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Sunday, May 27th, 2007

THIS TELEVISED BEHEADING OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO YOU BY PRESIDENT BILL RICHARDSON

Former UN Ambassador Bill Richardson just suggested to Tim Russert that all American troops should be withdrawn from Iraq in 2007 and that security for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad be placed in Iraqi hands. Right. The embassy would be overrun in about five minutes if that happened. Does the Democratic Party really ache to relive the hostage crisis of their youth ?

I realize that the worst of the delusional screamers now dominate the Democratic primary process but an experienced international diplomat like Richardson should really try to preserve his intellectual credibility. Richardson isn’t going to win the nomination but he just might be a Secretary of State or Defense, and, as such, he shouldn’t be saying really dumb things like this on television.

Saturday, May 26th, 2007

RECOMMENDED READING -EARLY EDITION

Frank Hoffman at SWJ BLOG – “Global Guerrillas
A SWJ review of Brave New War.

Freakonomics blog – “Straight From the Black Swan’s Mouth An interview with Nassim Nicholas Taleb ( Hat tip: Kent’s Imperative and Shloky)

Fester at The Newshoggers -“Urban resiliency

Further discussion on the implications of Global Guerillaism in an urban center.

PHK at Whirledview -“Bernard Fall: Memories of a Soldier-Scholar – book review essay

I disagree with PHK that we “backed the wrong side” in Vietnam ( what were we going to do, help consolidate a Stalinist regime in the late 1940’s even as we were trying like hell to keep Communism out of Italy, France, West Berlin and Greece? How would have Acheson and Truman made that work?) though we certainly did back the politically inept side. Nevertheless, a well-written essay about one of the fathers of COIN whose ideas need greater circulation today.

That’s it.

Saturday, May 26th, 2007

EMOTION AND LOGIC VISUALIZED

Dave Davison at Thoughts Illustrated has a post up, “Logic+Emotion – moving the needle on the Experience -O-Meter “, featuring the work of Chicago designer and blogger David Armano. I took a gander at Armano’s PPT presentation and was impressed. A wonderful combination of concepts and presentation:

Thursday, May 24th, 2007

INTELLIGENCE, PUZZLES AND MYSTERIES

Gregory F. Treverton writing in the latest issue of The Smithsonian:

Risks and Riddles

“During the cold war, much of the job of U.S. intelligence was puzzle-solving—seeking answers to questions that had answers, even if we didn’t know them. How many missiles did the Soviet Union have? Where were they located? How far could they travel? How accurate were they? It made sense to approach the military strength of the Soviet Union as a puzzle—the sum of its units and weapons, and their quality. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of terrorism changed all that. Those events upended U.S. intelligence, to the point that its major challenge now is to frame mysteries….

….Puzzle-solving is frustrated by a lack of information. Given Washington’s need to find out how many warheads Moscow’s missiles carried, the United States spent billions of dollars on satellites and other data-collection systems. But puzzles are relatively stable. If a critical piece is missing one day, it usually remains valuable the next.

By contrast, mysteries often grow out of too much information. Until the 9/11 hijackers actually boarded their airplanes, their plan was a mystery, the clues to which were buried in too much “noise”—too many threat scenarios. So warnings from FBI agents in Minneapolis and Phoenix went unexplored. The hijackers were able to hide in plain sight. After the attacks, they became a puzzle: it was easy to pick up their trail. Solving puzzles is useful for detection. But framing mysteries is necessary for prevention. “

This article, though written for a general audience, struck a number of chords with me. Specifically:

* “Noise” is an important consideration in an era of attention scarcity economies. Eliciting a surge in ” white noise” by unrelated third parties ( say disinformation that sends pro-lifers off on a media campaign and in turn, energizers their pro-choice enemies to respond, diverting the attention of the general public to “X” degree) is useful camoflague. Purpleslog had a deservedly well-received post at Dreaming 5GW on ” the Puppetmaster” as a “5GW Archetype”. Such a mentality would cultivate media noise the way the KGB once set up and subsidized endless Communist front groups in the West.

