisoners and an enemy that does not hesitate to torturer and murder innocents.”
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And usually that is the engineering corp, right? The guys that kick open the doors.
January 3rd, 2016 at 2:56 am
“The other scary fact is that since 2003, we have seen an unprecedented number of courts martial that the media labels “war crimes” … more “war crime” legal cases since 2003 than in all the battle history of all the United States war’s combined.”
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I have not heard this. Grim.