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Friday, June 8th, 2007

THE COMING OF AFRICOM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE VS. EMBRACING DEFEAT*

* image and title shamelessly “liberated” from the multidisciplinarily creative Dan of tdaxp who previously posted an excellent series by the same name.

Two articles with diametrically opposed worldviews of American intervention overseas.The path to error lies in the simplification of both approaches:

Africa Command: The Americans Have Landed” in Esquire by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett
(This article is currently only available in dead tree format)

Rethinking Insurgency” (PDF) at Strategic Studies Institute by Dr. Steven Metz (hat tip to Danger Room)

Tom Barnett’s Esquire article on the newly created AFRICOM is one of his best pieces in “journalist” mode and it demonstrated the dire need for establishing true ( and not primarily “kinetic”) “operational jointness” in interagency cooperation in Africa. This means accepting the inherent complexity of the Gap and answering with synergistic connectivity to globalization in order to engage in societal-building and state-building .

AFRICOM

Dr. Metz also accepts the complexity and interconnectivy of globalization but prescribes defusing conflicts by disengagement, accepting the co-option of aggrieved insurgencies into the national power structure even when they are resolutely hostile to American interests. A graceful retreat does less damage, in Metz’s view, than would sustained conflict fueled by American aid enhancing the power of states to resist insurgencies.

Unsurprisingly, I am in favor of Barnett’s approach but recognize that it is best employed judiciously, with an economy of force and minimalist platforms where aid gives the biggest bang for the buck. Likewise, while I see the Metz approach, if raised to a general rule, as a prescription for strategic erosion of American primacy and the decline of globalization, used with discretion, it is a useful “means-test” for evaluating the strategic importance of failing states and avoiding of the waste of American blood and treasure.

Malawi is not as important as Pakistan, even if al Qaida can be found in both countries. That doesn’t mean ignoring Malawi but that we engage it differently than we do Pakistan.

ADDENDUM:

Steve DeAngelis is also discussing AFRICOM at ERMB

Tuesday, May 22nd, 2007

650,000 MAN ARMY ?

Colonel Austin Bay’s op-ed “The bottom line is, U.S. needs a 650,000-troop Army” in The Houston Chronicle ( hat tip to Rob Thornton at SWC):

“Let’s return to 1990, just before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The U.S. Army had around 750,000 soldiers on active duty; the U.S. Marine Corps had 197,000 Marines. That same year, the U.S. population broke 250 million. Today, the U.S. population is slightly over 300 million.

That “old future” occurred during the final phases of the Cold War. Department of Defense budgeteers had already begun paring Cold War force structure. Though the Soviet Union hadn’t officially dissolved, cost-cutters identified Cold War air wings and armored divisions as expensive legacies.

Desert Storm briefly delayed the planned decline in strength. Based on “the near-term future” the Defense and Congress envisioned, the United States didn’t need Cold War troop levels. However, by 1995, peacekeeping commitments began stressing the personnel system. Then, the United States entered the Balkans, and hasn’t quite left yet.

The Army asked for a 30,000 troop “plus up” in the fiscal year 1997 budget request to meet those personnel requirements. It was denied.The Clinton administration began using the reserves as an operational force rather than as a strategic, war-winning reserve.The Bush administration continued to do this after 9/11, nudging Army end strength from around 480,000 in 2001 to approximately 515,000 today.

While that’s arguably close to the 30,000 “missing” since 1996, it’s a far cry from the forces on hand on Aug. 2, 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s tanks were on the move. It’s also proved to be inadequate to support Iraq, Afghanistan, peacekeeping operations and emergency contingencies”

Read the rest here. I recall when we had 300,000 soldiers in West Germany alone. It wasn’t all that long ago.

I’m inclined to agree that DoD and USG resources can be much better allocated to permit a significant increase on boots on the ground; the tasks assigned to the new boots though, is the critical variable. Not the boots themselves.

The spear needs more “point” and far less “butt”.

Thursday, March 15th, 2007

IS THE INSURGENCY OVER?