* Uncertainty is relative. Some “mysteries” are more decipherable with a change of perspective, scale or temporal framework; others represent questions of deep uncertainty. Imaginative scenario planning exercises can help pattern recognizers familiarize themselves with latent possibilities ( NeoEurasianism ? Pan-Turanism ? A derivatives-driven implosion of globalization? Eco-extremist bioterrorists longing for planetary genocide?).

We need radical thought experimentation.

UPDATE:

IT security expert Gunnar Peterson has already covered this base well but from a different angle:

Vulnerability Puzzles and Mysterious Threats

“Risk differs from uncertainty in that risk may be measured and managed whereas uncertainty may not. Risk management efforts hinge on this important distinction because it highlights differences where a team may be more proactive. For instance, many vulnerabilities are known, hence they may be measured and managed whereas the threats to a systems contain a greater degree of uncertainty in that the threat environment contains numerous elements such as threat actors that one’s organization can not directly control.”

Wednesday, May 23rd, 2007

TANJI INTERVIEWS ROBB

Michael Tanji, the IC veteran at Haft of the Spear, interviewed John Robb about his new book, Brave New War over at Tanji’s MSM gig, The SPOT Report ( have to add that to the blogroll…).

Brave New War Interview (Part I)

Brave New War Interview Part II

NEW!Brave New War Interview (Part III of III)

The interview is excellent. Tanji gets beyond the usual superficial questions into the meat of Robb’s analytical worldview. A sample:

TANJI: In The Long Tale of Warfare Emerges you take an Occam’s razor through the fundamentals about the size and capability of the insurgency. We can kill with precision and to any scale, but apparently cannot get the basic math right. Is dogma driving us to perform data-free analysis or are we just not preparing our strategists and planners to address complex or asymmetric problems?

ROBB: The problem may be whether or not we operate on best case data or worst case. If you always select the best case data in order to bolster the moral cohesion at home, then you are really lying to yourself — essentially, breathing your own exhaust. Another reason may be that that our intelligence system can’t handle the level of complexity involved within a closed environment (locked down by artificial barriers of secrecy). It’s not tapping into the vast pools of talent outside the organization effectively.

TANJI: Let me ask you a question that I get asked a lot: Why no major attack in the US since 9/11? Is it a question of difficulty in setting off systemic cascading failures? If major attacks suffer from diminishing returns and small attacks ratchet up the “tax” on targeted cities, why haven’t we seen IEDs on Wall St. or Main St.?

ROBB: Here are a couple of reasons. First is the diminishing returns of symbolic terrorism A big attack like 9/11 is hard to top. Anything less would hurt the al Qaeda brand and fail to return fear to anything near the levels of 9/11. Second, al Qaeda was severely damaged when we invaded Afghanistan. Those resources it had left were spent on staying alive and helping launch the operation in Iraq. Remember, a major reason for 9/11 was to get the US into a guerrilla war in Asia and repeat the experience of Russia’s Afghanistan. In terms of systems disruptions, this method has only recently emerged from the experience in Iraq. Not everyone gets it yet, but the insight is spreading quickly in an organic fashion. You could conclude that the attack on Abqaiq and the Golden Mosque were examples of systems disruption (the latter being social systems disruption) that al Qaeda didn’t have to project power to the US to accomplish. “

I found the section in BNW on Urban Takedowns problematic as well. I liked Robb’s concept of a ” terrorism tax” on targeted cities because that jives with a systematic understanding of applying market forces to societal analysis. I think, on the margin for certain important, narrow, questions, this idea works very well.

OTOH, historically, all cities were essentially death traps that could only be sustained by a daily influx of migrants ( usually peasants fleeing rural poverty) that exceeded those dying from disease, violence, fire and malnutrition at a rate that vastly exceeded the toll taken by today’s terrorism. Only in advanced states, with the creation of modern sanitation and water systems, public health, police and fire services has this dynamic changed for the better. Many cities in the Gap and a few in the New Core are still in this ” feral” state. The point being that as a complex social and economic networks, cities may have greater resilience than we realize, which makes estimating terror effects problematic.


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