Tom Barnett’s Communique to the Barbarians
First, I read this as a Mongolfier kind of trial balloon, a plausibly deniable rough draft of a Shanghai Communique 2.0 where Chinese rulers lay out their internal consensus “red line” vital interests and what they will put on the table in return, without any risk of “losing face”.
Secondly, while most of the critical noise will be over the security-military relationship, Taiwan and the total omission of Japan (!), I find the economics the most interesting section. Never before in history have two great powers with so little in common, who were not allies, so deeply entangled themselves in each others economies, basically to the point of no return. This piece tells me China’s leaders realize that a path of confrontation with America or pursuing beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy indefinitely, will mean the destruction of a generation of painfully accumulated surplus wealth, held largely in dollars and treasury securities. China’s elite would rather “double-down” on their bet on America instead of attempting to painfully wrench themselves free and cut their losses by cashing in devalued chips.
That concern is the apex of realism – a good variable to see at a time when nationalistic hubris and hypersensitivity have increasingly been on display in China’s foreign relations with great powers and weak neighbors alike. That kind of realism, other countries can do business with.
What are your thoughts?
ADDENDUM:
Tom has added his briefing slides
Page 2 of 2 | Previous page
Joseph Fouche:
November 24th, 2010 at 5:52 am
A better strategy: Immediately slap 60% (or higher) tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States. Print many, many, many, many more dollars. Build many, many more U.S. nuclear attack and ballistic submarines. Withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. Central Asia is a bridge too far for anything but rhetoric. Encourage Taiwan to develop nuclear armed ballistic missiles. Throw in Japan for good measure. Extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. If China tries to reabsorb Taiwan by force, Shanghai and Peiping will glow with an eerie otherworldly radiance. Encourage the modernization of Vietnam’s military, especially its capacity to rapidly move troops and weapons to its northern border. Encourage the Australians, Vietnamese, and anyone else to purchase more subs. Stop criticizing Russia’s conduct of its internal affairs. Complain loudly about Chinese human rights, especially its oppression of the right of the Uighurs and Tibetans (as well as the Taiwanese) to national self-determination. Don’t give up symbolic tokens like support for human rights, suffering Tibetans, etc. unless you extract real flesh from China in exchange. China and its Western enablers have so convinced China’s leadership that China is inevitable while the West is fading that they’ve become unhinged. The U.S. currently suffers from strategic understretch.
historyguy99:
November 24th, 2010 at 7:10 am
Hi Mark,
I would agree that this a timely move on Tom’s part that opens up diagloge that decidly was published as you noted in the People’s Daily and so must contain enough candy, to get the informed Netizens, who tend to be very nationalistic, interested in supporting a consensus that having a win-win situation with the U.S. is better than a zero-sum ending.
Here is a link to a study about the New Foreign Policy Actors in China. That might be helpful as a playbook in understanding how policy decisions are reached.
http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf
Larry Dunbar:
November 24th, 2010 at 8:14 am
"A better strategy: Immediately slap 60% (or higher) tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States. Print many, many, many, many more dollars." To me this means war with China. Not much of a strategy in itself. And what are we going to do with all that flesh, we can’t even eat most of the stuff they send us now. However, it does sound like what most of those 30-40 year olds are asking for, a pound of flesh. Which is fine, it is your world to begin to command. So if this is what you want for your children to control, so be it.
Curtis Gale Weeks:
November 24th, 2010 at 2:48 pm
The U.S. is, on the whole, far more resilient than China. In other words, China has more to gain from continued peace and increased cooperation with the U.S. and more to lose if these do not occur.
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I mentioned once before the general, overriding neurosis in the U.S., which could be summed up as "We must wait on the Chinese." Too many strategists start from the proposition that the U.S. has inherent weakness; and, applying this proposition to our relations with China, default to the above neurosis. There is the minority report — heh — by some suffering from the supposition that the U.S. is inherently weak: take a hard line, or take China out, now before the U.S. disintegrates as a/the world superpower. (This latter class may easily be confused with the class that believes the U.S. is, has been, and always will be super-super-empowered on the world stage; i.e. that type of jingoist.)
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This is not to say that we have nothing to gain from increased cooperation with China and nothing to lose from a deterioration in our relations with China; merely, that the stakes aren’t as great for us as for China.
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I cannot say whether Barnett’s strategy is informed by a notion of inherent U.S. weakness or is merely an acknowledgment that we can gain from improved relations and cooperation with China (irrespective of what China has to gain or lose although those considerations would also inform Barnett’s strategy.) There is, behind Barnett’s strategy, the general supposition that increased and more efficient vertical controls by nation-states, operating together, are required; this has always informed his strategy, regardless of considerations involving China.
