zenpundit.com » military reform

Archive for the ‘military reform’ Category

Dr. Barry Posen on American Grand Strategy

Friday, July 18th, 2008

Falling on the heels of the Bacevich post, MIT’s  Dr. Barry Posen’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee for oversight calls for ” Restraint and Renewal” (PDF – guess not too many interventionists received a subcommittee invite).

Posen is a sharp thinker who aims here to deflate comfortable assumptions and a number of sacred cows – like the existence of NATO or security relationships with Israel and Japan. While much of his critique of American excess is reasonable, Posen’s alternative quasi-non interventionist grand strategy is predicated, like others in this vein, on lowballing estimates of the negative, unintended, consequences on an American strategic retraction on this scale. America pulling out of NATO military command and loosening ties with Japan and Israel will cause ripple effects in the international order.

Hat tip to Wiggins.

Wass de Czege on Irregular Warfare and the Writing of Doctrine

Tuesday, July 8th, 2008

While I was away, the SWJ Blog ran a thoughtful essay by General  Huba Wass de Czege on the new military doctrine on irregular warfare. Not only is he good on the substance, Wass de Czege demonstrates how one needs to begin with clear thinking when attempting to formulate and apply usefuyl concepts:

A Reflection on the Illogic of New Military Concepts

What is it about the US Military that tends to produce sound, pragmatic, and common sense ideas about the concrete present, and tends toward illogic, faddish paradigms and hyperbole when dealing with the abstract future? Joint Operating Concepts for dealing with post cold war security problems have proven difficult to “get right.” This is because they begin from the wrong logical starting point and thus define the problem incorrectly. It is also because of inattention to historical fact, definitional subtlety and the theoretical logic within which military forces must operate. This inattention overlooks key logical inconsistencies in such documents crafted more to “sell” to constituencies within the Washington “Beltway” the capabilities and programs championed by one military interest group or another rather than to inform current decisions in the field.

….”Beltway” constituencies have been educated to think according to the attractive new paradigms military professionals have used to buttress their budget arguments.

Read the rest here.

“In the twenty-first century, wars are not won when the enemy army is defeated on the battlefield”

Saturday, June 21st, 2008

LTC. John Nagl had an article, not yet available online, in the prestigious RUSI journal where he used his review of The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War by Brian McAllister Linn to drive home a geopolitical and grand strategic reality that I offer here with my subsequent comments( major hat tip to Lexington Green for the PDF):

In the twenty-first century, wars are  not won when the enemy army is defeated on the battlefield; in fact, there may not be a uniformed enemy to fight at all. Instead, a war is only won when the conditions that spawned armed conflict have been changed.

 Fielding first rate conventional militaries of local or regional “reach” are inordinately expensive propositions and only the United States maintains one with global power projection capabilities and a logistical tail that can fight wars that are both far away and of long duration.  Economics, nuclear weapons, asymmetrical disparities in conventional firepower, globalization and the revolution in information technology that permits open-source warfare have incentivized warfare on the cheap and stealthy at the expense of classic state on state warfare. The predictions of Martin van Creveld in The Transformation of War are coming to pass – war has ratcheted downward from armies to networks and blurs into crime and tribalism. In this scenario, kinetics can no longer be neatly divorced from politics – or economics, sociology, history and culture. “Legitimacy”, stemming from getting actions on the mental and moral levels of war right, matter tremendously.

‘Decisive results’ in the twenty-first century will come not when we wipe a piece of land clean of enemy forces, but when we protect its people and allow them to control their territory in a manner consistent with the norms of the civilised world.

 This is “Shrinking the Gap” to use Thomas P.M. Barnett’s phrase. The remediation of failing and failed states not to “utopia” but basic functionality that permits a responsible exercise of sovereignty and positive connectivity with the rest of the world.

Thus victory in Iraq and Afghanistan will come when those nations enjoy governments that meet the basic needs and garner the support of all of their peoples.

Taken literally, Nagl errs here with two polyglot regions, especially Afghanistan where the popular expectation of a “good” central government is one that eschews excessive meddling while providing – or rather presiding over – social stability and peace. Taken more broadly to mean a gruff acceptance by the people of the legitimacy of their state so they do not take up arms ( or put them down), then nagl is on target. Realism about our own interests vs. global needs and our own finite resources requires a ” good enough” standard be in place.

Winning the Global War on Terror is an even more challenging task; victory in the Long War requires the strengthening of literally dozens of governments afflicted by insurgents who are radicalised by hatred and inspired by fear.

 We might want to consider prophylactic efforts to strengthen weak states prior to a major crisis arising – more bang for our buck – and this should be a major task of AFRICOM. Strengthen the Botswanas, Malis and Zambias before wading hip-deep into the Congo.

The soldiers who will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies – and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms, or work for the Department of Army. The most important warriors of the current century may fight for the US Information Agency rather than the Department of Defense

Nagl has internalized an important point. The “jointness” forced upon the U.S. military by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the late 1980’s and 1990’s needs to be broadened, first into true “interagency operational jointness” of American assets then into a full-fledged “System Administration” umbrella that can integrate IGO’s, NGO’s, and the private sector along with military-governmental entities to maximize impact.

Like SecDef Robert Gates, LTC. Nagl “gets it” and we can hope now that he has joined the ranks of policy wonks that an administration job is in his future.

UPDATE:

Check out this post at Kings of War – highly relevant.

And at the SWJ Blog

Democracy Journal

Wednesday, June 11th, 2008

Much thanks to Eddie Beaver and Lexington Green who separately but nearly simultaneously sent me links this morning to a very fine e-zine, Democracy Journal.org. What caught their eye were the following articles by some familiar names:

Pentagon 2.0” by Colonel T.X. Hammes

The author of the critically acclaimed The Sling and the Stone reviews the latest book by another premier military theorist, John Arquilla’s Worst Enemy and finds it wanting.

Return of the Jihadi” by Andrew Exum a.k.a. “Abu Muqawama

Exum methodically analyzes the implications of “when Omar comes marching home” and offers sensible solutions I would describe as “Interagency COIN Jointness”.

Parenthetical aside: One side effect of the GWOT/Iraq War/Afghanistan, I think we shall see in the coming decade, is to have created a generation of future policy makers and statesmen like we have not seen since WWII.

Skelton on Asymmetric Warfare

Friday, May 23rd, 2008

An older (2001) PDF on the lessons of history for American leaders facing asymmetric threats by Representative Ike Skelton (D-Missouri). Skelton is currently the Chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee.

America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts

Very nice to see a member of Congress who thought well ahead of the curve, demonstrating real expertise on an important national security matter over which he has jurisdiction and considerable influence for shaping policy long-term decisions. If every member of Congress emulated Skelton, their approval rating would be a good deal higher.

Hat tip to Charlie of Abu Muqawama


Switch to our mobile site