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Thucydides Roundtable, Books I & II: Everybody Wants a Thucydides Trap

By T. Greer

All the world trembles at the dreaded “Thucydides trap.”

Of late this phrase has been all the rage. It was first popularized by Graham Allison in 2012, and has only become more popular since. Read American debates about China’s future, and you will see it; read Chinese debates about America’s future, and you will find it there as well. On the lips of all is Thucydides’ famed assessment of the origins of his war. It might be the punchiest pronouncement of the entire book:

The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. (1.23.5)

It is not clear to me that Thucydides intended this theory to be a general theory of why all great powers go to war, though many take it this way. The other famous phrase from this book—the Athenian declaration that they were motivated to build their empire by “fear, honor, and interest” (1.76)—has a far better claim to this title, followed as it is by the note, “it has always been the law the weaker should be subject to the stronger.” Thucydides invokes no laws in his famous one liner on the “real cause” of the war. Notice too that only one leg of his trinity is invoked to explain the Spartan decision for war. Were Thucydides serious about conflating the cause of this war with the cause of all wars, it would make sense to include the other two legs in his explanation.

But whether or not Thucydides hoped his statement might be a template for all time, it is being treated as such. Here it used to explain all great power wars of the last four centuries:

Graphic created by the Harvard Belfer Center’s “Thucydides Trap Case File” page

This roundtable’s journey through Thucydides’ History gives us the chance to assess whether the   “Thucydides trap” metaphor helpfully explains the historical events it is drawn from. To approach this question is to first ask another: can we untangle the events of the war itself from the narrative of the man who chronicled it? This is the  issue at the center at this post; no one can appraise the work and words of Thucydides without carefully working through it.

Thucydides is celebrated today as a man who articulated and developed grand principles of politics and conflict. However, Thucydides was not an explicit theorist of war. His book has themes, not theses. He does not prove, but impresses. These impressions are made through narrative art. The order in which Thucydides introduces ideas and events has great meaning; the amount of space he devotes to some events (but not to others) changes how readers perceive them. These subtle decisions of placement and length develop Thucydides’ main themes far more powerfully than his occasional editorial comments. Perceptive readers of Thucydides time, aware of the narratives Thucydides hoped his work would displace and familiar with the events he passes over, would understand exactly what Thucydides was doing. With us the challenge is harder. We don’t come to Thucydides’ History with preexisting knowledge of the war. Our only guide to Thucydides is Thucydides himself. We thus must read with utmost care. If we do not, we risk mistaking Thucydides’ judgments about the war for the events of the war itself.

Nowhere is more careful attention demanded than Thucydides’ treatment of the Megarian Decree. Like all Greeks of the age, the Athenians had long memories. Their enmity for Megara began a generation earlier, when Athenian blood was lost as consequence of Megarian betrayal. The Megarian betrayal came during a day of war, Athen’s first life-and-death struggle with the men of Sparta. The proximate causes of the this dispute were more recent, however. Thucydides reports that Athens “accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation into consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on their border, and of harboring runaway slaves.” Thucydides’ description of the Athenian response: a “Megara Decree, excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbors and of the market of Athens.” (1.139.2)

The Megarians declared that this degree stood “in defiance of the treaty (1.67), and the Spartans apparently agreed. The decree was the price of peace; the Spartans informed the Athenians that “war could be prevented if they revoked the Megara decree” (1.139.2) and it was on the question of whether or not to revoke the decree (for, said those against it, there was “folly [in] allowing it to stand in way of peace” (1.139.4). In face of these questions Pericles was dismissive:

I hope that none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbor as commands before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery. [1.40.4, emphasis added]

The argument that Thucydides puts into Pericles’ mouth is simple: the coming war is not really about the decree at all, but more fundamental questions of power and rank. Is Athens subordinate to Sparta? Or are the two polis equal in rank? That was the real question being decided by this war. Any “ostensible cause” to get things rolling would do—in this case that ostensible cause just happened to be the embargo of Megara.