Fabius Maximus offers a contrarian argument at DNI -” The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace“. I found this to be one of FM’s most interesting pieces, which should be read in full; I will comment on several points that intrigued me in particular:

Having a bureaucracy, capital, constitution, and seat at the UN does not make a government. Governments have specific characteristics. The more of these they possess, the stronger and more durable they are. The most important attributes:

Control of armed forces, or even monopoly of armed force in its borders.

The ability to levy and collect taxes.

An administrative mechanism to execute its policies.

Territory in which it is the dominant political entity.

Control of borders.

Legitimacy (not love) in the eyes of its people.

The national “government” of Iraq has, by most reports, none of these. It lives on oil revenue and US funding. Its ministries are controlled by ethnic and religious groups, parceled out as patronage and run for their “owners” benefit. The only territory it controls is the Green Zone, by the grace of the Coalition’s armed forces.”

Defining or determining the “legitimacy” of states is one of the stickiest questions in international relations and one in which statesmen, political scientists, historians and international law experts lack a consensus. De jure recognition of other states is a small substantive component but a large diplomatic one and it can matter. Having the consent of the governed, implicitly by primary loyalty or explicitly through an electoral process is critical but it can quickly be frittered away through incompetence and weakness.

What were the Iraq elections? An expression of hope by its people, or an ignorant or delusional attempt at nation-building by America. Perhaps both.

Either way, it was a step on a path to nowhere. Athenian democracy and the Roman republic were built on a foundation of internal political machinery by which the leaders’ decisions were translated into actions. Iraq lacked that after our invasion, and we constructed the government with no supporting bureaucratic mechanisms. Voting does not magically call the necessary apparatus into existence.

The only effective political apparatus in Iraq exists at the local level. Much of that is done by the most basic form of government: only those commanding armed men have a vote.”

The democratic vote in Iraq was a historically important moment, Fabius underestimates the import. He is however, quite correct, that the moment was not capitalized upon nor did the administration even attempt to prepare the interim Iraqi government to do so. Most of the political momentum was lost and democracy as a value was depreciated in the long and mostly pointless wrangling among Iraqi parties that followed. Where was General Leonard Wood when we needed him ?

Fabius also offers some advice:

“Beyond that, there are two possible ways we can help.

First, to secure public spaces in Iraq’s major cities – a form of static defense. No longer attackers, clear to all as only temporary helpers, we might transform from targets to neutral guardians.

Second, even more important, we can secure Iraq’s borders, especially with Iran. Iraq has no Army, probably by our design to maximize their dependence on us. In this role we can relocate our forces out of harm’s way (except as needed as above). Unlike the dreams of neocons, this is probably not a long-term arrangement. If Iraq survives, eventually it will build a real army and tell us to leave.

This plan gives us a soft exit path, no matter what happens in Iraq.”

Some of this is quite sage but I’m hard pressed to see how the first part in particular is going to be different in the functional military sense from what General Petraeus is doing with the COIN surge. Different intent on FM’s part, certainly, but actions will be similar, if not identical.

Much to read in that piece.

Sunday, January 28th, 2007

RECOMMENDED READING

I’m a tad late on this today due to a busy weekend but better late than never. In fact, I am forced to do this one ” speedy quick”:

Bruce Kesler – “Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense“. Top billing. Regardless of the prospects for the ” surge” (insert healthy realism about the parameters of the possible here) I am totally opposed to attempting to micromanage battlefield tactics from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That’s simply a bad precedent for future conflicts and I’m not comfortable with some military manuver becoming the equivalent of “partial birth abortion” at the hands of folks not currently being shot at. There are more responsible ways to signal displeasure with Bush administration policy, if that is the Senators’ intentions.

Stephen DeAngelis – ” Wikileaks and Secrecy

Dave Schuler – “The Fog of War

Michael Tanji –(Global) Guerrillas in our Midst?

Thomas P.M. Barnett – “When America threatens war with Iran

David Kilcullen -“Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency

MountainRunner – “Petraeus on Goldwater-Nichols & Private Security Contractors

Purpleslog – “Criticism of 5GW found in TDAXP Comments

Whew ! I’m outta here….that’s it!


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