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I think that our response to China on the world stage should take into account the above. Modest reassurances to achieve modest gains and prevent distractions seem appropriate. In general, I think we should look closer to home, at Mexico for instance (and contemplate increased interaction with, perhaps union with, Canada and Mexico, at least as a long-term goal informing what we do if not an outright plan to be implemented post-haste.) We should look to Brazil, and Central and South America in general. We do not need joint naval exercises with China to achieve these things; etc.
Curtis Gale Weeks:
November 24th, 2010 at 2:55 pm
Oh, and I forgot to mention India. ’nuff said. Maybe I’ll say more: increased cooperation with India, although it could be a moderate increase, will go fairly far in helping to prevent distractions from China and moderate Chinese actions in the region, without requiring such in-depth integration of efforts proposed by Barnett and hard-and-fast guarantees made to China. We wouldn’t even need in-depth integration of efforts with India for this.
slapout9:
November 24th, 2010 at 5:19 pm
I am confused on how Barnett thinks this could be done with an Executive order. That dosen’t seem to be legal to me. Is there anybody that could shed some light on this?
zen:
November 24th, 2010 at 5:53 pm
Hi Gents,
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It can’t, Slap. Which I am sure Tom realizes ( though he probably wishes it were the case). What I think the Chinese see is Medvedev twisting in the wind right now on START on the word of one US senator ( Kyl has done a good job garnering much needed funds for our nuclear labs, but barring some major unknown problem, the treaty should be ratified) and HistoryGuy upthread, who has a lot of firsthand China experience, is on target when he pointed out that there are things there designed to sound good to a Chinese audience.
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Generally agree with Curtis that it is a mistake to see China as 10 feet tall and that this is logical continuity of Tom’s strategic thinking. I suspect Tom is very much interested in arresting any momentum of "the big war crowd" that would like to turn China into our near-peer enemy permanently for budgetary reasons.
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Joseph Fouche has laid out another kind of "balancing" that we are likely to see if Sino-American relations drift further toward a "cold peace"
Lexington Green:
November 24th, 2010 at 9:42 pm
Joseph Fouche’s comment reminds me of Lord Salisbury’s observation that Britain should have backed the Confederacy and broken up the United States and eliminated it as a competitor when it had the chance, and that such opportunities are not granted to any power twice.
Dave Schuler:
November 25th, 2010 at 12:40 pm
I doubt that we would be able to enforce our side of Tom’s bargain to China’s satisfaction without major changes to our society that, simply stated, we won’t make. Will we impose censorship on our newspapers and foreclose freedom of speech here? Without those measures we can’t eliminate some of the things that China considers U. S. interference in its internal affairs..I also think that Tom’s piece assumes that China’s rulers are more interested in a prosperous and peaceful future for China than in "preserving harmony", i.e. staying in power. Not a good assumption. China has gone mad in the past and it may well do so in the future. Remember the Cultural Revolution? Some of the guys in charge now were the young thugs then..China isn’t forcing us to spend beyond our means and it isn’t forcing us to sell it Treasury notes. It also isn’t forcing us to sell land and other U. S. assets to foreigners (a willingness rather rare among nations). China isn’t forcing us or the Europeans to export our air, water, and land pollution to China (and our heavy industries along with them).
zen:
November 26th, 2010 at 6:33 am
Hi Dave,
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Yeah, Tom’s assumption is that that economic liberalization over a period of generations yields an eventually more democratic, consumerist, middle-class, Westernized China that is too burdened by a massive elderly population to cause much in the way of mischief and that more human rights/democracy now demands right now are pointlessly unrealistic. I’m not as optimistic that China’s rulers will voluntarily mellow their system so much as try to legitimize their continued monopoly of power as an explicit model of "Asian" consensus.
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Hi Lex,
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I think our shot was 1989 and we blew it.
Larry Dunbar:
November 28th, 2010 at 9:17 pm
" merely, that the stakes aren’t as great for us as for China." So when South Korea’s economy is destroyed by bombardment from the North, and we have to supplement their economy with ours, this is more a burden on China , than us ? Interesting analysis. Maybe the North will make it short and sweet. On the other hand, I am sure China or Japan will be more than willing to pick up this debt, which we will accumulate otherwise ;)"I think our shot was 1989 and we blew it." Wasn’t your shot lost when Carter became president and gave China favorite status? Bad day for Nixionites, you think? As a Sith lord he must have had something else planed. Too bad he was distracted at the end there, just saying…"China isn’t forcing us or the Europeans to export our air, water, and land pollution to China (and our heavy industries along with them)." yeah, my guess is that it’s those multi-national corporations based mostly in the clean environment of the USA and their insatiable appetites for the generation of diversity (profits). Go figure! Maybe it is better to be inviting than ignored, as a wise man once told me?