Readers will notice a similarity between Pericles’ talk of “ostensible causes” and Thucydides’ earlier distinction between “immediate” and “real“ causes of the war. This cannot be coincidence, though it is difficult to tell if Thucydides places this argument in Pericles’ mouth to strengthen his own argument about the cause of the war, or if Pericles’s understanding of the war’s origins is part of the reason Thucydides admires him so. By the time Pericles made this statement he was probably correct. That the Spartans hoped to use the issue as a stand in for the competition between the two polis was proven by the uncompromising demand that followed it:

“”Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.” (1.39.3)

But how did the Athenians get into this position, handing the Spartans such an easy cause to justify their war with? We do not know. Thucydides’ editorial decisions have made the Megarian decree something of a mystery. The Megarians and the Spartans maintained that the decree was a violation of the treaty of peace, though just how it was a breach in the treaty we are not sure. The Megarians formally listed their reasoning during the 431 conference of the Peloponnesian allies (1.67.4), but Thucydides does not relate the speech, nor tell us anything about it except that it was given. Of the debates that led the Athenians to enact the degree even less is written. We do not, in fact, even know what year the decree was enacted, or whether it came before or after the disputes with Corinth. Though we are told some Athenians argued for its repeal in the face of Spartan demands, their arguments, like that of the Megarians, are only mentioned in a sentence or two of narrative, as mere context for the speech given by Pericles that I have quoted above.

See this for what it is: Thucydides has omitted from his history a central cause of the war! This was not an oversight. It may have been the entire point of Book I. In Thucydidean terms, the Megarian decree was (as Thucydides has Pericles say) “a trifle.” It was an “ostensible cause” of the great war, but not its true one. A war of this magnitude could not be caused by trifles, and to drive home the point of just how trifling and irrelevant this causus belli was to the war’s actual conduct, Thucydides crafts a narrative of the war that does not include it at all. This is clever, and Thucydides’ contemporaries, quite aware of the decree’s details, probably considered the omission quite artful.

While we don’t know the details of the debates surrounding the decree, it is easy to see how reporting those debates in detail might have undermined Thucydides’ narrative. Did the Athenians enact the decree in ignorance of its long-term consequences—was it merely an angry and reflexive response to a localized spat with the Megarians? If that was the case, then many would say that the Athenians stumbled into the war blindly, unaware of the import their actions would have on broader Hellas. What better caricature of bumbling democracy could there be? This image of Athens would serve Thucydides well later in his narrative, but it is at odds with his idealized portrait of Athens under Pericles, a time when “what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen” (2.65). This was the clear-sighted visionary whose guiding hand might have led Athens to victory! Bumbling into a great war does not match the narrative.

On the other hand, if the Athenians knew exactly what they were doing in enacting the decree, then the decree was a challenge—a deliberate attempt to humiliate the Spartans, weaken their alliance, and goad them into war. If this is true then Thucydides’ grand narrative is weakened even more than if the Megarian degree was a simple, bumbling mistake. Sparta’s decision for war would then be less a fearful reaction to forty years of growing Athenian power than a measured response to a deliberate insult.

Thanks to Thucydides, we do not know which of these is the true story. What we do know is that we do not have the true story. We cannot trust Thucydides to give us an honest picture of the past.

The gaps in Thucydides’ account of the Megarian Decree are not unique. They appear again and again in the first book of the History, and creep even into the beginning sections of Book II. Many of these are moments Thucydides would have observed first hand. Thucydides reports that the Athenians debated the alliance with Corcyra twice before agreeing to dispatch two ships to the island’s defense. But his description is terse: “in the first assembly there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representatives of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on.” (1.44.3). What the arguments of each side were, and why the public feeling changed so forcefully in favor of Corcyra (perhaps the influence of Pericles?), is never revealed. The debates where the Athenians decided their demands on Potidaea are also ignored. And as mentioned earlier, the speeches against the general war, though noted, are not described in detail. Indeed, in all of Book I’s eighty pages, Thucydides includes only one speech from Athens’s internal debates, the speech in which Pericles declares that Sparta “always had designs against us” and that the time for Athens to go to war in defense of their rank had come, “without caring whether the ostensible cause [for war] be great or small” (1.141.4).

