Reality, Strategy and Afghanistan: Some Questions
Are all the strategic objectives in Afghanistan clearly defined and acheivable by military force?
Of the operational activities that might support our strategic objectives that require civilian expertise, why in nine years have we not sent adequate civilian agency representation and funding?
If military operations in Afghanistan require a single commander, why does the civilian side of the COIN campaign have authority divided between at least a half-dozen senior officials without anyone having a deliverable “final say” reporting to the President?
If Pakistan’s “partnership” is officially a requirement for strategic success (and it is), why would Pakistan be a “partner” in helping stabilize an independent regime in Afghanistan that would terminate Pakistan’s ability to use Afghanistan as “strategic depth”?
Is the Taliban more important to our national security than is al Qaida?
If we can’t get at al Qaida after nine long years to finish them off, why is that?
If Pakistan’s ISI is sponsoring the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Afghan Taliban and other extremist jihadi groups, doesn’t that make the ISI as a critical component – the strategic “brains” – of the Enemy’s center of gravity?
Shouldn’t we be targeting the Enemy center of gravity if we are to acheive our strategic objectives? (If we are going to be squeamish and pants-wetting about that, how about the retired and bearded “plausibly deniable” ex-ISI guys running around FATA as “advisers” and fixers to jihadi and tribal factions?)
Should we be sending the Enemy’s strategic brains billions of dollars annually?
For that matter, is the size of our own logistical tail effectively funding the guys in black turbans shooting at American soldiers and burying IEDs? Would less be more?
Can we ever gain the initiative if the Enemy has safe sanctuaries – oh, has anyone noticed that Pakistan has twice as many Pushtuns as Afghanistan and how does that affect the odds for winning a purist COIN campaign….in 18 months?
Are COIN warfare and proxy warfare the same thing to be treated with the same policy?
If we assume the Enemy has read FM 3-24, shouldn’t we make certain that a considerable percentage of our tactical moves in AfPak are not coming out of a “cookbook”? Is the element of surprise something we can use, or is it considered unsporting these days in warfighting doctrine?
Given that most of Afghanistan’s GDP is derived from US military spending, how is the Karzai regime going to afford an ANA of the requisite size that COIN theory requires for an operational handoff at our arbitrary political deadline of 18 months?
And on a related note, if the Karzai regime in it’s entirety was suddenly frozen in carbonite like Han Solo in The Empire Strikes Back, how much more efficient and popular would the Afghan government instantly become with ordinary Afghans compared to how it is now?
If we can’t work with Karzai why can’t we work with somebody else? It’s not like he was, you know, actually elected 😉
If political authorities are not effectively linking Ends, Ways and Means – some old-fashioned gadflys call this state of affairs “not having a strategy” – and are unlikely to acheive our objectives and said political authorities will not consider changing the objectives, what practical actions can we take in the next 18 months to seize the initiative, maximize the harm inflicted on our enemies, ensure help for our friends and the furtherance of our own interests?
July 6th, 2010 at 5:10 am
You have raised many of the questions that have knawed on my mind for a couple of years. Your post poses fifteen questions any one of which is an example of gross negligence on the part of those we charge with spending the lives of our soldiers as they are sworn to defend our nation and it’s citizens.
I sense that the effect of Restrepo and War is nagging on your brain too.
http://greatsatansgirlfriend.blogspot.com/2010/07/sky-soldier.html has something that seems to dovetail into the narrative with this ironic parallel track by Linda Rubin at the NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?_r=1
July 6th, 2010 at 9:26 am
"doesn’t that make the ISI as a critical component – the strategic “brains” – of the Enemy’s center of gravity?Shouldn’t we be targeting the Enemy center of gravity if we are to acheive our strategic objectives?"Thats a joke right?
July 6th, 2010 at 2:17 pm
[…] Mark Safranski asks a series of tough questions about Afghanistan. Here are the first five: Are all the strategic objectives in Afghanistan clearly defined and acheivable by military force? […]
July 6th, 2010 at 2:43 pm
Nope. No joke. Forget who the ISI is or what government they belong to.There is a core of connected, resourceful individuals aiding our terrorist enemies in the most strategic sense. The cost of doing little/nothing about that is increased expended American lives on the chosen battlefields (ours, in Afghanistan; theirs, here at home and elsewhere).What must you do about an enemy’s longevity/lethality-enhancing resources? Our enemy attacks our supply lines in Pakistan – unless paid not to do so. That’s what they do.Plug in the fact that it’s the Pakistani military’s ISI. Unfortunate that this complicates matters, but the basic math remains the same.Hopefully, the intelligence war being executed out of line-of-sight is about to turn our way. I see little reason to wager much in Vegas on that line, however.The questions are very valid, no matter how uncomfortable they are to answer. Uncomfortable does not equate difficult.
July 6th, 2010 at 2:46 pm
Colonel Warden on are Strategic options in Afghanistan, this is from 2008.
http://www.strategydevelopment.net/strategic-options-the-west-and-afghanistan.php
July 6th, 2010 at 3:46 pm
Mark, What you ask is very, very important. Those are questions about who we are and what we stand for. They are existential questions.
