A Short Analysis on The Whyte-Barnett Sino-American Grand Strategy Proposal
A few comments on the proposed Whyte-Min-Barnett Grand Strategy Executive Agreement for a Sino-American partnership that Dr. Barnett has been deeply engaged with the past few months.
First, a caveat: while Tom has involved me in aa few of his past projects, I was not involved in this one and know only what I have read recently. Secondly, while I know a bit about China in an academic sense, it is not an area of research for me nor am I up to speed on the current politics of China’s generational transfer of power/power struggle. Those readers who are avid China watchers should chime in with comments.
As an overview, I think the proposal’s specific terms should be viewed less seriously individually than the gesture itself, which represents in my view a very significant trial balloon signal from China’s leadership that they see a need to negotiate a successor to the long outgrown cornerstone of Chinese-American relations, the Shanghai Communique, signed during Nixon’s historic summit with Mao. A new agreement would provide some updated “rules of the road” that would defuse potential and existing tensions and allow the US and China to tackle some urgent problems in the global economy. By using a semi-official independent set of pundits ( Whyte and Min) and a maverick private sector American geostrategist ( Tom) with close ties to the Pentagon, China can advance it’s talking points and interest in negotiating without any loss of face that an official inquiry risks as a result of America’s fractious domestic partisan politics.
Read up on the secret diplomatic minuet that ensued between the US and China 1969-1972.
China’s leadership seems to have invested a sizable heavyweight participation in this proposal, Tom cites:
– Former Minister of Foreign Affairs;
– Former UN ambassador,
– Former U.S. ambassador,
– Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA,
– Former Military Attaché to North Korea and Israel,
– Former Vice Minister of Commerce,
– President of Shanghai Institutes of International Studies,
– China’s Central Party School Institute of International Strategic Studies,
– Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs,
– China Center for International Economic Exchanges,
– China Institute For International Strategic Studies,
– China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies,
– Boao Forum,
– China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
This has resulted in a document that unsurprisingly leans strongly towards China’s interpretation of a good Sino-American partnership but this proposal is not holy writ, it is a red flag ( pun intended) for bargaining to begin. A plea, really by a leadership craving greater certainty, medium term security and “recognition” ( i.e. “face” or “respect” – this is very much like Brezhnev and Kosygin deeply desiring that the USSR be seen as an equal to the US, except unlike the Soviets, China actually has a productive economy) Imagine a US doc shepherded by a comparable set of former and current powerbrokers, the Council of Foreign Relations, CNAS, Carnegie, CNA, SSI, Brookings, AEI, Hoover, the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic Parties and the president of Harvard. Would that catch the attention of foreign observers?
I am not sure if it is being received that way over here. My perception – and I freely admit to having large gaps of knowledge – is that US policy toward China is determined below the NSC level and not in a strategic fashion by a) Treasury b) the Fed c) PACOM in that order , pursuing contradictory policy goals and without proper coordination while State, which should be taking a lead role, is a quiet secondary voice relegated to managing lower level, day to day, routine problems in ad hoc fashion. Some carping and special pleading from Congress is erratically inserted into the mix. If someone in the Obama administration is the China policy “czar” it is obscure to me. It must be obscure to Beijing as well or they would be having their ambassador or foreign minister pushing these proposals to their American counterparts in a normal fashion instead of Tom.
Barnett, Whyte and Min devote a great deal of space to bilateral and global economics relationships. They should. The magnitude of the Sino-American monetary and trade relationship and it’s evolved distortions between two nations that are radically dissimilar, understand one another poorly and are not allied are actually scary. Immense quanties of locked up capital – and we are talking epic figures that dwarf the interwar period European “dollar gap” or even that of the postwar era remedied by the Marshall Plan – ultimately create money scarcity elsewhere in the global economy until trade breaks down in political reaction or the ebb of a medium of mutual exchange. That money needs to begin circulating via productive investment and Chinese policies creating this structural imbalance need to be phased out. How exactly this should be done is beyond my ken, but that something needs to be done is obvious.