Clever, is it not? Thucydides first book is a polemic. It is designed to prove that this was a war decades in the making, a product of Sparta’s growing fear over Athens growing power. For this scheme to work the growth of Athenian power must seem incessant and inevitable; it must be a trend beyond the control of individual men. But the actual course of events preceding the war suggests that this was hardly the case—before 433 BC, there was a rough balance of power between the two blocs.  Athens was the master of the sea. Sparta was master of the land. With a few exceptions codified during the last peace, Athenian activities were restricted to Ionia and the Aegean. The Athenians had no interests in the Peloponnese, nor on the Adriatic coasts or in Sicily. In these regions their power was not growing. What threat the Athenians presented was to Spartan pride and self-esteem. The Athenians put all of Greece to shame with their massive temples and marble monuments. The Athenians built structures that surpassed Pan-Hellenic temples in Delphi; they hosted festivals no one in Greece could compete with. But until the affair in Corcyra, the Athenians showed no new geopolitical ambitions. The expedition to Corcyra almost did not happen. What if it hadn’t?

It is a question worth asking. Opposition within Athens to the decisions of these years was constant, though it is difficult to know for what reasons this opposition arose. Perhaps it was because many in Athens earnestly did not wish a war with Sparta? If Thucydides’s glowing picture of Athen’s first citizen is to be trusted, it is likely that events proceded as they did only because the leadership of famed Pericles. If Pericles had died years before, would there have been a war with Sparta? Had the opposition kept Athens out the Corcyran affair, would the Corinthians still have dragged the rest of the Peloponnesian League to war? Had the Athenians not directly challenged Sparta through the insult of the Megara decree, would the Spartans have been so eager to listen to the Corinthian call?

We cannot know the answer to these questions. This is no accident: we cannot know the answer to these questions only because Thucydides does not want us to dwell on the answers to them. This suggests that the answers to these questions, if known and considered, would place a dent in his explanation for the war. Thucydides is not a historian to be trusted.

Much more could be said on this theme. The Spartan decision for war seems no more inevitable than the Athenian one. It was Corinthian interests, not Spartan ones, at stake in Corcyra and Potidaea. Sparta could sacrifice these without the loss of anything but face. (Indeed, when the war began it was not clear to the Lacedaemonians that complete control of the littoral to their west and north would have damaged Sparta in any real way. Athens had complete control of the sea during the last war, after all, but she still lost it). The Corinthians had embarked upon a “private enterprise” (1.66) against the Athenians for the sake of “sectional interests” (1.82.6)—e.g., an enterprise whose profits would go to no one but themselves. The Spartans were clearly divided on the wisdom on helping them; it took substantial Corinthian lobbying of all the allies (1.119), direct insults to Sparta (1.68-1.71), two separate councils of war, and, as Joe Byerly has pointed out earlier in this roundtable, a manipulative method of voting, before the the Spartan war party took control. Even then Spartans were slow to act. A little less than a year would pass between the Spartan decision to go to war and the actual waging of it, and it was not Sparta, but her ally Thebes, who fired the first shot. In contrast to the quick moving Thebans, eager to take their enemies by surprise, Thucydides reports that it was not until the Thebans launched their attack on Plataea that the Peloponnesians began to truly “prepare for war.” The Spartans then sent to the Athenians yet another herald in search of peace (2.12), and followed this up by campaigning and marching with special slowness in hope that the Athenians might change their mind (2.18).

