On COIN and an Anti-COIN Counterrevolution?
Had a pleasant and interesting email conversation with the always thoughtful Dr. Bernard Finel of The American Security Project ( that link is the blog, here is the main site for the org). Dr. Finel has been blogging vigorously and very critically of late about COIN becoming conventional Beltway wisdom, a premise he does not accept nor believe to be a useful strategic posture for the United 
States. It was a good discussion and one that I would like the readers to join.
Due to space limitations, I’m going to give the links and some small excerpts for each of Dr. Finel’s posts, but I strongly recommend reading his arguments in full before going on to my assessment:
Did we Really Ever Have an Afghanistan Debate?
The issue isn’t that people like Exum haven’t considered the issue individually. I am sure he has. Many others have also considered the issue, and many have shared their concerns with one another, but it has been, for years, in the context a shared consensus that has actively sought to exclude real disagreement. It is not about doing due diligence on the policy, it has been about reinforcing the group identity about supporters of expansion of the war in Afghanistan.
The Incoherence of COIN Advocates: Andrew Exum Edition
But unfortunately, the prerequisites are actually virtually impossible to achieve. The Afghan government does not have the tax base, infrastructure, expertise, or – significantly – the inclination to build the kind of military and institutional capacity that our strategy requires from the local partner. Furthermore, the desire to curtail corruption runs counter to the desire to secure the cooperation of provincial leaders. We are setting the Afghans up to fail. And unfortunately, setting the Afghans up to fail is a win-win scenario for the COIN theorists. If, by some miracle, the Afghan government is able to meet our needs, we will claim credit for having given the Afghans a model to achieve. If the Afghans fail, then any negative consequences will be the fault of the Afghans.
Important Stories from Iraq and Afghanistan
Defeating the current “population security” focused COIN approach is not that hard conceptually. All the insurgents have to do is reverse the dynamic, by making a U.S. presence synonymous with increased violence. The logic of population security then forces the counter-insurgent to move the population into more secure locations – minimally with checkpoints and controls over movement, but historically often also into fortified camps or villages (which quickly take on the characteristics of a prison). Either way, the costs of the American provided “security” begins to look worse than the risks from the insurgents, who – if they are smart – are looking for little other than tolerance from the population.
So, I am confused. Does Ricks think that the new COIN doctrine works, but is not always well implemented? Does he believe that it produces short-term security improvements, but no long-term political benefits? Does he think COIN is a failed doctrine, but nevertheless the best chance we have to rescue bad situations? Is he a closet COIN skeptic, but under pressure to toe the party line at CNAS?
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