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Fellow member of  The Small Wars Council  , Dr. Steven Metz, visted here the other day and left a comment on an old post where his most recent SSI monograph, Rethinking Insurgency, had appeared with some critical commentary from me. Here was Dr. Metz’s response, since the sidebar plug in for comments did not let readers hop into the archives (possibly because the post was at my old site and archived here in a category):

“I’m not sure the distinction between my position and Tom Barnett’s is as stark as you suggest.  AFRICOM will mostly be focused on preventative measures.  I’m greatly in favor of that.  I was, for instance, an early supporter of the African Crisis Response Initiative. 

I would only warn that we resist any urge to unilaterally undertake major counterinsurgency support from any African government unwilling to address its systemic problems. 

I did, on the other hand, advocate military disengagement from the Arab world.  Having spent time in both places, my impression is that American security assistance provokes hostility in the Arab world and does not, at least to the same extent, in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Nice blog, by the way!”

Thanks, and a fair criticism of my post . As a result of Steve’s comment I decided to give Rethinking Insurgency another read without the AFRICOM context being the foremost concept  in my mind as it was at the time when I wrote that post. Here’s my second take.

There’s a lot to like in Rethinking Insurgency. I was particularly impressed with how Metz dealt with militias ( loyalist paramilitaries) and their permutations in terms of sophistication, their origin and relationship to states and/or criminal organizations and the risks such forces present. Metz presents an extensive analysis of the interrelationships of non-state actors (militias, insurgents, OC, PMC’s) in a conflict zone with one another, the state and foreign entities that readers here will find quite engaging.

Another twist that readers here will like is Metz’s take on ” fourth forces” – media, IGO’s, NGO’s and transnational corporations – and how they impact what Boyd termed the “mental” and “moral” levels of warfare, usually to the disadvantage of the state and complicating the already delicate dynamics of counterinsurgency operations. Even the most benevolent intervention by fourth forces can be an unsettling variable. According to Metz:

“….External humanitarian efforts, while exceptionally valuable to alleviate suffering, may leave a state unprepared to take over the provision of services when the conflict ends or subsides. Hence the widespread involvement of international or nongovernmental organizations in an insurgency increases the chances that conflict will reemerge once the shortcomings and weaknesses of the state provide political space for insurgents or other violent actors….what seems best -the alleviation of suffering- may increase the chances of renewed suffering at a later date”

With insurgency often being a contest of will and popular perceptions of political legitimacy, having conflicts “burn out” naturally with higher intensity will often be preferred by states to letting them drag on for decades. It may be, to use SEA as an example, that the Indonesian military’s attempt to block relief to hurricaine victims in rebellious Aceh or Thailand’s more recent appointment of the admired and feared General Pallop Pinmanee, run to this line of thinking argued by Metz. Countervailing pressures of a globalized environment and communally-oriented actors though will, according to Metz, force most regimes to settle for ” sustaining a controllable conflict” rather than inflicting a decisive military defeat on their enemies. Insurgency, in a certain light, becomes one of the costs of doing business as a state.

I recommend that you read Dr. Metz’s paper in full, which can be downloaded here at SSI.

This entry was posted on Sunday, December 2nd, 2007 at 5:59 pm and is filed under COIN, foreign policy, ideas, insurgency, intellectuals, military, military reform, non-state actors. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.