The image of Sparta painted here is quite different from that suggested by Thucydides’ claim that the war was waged by a frightened Sparta. The Spartans did not fear the Athenians enough to immediately launch her full fury against Attica before the Athenians had time to prepare a defense. Giving the Athenians a last chance for peace was more important to the Spartans than dealing a crushing opening blow when the war began. Perhaps this is because they thought they could easily defeat the Athenians (in which case, what was there to fear?); perhaps it was because they did not see the war as inevitable at all. The total picture one gets of Sparta on the eve of war is of a people divided, dragged into a war many did not care for because of the machinations of their allies and the deliberate insults of their enemies. It was less fear that drove Sparta to war than honor (see esp 1.86.5); their aim was not to rob Athens of her power, but of her pride.

On this count the Athenians were not so different. Pericles says the Athenians must go to war to prove to the Lacedaemonians—and, we assume, the rest of Hellas—that they were the equal of great Sparta. But this was tacitly acknowledged in the treaty of the Thirty Year’s peace, which divided the world into discrete spheres of influence, one led by Sparta, the others by Athens. Only in the immediate years preceding the war did the Athenians do anything that might challenge this arrangement. Why weren’t the Athenians willing to accept this status quo? The answer is not found until Book II, when Thucydides puts the answer into the mouth of Pericles:

Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause (2.41).

A review of the origins and first moments of this war suggests that it was less a matter of growing fear and growing power, than a matter of tarnished honor and quests for glory. Athens’ growing wealth was a necessary condition for the war, but it was hardly the only or the most important cause of it. Had Athens’ quest for glory been less ambitious, had Sparta not tied herself to an ally hellbent on forcing her private wars and narrow interests onto the entire league of Spartan allies, and had the Greeks not been a people obsessed with insults, rank, and honor, this war may never have occurred. It was not an inevitable clash of fear and power that brought war to Hellas, but a very specific set of decisions made by a very specific set of leaders in the years before the war.

In some ways this is a heartening conclusion. The war was not inevitable—it was not the preordained result of some inhuman “Thucydides trap.” If this war was not inevitable then conflicts between the rising and settled powers of our day are not inevitable either.

Not all of the implications of this conclusion are so heart-warming. The war between Athens and Sparta is misunderstood. It was not a war between a rising power and an existing hegemon. It was not, as is so often told, caused by a hegemon who failed to find a place for a growing newcomer in the existing order. That better describes the first war between Athens and Sparta. The war of Thucydides’ day was different. It was a war between two powers who had already reached a rough state of bipolar equilibrium. The Spartans had already accommodated the rise of Athens; at the end of their last war they had not torn down their walls, nor compelled them to give up their empire. Instead they had given the Athenians a secure place in the Greek world, a sphere of interests in which the Spartans agreed not to interfere. The lesson of the Peloponnesian War, may actually be the opposite of what many who invoke “Thucydides traps” intend! ‘Accommodating’ a rising power does not promise peace. The stability of such an accommodation depends very much on the nature of the power being accommodated.

What exactly prompted the Athenians to change tack in the 430s is hard to discern. Though the Athenians did not formally break the treaty, they instigated more than one “event… which [was] equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter for war,” especially the decisions to embargo the Megarans and war against the Corinthians in defense of Corcyra (1.146). It is possible that the Athenians stumbled into these decisions unaware of their consequences. But if Athens was truly led by one man, and that man was half the leader that Thucydides claims he was, then this is unlikely. It is from the mouth of Pericles, not that of the Spartan war party, that we hear the claim that the war was inevitable. Pericles was quite clear about his priorities: what he sought was Athenian glory, glory to be remembered through the ages. He believed that Sparta would never let Athens seize such glory unmolested. Thus the Athenians were to persist in war, despite any peace offers received before it began or destruction wreaked upon their fields and homes afterwards. The Athenians could not reconcile their ambitions with Spartan hegemony—or even a rough and tacit parity. What tore apart Hellas, then, was not a hegemon caught in a Thucydidean trap of fear, but a polis whose quest for glory could not be sated by stable equilibrium.

Take from that what lessons you will.