Dr. Barnett, as I understand his strategic thinking, takes the long view and is willing to concede in the short term what would be impossible to sustain in the long term anyway (“locking in tomorrow’s China at today’s prices” ) and is concerned about defense contractors eager to make China the justification for hyperexpensive weapons mega-platforms ultimately inculcating over time thinking that carelessly slides the United States toward a needless great power war with China. A position mirrored by China’s own ambitious self-dealing military asshats.
Is Tom’s view the last word? No. but it is disturbing to me that a strategic relationship as we have with China is not being handled by American officials with the same attention and degree long term focus we give to Europe.
What do the Sinologists out there say?
January 4th, 2011 at 4:45 am
This should be an embarrassment to the current Obama administration, and the alumni of its predecessor under Mr. Bush. Whether you like Barnett’s road map or not (and it looks pretty good to me, with some caveats) it is imperative that there be a road map. As far as I can tell, there is drift, handwringing and the Pentagon budget and not much else. As we all know, you can’t revise a blank piece of paper. This is a serious first cut at a grand bargain. Mr. Obama should probably backburner the entire domestic agenda for a year, let Congress fight it out, and focus on this sort of thing. After you get your ass handed to you by the electorate, you can at least get respect talking to foreigners. And a massive influx of Chinese investment, or at least a reasonable expectation of it, might give a real boost to the economy, and hence to his reelection bid. Bravo to TPMB for getting this onto the table. Let’s see what the Americans do with it. I hope Hillary has read it.
January 4th, 2011 at 4:55 am
Well said, Lex. I am genuinely worried that no one is at the bridge on this one. That Tom did this and received such a response from the Chinese side is frigging weird. It means phone calls have gone unanswered. For years.
January 4th, 2011 at 4:20 pm
To contextualize the CUSGSAP, start by parsing the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111701090.html?sid=ST2009111700768">November 20009 joint press statement of Messrs. President Hu and President Obama.</a> It’s ripe with positive statements about bilateral relationship, but all the ‘agreeing’ relates to conceptual thinking rather than written agreements. And I think there is good reason for this: Dominant thought leaders from America’s perspective have not yet been primed for the pragmatic, deliberative conversations needed to advance the bilateral relationship between these two elites. For a context starter, how do we reconcile 200+ years of America’s multiple definitions of ideals of freedom and equality with China tradition–nearly 4000 years of continuous history?I’m reading China & America’s Emerging Partnership: A Realistic New Perspective, which is authored by Whyte and Min. With the caution that this book looks like it received no Mark-Warren-like editorial guidance (500 pages, no index), a close read (requires patience, ok?) will reward the reader with a rosetta stone to help understand the critical contexts for deliberative conversation.
January 5th, 2011 at 1:25 am
Hi Lex,
Your hope that Hillary reads this proposal might be in the cards, as the US Ambassador seems to have gotten a copy delivered to him.
Press Release
"For Immediate Release: 31 December 2010
A proposed China-US Grand Strategy Executive Agreement between Presidents Hu and Obama formally delivered today to the China’s State Council and U.S. Ambassador…
Of note is that Ambassador Huntsman seems to be getting some press wanted or not, which may either dampen or enhance this proposal.
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/playing-a-china-card-hidden-genius-in-the-bogus-huntsman-story/68748/
Critt,
I also have been reading Whyte and Min’s China and America’s Emerging Partnership and would agree with your description of it being a sort of Chinese rosetta stone for getting inside their thought process. Their Center for ACP, has a White Paper for the Presidents of America and China, that summerizes the proposal and much of what is in this book; it is well worth downloading and reading.
http://centeracp.com/publications/
Zen,
Great job of summarizing this proposal and for getting it out there for discussion
January 5th, 2011 at 3:46 pm
re: Ambassador Huntsman: dampen or enhance>>That interview is going to raise JH’s effectiveness as ambassador exponentially with the Chinese. The way they like to hedge….<< Enhance. The Red Book (a.k.a [] China and America’s Emerging Partnership) acknowledges the hedge in public rhetoric ;)Nice catch, Historyguy99!
January 5th, 2011 at 3:48 pm
test delete this text
January 5th, 2011 at 3:52 pm
Ok, one more time Test Delete *THIS* comment… Please.
January 5th, 2011 at 3:53 pm
oi