July 6th, 2010 at 4:02 pm
Mark I just go an email that may answer some of your questions, in an odd way.http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
July 6th, 2010 at 5:23 pm
"Nope. No joke. Forget who the ISI is or what government they belong to.There is a core of connected, resourceful individuals aiding our terrorist enemies in the most strategic sense. The cost of doing little/nothing about that is increased expended American lives on the chosen battlefields (ours, in Afghanistan; theirs, here at home and elsewhere)."The ISI are in there with the approval of the the Civilian and military leadership of Pakistan, because there is a mess on there border and they need to keep there fingers in a lot of pies, that does not translate into support for Taliban attacks on US troops. To think Americas needs are the same as Pakistan’s needs are ridiculous."Taking out" the ISI elements you have suspicions about will lead to the end of Pakistan support in Afghanistan, and the rapid termination of American involvement in Afghanistan. Agree with the broad thrust of Zens post, but lines like that show a certain lack of appreciation of other nation states motivations and concerns.
July 6th, 2010 at 11:30 pm
Hi Gents,
.
HG99 – RESTREPO/WAR did bother me, even though Korengal does not = Afghanistan, it equals it enough if we are moving without an endgame ( a deadline is an end, not an endgame).
.
joey,
.
These questions are very much about prodding ppl to think that Pakistan’s and America’s interests are very, very different. This is not to argue that Pakistan does not have a legitimate security interest in Afghanistan, it does. Or to argue that a regional diplomatic settlement that transforms Indo-Pakistani relations into something stable and transitions the Taliban into a peaceful political and social movement would not be a great thing, it would be the best possible outcome in my view. Unfortunately, I see no evidence that Pakistan’s rulers would settle for just the former ( as opposed to dominating Afghanistan via client proxies), because if they were, they would be proponents of the latter.
.
If Pakistan were genuinely a military ally here, we’d see American/ISAF/ANA forces and the Pakistani Army executing a classic pincer movement on the Talibans, Afghan and Pakistani in a joint campaign that corrals the whole leadership, disarms the fighters and kills and imprisons their leaders and foreign allies. I think it is safe to say that we will not be seeing such a joint offensive from a state that has sheltered Mullah Omar and his Shura as strategic assets and tried to turn the Pakistani Taliban militants northward against US troops. Herein lies our strategic dilemma.
.
I would rather see us reduce our forces in Afghanistan and use them with a free hand as they need to be best employed than remain in our dysfunctional strategic co-dependency with Pakistan’s regime. Pakistan is a problem not because Pakistanis are bad people but because their military leaders intend to frustrate our policy in Afghanistan until we leave, taking as much money as they can to do as little as they can get away with. Fine, I do not fault them for pursuing their interests but we too should pursue our own. After pouring blood and treasure into Afghanistan, America can either walk away in defeat or squeeze Pakistan until they either bend to a reasonable diplomatic compromise that takes the interests of many parties into account or until we break Pakistan as a state. Right now, American leaders are very reluctant to do that, but as 2012 election season approaches the temptation is going to grow significantly.
.
MM,
.
Great essay! That was excellent.
.
Slapout,
.
Has Col. Warden written a book by chance?
.
Hi Steve,
.
You summed that up well. The carefully crafted ambiguity of who is officially or unofficially doing what matters less than the fact it is an ongoing reality we should never have tolerated in the first place.
July 7th, 2010 at 3:36 am
Hi Zen, yes he has. Go to the link below and click on the store button. Also watch some videos for free. His class materials are more detailed than his books and some are more geared to the business market but the ideas are the same in war, they are all Systems. I don’t know if he knows it or not but President Obama did one of the most critical things you can do according to Warden and that is he set a deadline!!! it’s part of the TVA (Time Value of Action). I’ll tell you a story about that some time.
http://www.strategydevelopment.net/
July 7th, 2010 at 4:44 am
Spy vs. Spy, as seen and drawn by the AP.
July 7th, 2010 at 5:50 am
[…] Mark Safranski asks a series of tough questions about Afghanistan. Here are the first four: Are all the strategic objectives in Afghanistan clearly defined and acheivable by military force? […]
July 7th, 2010 at 12:52 pm
[…] – Reality, Strategy and Afghanistan: Some Questions submitted by The Glittering […]
July 9th, 2010 at 1:31 am
[…] – Reality, Strategy and Afghanistan: Some Questions submitted by The Glittering […]
July 9th, 2010 at 12:51 pm
[…] place *t* with 1 2/3 votes – Zenpundit – Reality, Strategy and Afghanistan: Some Questions submitted by The Glittering […]
July 10th, 2010 at 12:28 am
"I would rather see us reduce our forces in Afghanistan and use them with a free hand as they need to be best employed than remain in our dysfunctional strategic co-dependency with Pakistan’s regime. Pakistan is a problem not because Pakistanis are bad people but because their military leaders intend to frustrate our policy in Afghanistan until we leave, taking as much money as they can to do as little as they can get away with."
.
Well put, zen.
.
Pakistanis are most definitely not bad people. Culturally, someone from my background will have quite a bit in common with a certain type of Pakistani. Hey, if you understand Hindi you are gonna understand Urdu a bit, right? But I don’t admire the politics or policies of certain members of the elite, and American national interests and goals are divergent.
.
This is reality but we seem to be stuck in 20th century thinking when we need 21st century solutions. Or some nonsense like that. Easy to write in a blog comment, hard to put to practice in real life.
.
– Madhu
July 12th, 2010 at 2:58 am
Hi Madhu,
.
"This is reality but we seem to be stuck in 20th century thinking when we need 21st century solutions"
.
Yes, but unfortunately the American career arc is such that most top tier decision makers were born in the 1940’s and 1950’s and came of age in the early 60’s to early 70’s which bodes poorly for institutionalizing 21st century paradigms any time soon
July 13th, 2010 at 11:16 pm
[…] place *t* with 1 2/3 votes – Zenpundit – Reality, Strategy and Afghanistan: Some Questions submitted by The Glittering […]