16 Responses to “Thucydides Roundtable, Books I & II: Everybody Wants a Thucydides Trap”

  1. Zen Says:

    Excellent post.
    There is also the question of Corinthian ambitions within the Peloponnesian League entering into a dynamic with Athenian ambitions outside it. While the Corinthians and Athenians did not have poor relations per se, Corinth was very aggressive and its actions, while not directed at Athens, impacted the power calculus ( or had the potential to do so) in ways Athens could not ignore. Megara is close to Athens and Cocyra was a naval power. Sparta declined to restrain their ally. This was noticed by the Athenians especially in light of the insult Sparta had given when Athenian hoplites were sent in accordance with a treaty to aid Sparta against a helot rebellion and the Spartans dismissed their aid and sent them home. That went over exceptionally poorly with Athenians and politically embarrassed what had been a friendly, pro-Spartan regime under Cimon. Supposedly this led to Cimon’s downfall but more likely it was a useful pretext or a final straw for the more democratic faction in Athens led by Pericles

  2. Kaiser Says:

    One of the amusing misunderstandings of the notion of the Thucydides Trap I’ve encountered often over the last few years involves people—usually Americans—somehow believing that the incumbent power on the eve of the Peloponnesian War was actually Athens, and not Sparta. They have trouble with an analogy in which the democratic U.S. isn’t Athens, and in which authoritarian China isn’t Sparta.

    As I read this section I wondered often, “Can we think of a situation in the world today that might be analogous to the Corcyra-Corinth conflict—a flashpoint involving Chinese and American clients that might draw in their respective patron states?” Wondering what your thoughts are on this.

  3. A. E. Clark Says:

    This essay persuasively debunks the conventional wisdom on a matter that is crucial to understanding the present as well as the past. It should be required reading in high places.
    If these insights are original, Mr. Greer, this is a breakthrough work, richer than the total output of many an academic career.
    If these insights draw on existing scholarship, you have refashioned them into a lucid and compelling synthesis — also an impressive achievement.
    Either way, kudos!
    As for whether current Chinese attitudes rhyme with 5th-century Athenian attitudes, you are too tactful to elaborate, and I suspect that most of your readers don’t need it spelled out.

  4. A. E. Clark Says:

    Kaiser, you are right that Americans instinctively identify with the archetypal democracy. But there is another reason why they may be uncertain of the correspondence in the putative Trap: Sea power vs. a mighty land army . . .

    As for the “flashpoint involving Chinese and American clients that might draw in their respective patron states” — that sounds like June 1950, no? Today, any flashpoints are more likely to involve the PRC herself, directly.

  5. Zen Says:

    To take up Kaiser’s question:
    In the last 100+ years when China was acting like a regional power ( i e not during the warlord/civil war eras or WWII) Chiina projected power on behalf of other states four times: the Sino-Japanese War where the Q’ing fought Japan over Korea; the Korean War when Communist China intervened on behalf of North Korea to prevent their defeat; during the Vietnam War where China sent an estimated 300,000 support troops to North Vietnam to handle rear echelon tasks and ( I think?) anti-air defenses against US bombing; the 1979 punitive expedition against Vietnam for Hanoi’s invasion and occupation of Khmer Rouge Cambodia.
    From this we can conclude that historically China has made limited but robust use of military force on behalf of other states with which China acts the patron or benefactor where Chinese prestige is seen as being at stake in the military outcome if the smaller state had been left to its own devices. Chinese rulers were willing in each case to sustain substantial casualties to make this point but in no case did the military commitment grow to jeopardize other Chinese vital interests or the stability of the regime. All out commitment (existential) of military force did take place during WWII against the Imperisl Japanese Army in some campaigns by the Kuomintang armies and again later in late stage civil war between the Red Army and the Nationalist armies.
    Today China’s only real military ally is the Kim Family regime in North Korea and China has a security interest in not seeing North Korea collapse or be unified in such a way that the ROK-US alliance would be moved to the Yalu. China’s ability to control North Korean behavior even with carrots and sticks is limited (short of invading and toppling the regime) or cutting off all energy and food trade. As North Korea regularly does provocative military actions against South Korea and Japan, this is the most likely situation to spin out of control due to a miscalculation by Pyongyang and bring China into military conflict with another state, including the United States which is obligated to come to the aid of ROK and Japan if either are attacked. China’s reaction would presumably vary depending on the circumstances but China would fight if its security interests on the peninsula were ignored by South Korea, Japan or the US and would send millions of impoverished North Koreans over the Yalu.

    Elsewhere China has interests rather than client-allies and Chinese military intervention would depend on its realistic power projection capabilities. Situs that could trigger some level of military intervention, coercion or activity would be, in my view:
    Taiwan declaring independence
    A ROK-Japanese conflict
    Indonesia or India blockading Chinese shipping from sea lanes, likely with American assistance
    Pakistan and India escalating toward a full scale nuclear exchange
    Seizure of islands actively controlled by China or Taiwan by another power
    How much the PLA-CCP senior leadership contemplate second and third order effects in these hypothetical scenarios is an open question. Obviously, it would seem that “winning” a tactical aerial battle or short naval conflict Japan would not be a strategic victory if Tokyo’s reaction is to acquire nuclear weapons, which it could do in a relatively short period of time. So could, for that matter Taiwan and South Korea if they felt threatened enough. Having had discussions for close to a decade with American field grade and general officers, their civilian counterparts and academic strategists and observed how narrow, politicized and myopic US decision making really can be, I’m none too confident in Chinese strategizing being much better or free of domestic political-bureaucratic agendas

  6. Neville Morley Says:

    This is a really great discussion, and an excellent take-down of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ idea that persistently gets on my nerves; the latter is a fascinating case study in scholarly branding, so to speak, using the recognition factor of Thucydides’ name and reputation to lend credibility to a highly arguable theory – that may indeed prove dangerous, given that some commentators (at least in the US) seem to have responded by urging escalation: if war is inevitable, make sure you’re in the stronger position for when it arrives.

    I’m going to do the classicist thing again, and note that this is another occasion where relying on translations can lead to misleading claims about what Thucydides actually said and meant. This is indeed one of the punchiest pronouncements in Thucydides – in translation (and not just in Crawley’s translation). However, the original Greek is much more complex and convoluted, and one of the reasons that the English looks quite blunt and straightforward is that most translators make the choice to break a long and confusing sentence into a series of separate statements. Of course the aim is to render Thucydides’ ideas clearly and accurately (unless you think, as I sometimes do, that the complex language is part of the point: we are *supposed* to struggle to work out what he means) – but inevitably this involves taking one interpretation rather than another, and ironing out uncertainties.

    My attempt at a more literal rendition of the whole sentence: “For the truest cause [prophasis, which can also mean excuse or alleged cause], but the most concealed by argument [or: the least spoken of], I consider the Athenians becoming great and having produced fear in the Lacedaimonians to have compelled [them?] to war; but the reasons [aitiai] being spoken openly were [as follows] of each side, by which having broken the treaties they embarked on the war.”

    One reason for stressing this is that it isn’t completely clear that Thucydides claims the war was inevitable; this could be read as suggesting that the Spartans *felt* compelled to go to war because of their fear, rather than that they *were* compelled by some supernatural force. Implying that Thucydides might agree with a lot more of this post than one would necessarily expect on the basis of the usual translation; the war was *not* inevitable, but the result of developments to which either side could have responded differently, or indeed have acted to de-escalate.

  7. Grurray Says:

    “With a few exceptions codified during the last peace, Athenian activities were restricted to Ionia and the Aegean. ”
    That’s a big exception isn’t it?
    The other analogy, besides the ones already mentioned, is one of the colonial power vs the people’s liberation army. It also gets a little muddled in the ideological soup. Spartans, even though they had a system of slavery, were seen as liberating Athens’ vassals from the Athenian hegemony and, more importantly, the tyranny of democracy.
    With democracy there’s always the possibility that what becomes law is whatever the people happen to decide depending on their latest whims. This was a direct threat to the Spartan feudal system that was based on power and tradition and castes. An Athenian alliance with the Helots could spell disaster for the Spartans.

  8. T. Greer Says:


    A good question.
    This is one respect in which the Spartans are more like the U.S. Democratic and Naval we may be, but our alliance system–in Asia at least–is built mostly on bilateral security agreements, not a collective security regime. The Spartan case seems to be very similar. The Athenians seemed to have started with something like NATO, but over time slowly turned into an empire. This is not the American way of doing things.


    Distinguishing features of Corinth’s place in the alliance structure: ambitious and powerful great power, with interests far from home and the capability of pursuing them. Fully independent power whose interests do not quite align with her hegemon’s. Too small to take on an opposing super power alone, but large enough that the threat to defect (silly in any case: who were the Corinthians going to join, Athens?) forces her super-power ally to take desperate measures.


    So that’s gotta be Japan or India.


    If we want a blow-by-blow parallel it would look something like this:


    Its 2033 and a baloch insurgency (Epidamnos) runs amok in Pakistan (Corcya). Leadership escapes to India (Corinth), and the Indians begin their own special ops raids into India, doing to Pakistan what the Pakistanis have been doing to India since the ’80s. The Pakistanis ask for Chinese (Athenian) support putting down the rebellion engulfing them, and the Chinese decide to send in a few special advisors to train Pakistani troops, and perhaps give them access to Chinese satellite based intelligence as well. There’s a clash that goes poorly for the Indians, and now there is call for Chinese blood in New Delhi. China sees the writing on the wall and tries to expel all Indian agents out of its protectorates in Nepal, Burma, and Tibet; the Indians begin to filter in special forces to these same places (Potidaea). New Delhi is now very close to a war with China, and in alarm turns to the U.S.-Japan-Australia diamond military alliance (Peloponnesean League), signed 15 years earlier, asking for a per-emptive strike. Japan (Thebes) jumps the gun by seizing the Senkakus (Plataea).


    Probably won’t happen like that. That was fun to write though.


    I have previously argued that the U.S. has made a mistake in so carelessly letting the Japanese expand the SDF and revise their constitution precisely because I fear they may become a modern day Corinth. A lot of that depends on timing, though. Right now Japan is the only possible Corinth; India might fill those shoes when she signs an alliance with us in ten years (present trends continuing). But for the moment, it’s all about Japan.

  9. T. Greer Says:

    @A.E. Clark–

    I have had a version of this essay stewing in my head for a bout two years. Part of the reason I was eager for this roundtable to begin was because I knew it would force me to sit down and actually write it out.


    (Other long form essays in my head but nowhere else: a comparison between Lord of the Rings and Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a survey of all Chinese literature and philosophy on the theme of tragedy, a series of essays on the death of the humanities and how they ought to be taught, notes on the grand strategy of Rome and a strategy-centric explanation of Rome’s fall, a comparison of multiculturalism as experienced by America’s poor and America’s rich, and yet another explanation of why Trump happened. Alas, I write so much slower than I think!)


    This essay benefited from insights by other historians, especially Donald Kagan and J.E. Lendon. The first tipped me off to the importance of the Megara decree, though his argument focuses more on the non-Thucydidean material (e.g. the comic poet Aristophanes suggests in his lampoons that the decree was the cause of the war). To Lendon I must give credit the idea that this entire war was an affair of rank and honor. With that said, I do not recall either one using the precise examples that I used above. It would be accurate to say that familiarity with their theses led me to pay special attention to passages that supported (or disproved) what they wrote.


    Both wrote contrarian histories arguing Thucydides explanation for why the war happened doesn’t work, mostly on the grounds that Athenian power was not actually growing. Both write as if they are radicals for saying this, but as they wrote the two most respected histories of the war in recent times I can’t imagine their position is that radical. (Neville will probably be able to say better than I can where the current scholarly consensus is). With that said, they don’t agree on much else; it would be accurate to say my essay was an attempt to synthesize their perspectives with a few twists of my own.


    The single insight that I am most proud of here is that Pericles’ theory of the war’s origin is essentially the same as Thucydides’. I am sure this cannot be a completely original observation–so many have written about Thucydides after all!–but I’m fairly proud that I was able to connect that dot without any outside guidance.


    Which leaves me with a question for @Neville- is there anything in the original Greek that suggests the comparison between Pericles discussion of causes (1.40.4) and Thucydides early discussion of the same(1.23)isn’t quite as natural as it seems in this translation?

  10. Neville Morley Says:

    Sorry for belated reply. Assuming you mean 1.140.4, I don’t think there is anything in the Greek that directly echoes or references 1.23 – but at the same time I think it would be entirely natural to read what Pericles has to say about the demands being made by the Spartans as picking up on Thucydides’ comments about the pretexts/reasons which were openly expressed, i.e. that this isn’t really about the Megaran decree.

  11. Neville Morley Says:

    In relation to Kagan, there’s a very interesting discussion in Jeanne Morefield’s 2014 book on Anglo-American political thought and its links to imperialism. Her argument is that K needs to prove Thucydides wrong in order to legitimise his own beliefs: to reconcile love of freedom and aggressive US foreign policy by rejecting the Thucydidean reading of Athenian hubris followed nemesis at Syracuse and by presenting the Pel War as *not* inevitable.

  12. zen Says:

    Hi Neville,
    I think Kagan has spent a fair amount of time drilling down on what might be called Thucydides’ sins of omission or balance in the text. This of course is not the same thing as “proving Thucydides wrong” as Kagan illuminating possible biases in Thucydides approach. I’m not sure how we would go about proving Thucydides wrong given the paucity of texts, though you would know more about what evidence about competing sources might be brought to bear.
    A friend of mine, Dave Schuler, who blogs at The Glittering Eye, raised the question in an email to me about the age of the manuscripts on which historians are relying and the possibility of selective preservation or editing of Thucydides by Medieval Church or Islamic authorities. Could you comment upon that question?

  13. Neville Morley Says:

    The basic problem is that we have very little contemporary evidence to set alongside Thucydides; a lot of the discussion, in Kagan and others, ends up as an attempt to read his account critically on the basis of what we think he might not be telling us, or might be distorting.

    The question about texts is a good one. There’s no evidence that I know of him being read in the Islamic world, and he disappeared from Western Europe completely during the Middle Ages – so no chance for the Church to make changes. Reappears in 14th century with translation of 38 speeches into Aragonese, presumably from a text brought from the East. Full Latin translation in following century. What we don’t know, other than the usual philological analysis, is how far the text may have been distorted before that, but there isn’t any obvious motive for deliberate changes rather than mistakes in copying.

  14. John Winterton Says:

    Neville – it is indeed the case that, at 1.23.6, one doesn’t have to (and perhaps shouldn’t) translate ‘anagkasai’ as ‘made inevitable’. But how then should one take Pericles’ statement at 1.144.3: ‘eidenai de chre hoti anagke polemein’? Should it be: ‘But you should know that war is inevitable’, or something less categorical? And in any case, should one aim to translate 1.144.3 in such a way as to echo one’s translation of 1.23.6, on the grounds that Thucydides may well be intending a link between the two?

  15. Neville Morley Says:

    It’s really tricky; clearly Pericles wants to present the Athenians as the injured party, not as the aggressors, but it’s ambiguous as to whether war is coming as a matter of inecessity (blamed on circumstances, so implying inevitability) or as a matter of compulsion (blamed on the Spartans). Maybe best to leave it ambiguous – “You must know that war is being forced upon us” – and to consider that we don’t have to take Pericles at face value, but could see this as Thucydides subtly exposing his weasel words; the obvious British analogy would be Tony Blair’s “Of course we don’t want to go to war, but we have no choice” in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.

    So, you could translate this in ways that echo 1.23, if you think that’s what T intended – but not if you don’t. The issue, as I said, is that any translation closes down some of the ambiguities and uncertainties in the original.

  16. Neville Morley Says:

    Damn spelling errors. “…whether war is coming as a matter of necessity…”

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