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PART II: THE IDEAS AT BOYD 2007

The ideas and arguments presented at Boyd 2007 were stimulating and, at times, controversial. I’m still pondering the implications of many of them and regret that I could not attend the next day’s follow-up discussion organized by Don Vandergriff (reportedly, AE of Simulated Laughter was present. Hopefully, he will review it). I took many notes and here are my impressions of the sessions:

Colonel Frans Osinga and Dr. Chet Richards:

These back to back presentations were the ones that dealt in depth with the strategic theories of John Boyd, particularly the meaning and use of the famous OODA Loop. Osinga’s major point was that the OODA Loop really reflected the deeper epistemological themes in Boyd’s research of military history, theoretical science and strategy; that Boyd’s strategic worldview was “neo-Darwinian” and geared to the adaptive competitive fitness of systems in conflict.

Richards focused on the overriding importance of the implicit in the OODA Loop, serving as guidance and control for Orientation and empowering the ability of individuals and harmoniously aligned groups (” novelty-generating systems” ) to sieze and retain the initiative over their opponents. The purpose of the OODA Loop is to ” reduce your opponents to a quivering mass of jelly” ( and here Richards means the complex version of OODA, not the simple circular version) by creating disharmony in the other side even as you improve your own.

William Lind, Colonel TX Hammes, Frank Hoffman, Bruce Gudmundsson on 4GW:

I am conflating several sessions here and probably will not or cannot to justice to the views of all of the participants. Anyone who was also there, please feel free to offer corrections or extensions in the comment section.

William Lind was the most colorful and entertaining speaker at Boyd 2007 and, unsurprisingly if you have followed Lind’s writings at all, the most radical in his arguments for 4GW. To an extent, many of the participants were responding to Lind’s thesis as much as they were putting forth their own arguments. Frank Hoffman is somewhat excepted, as his role was a designated devil’s advocate critiquing the weaknesses of the 4GW theory from the viewpoint of mainstream military historians and defense policy academics.

Lind opened by postulating “Three great Civil Wars” – namely WWI, WWII and the Cold War – that irreparably weakened Western civilization physically and, most importantly, morally and led to the rise of 4GW. This view is akin to Philip Bobbitt’s concept of the 20th century ” Long War” and Niall Ferguson’s gloomy interpretaion of the First World War. In Lind’s view, this civilizational loss of confidence set in motion by the horrors of the Western Front has led to the nation-state undergoing a ” crisis of legitimacy” and the universal decline of the state argued by Martin van Creveld.

As the conflicts today are, in Lind’s view, organic cultural conflicts of clashing ( and fractionating) primary loyalties, a new grand strategy must be offered; a defensive posture that seeks to conserve ” centers of order” ( like China, America, Europe) and isolate ourselves from those centers of ” disorder”, including immigration by culturally indigestible groups like ” Islamics”. Lind also pointed to the need for an intellectual and moral regeneration at home and replacement of a self-serving, corrupt and politically inept bipartisan elite influenced by the tenets of cultural Marxism and political correctness ( interestingly, no one cared to argue the point about the incompetence of the elite though the cultural aspect was disputed).

Lind further dismissed any idea of the emergence of a 5th generation of war from consideration and, in response to a question, offered a ferociously bitter, ad hominem, attack on the ideas of Thomas P.M. Barnett as “a fairy tale”, fit for publication in ” a comic book”. Lind offered no specifics and my impression was that Lind has a visceral dislike of Dr. Barnett’s theories because their optimism and economic determinism sharply contradicts Lind’s deeply pessimistic, culturally-based, analysis.

TX Hammes, while admiring of Lind’s work, did not accept Lind’s “kultur uber alles” premise and pointed to traditional political-economic-military indicators as being sufficient analytical categories for 4GW and emerging 5GW. Frank Hoffman hammered hard at the theoretical weaknesses in 4GW theory, accusing the school of making use of ” selective history” and being elusive in its definitions – though Hoffman too blasted the ineptitude and blindness of the political and military establishment with much the same vehemence of Lind. In the seniors session, General Anthony Zinni, flatly repudiated Lind’s characterization of Muslim societies as myopic, being based upon the mythic rantings of Islamist radicals who were wholly unrepresentative of Muslims or mainstream Islam.

The Generals And the Major:

The senior session with General Paul Van Riper, the aforementioned General Zinni and General Alfred Gray are worth noting as was the seminar conducted by Major Don Vandergriff.

Van Riper called for a return to a “wide open intellectual climate” in the Marines and the military as a whole that ignored rank and focused upon the quality of ideas. An education of “how the world works” in terms of complex adaptive systems and the differences between those that were structurally complex and rigid and those that were interactively complex and fluid must be given and understood in order to confront ” wicked problems” effectively. The “Reductionist-Analytical” intellectual model can no longer be relied upon to provide answers, in Van Riper’s view.

Much of the rest of the time was taken by the generals answering Shane Deichman’s question of operational jointness and Goldwater-Nichols. Shane’s question was so good it basically hijacked the rest of the session as the generals offered their experiences and criticism of how “jointness” came to evolve in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Attaboy, Shane! ;o)

Vandergriff offered an outline in implementing the intellectual change Van Riper hopes to see come about with a forced practice method starting with ” Three Levels Above” that requires students to adapt and think in “free play” scenarios. Vandergriff boiled his educational theory down to the principles of:

1. Evolve the Course

2. Every moment offers an opportunity to develop adaptability

3. Student Ownership

4.Develop at three levels.

5. Outstanding teachers

Vandergriff’s ideas are centered in military education but their applicability is entirely societal and systemic.

Comments are welcomed, especially if you can fill in anything that I have missed or gotten wrong.

OFF TO BOYD 2007

BOYD 2007 LINKS

Looking forward to this conference. A few links in the spirit of the event.

Patterns of Conflict (PDF)

The Strategic Game of ? and ? (PDF)

FMFM 1-A Fourth Generation War (PDF)

OODA LOOP

RICHARDS ON STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION

Dr. Chet Richards of DNI has posted the introduction to his forthcoming book, If We Can Keep It. From what I have gathered, this book will be an extension of the radical military analysis Richards began with his previous work, Neither Shall the Sword: Conflict in the Years Ahead . An excerpt:

“Three national myths

The third, and perhaps the most dangerous because it seduces us into thinking that we can make military force into a normal tool of policy, is the notion of counterinsurgency theory. The problem is not that insurgencies cannot be defeated, but that proponents of this theory sometimes fail to distinguish between different meanings of the term “insurgency.” Several observers, recognizing this limitation, have proposed classifications. Biddle (2006) distinguishes between “people’s wars,” in which groups try to overthrow the government, and “communal civil wars,” where groups are fighting to avoid genocide. Metz (2007) classifies insurgencies based upon whether a legitimate government exists or can be created. These are both valuable and help explain why some insurgencies succeed where others do not.

….In the specific area of national defense policy, I recommend that the Department of Defense be gradually downsized to roughly the current U.S. Marine Corps plus special operations forces and supporting tactical air. This is more than adequate to deal with any future military threat. Concerning strategic – nuclear – forces, 10,000 weapons are more than we need to preserve the proven doctrine of mutually assured destruction (Blair, 2007a). Some reduction in this arsenal is clearly feasible.

Read the entire introduction here.

It would appear that Richards, whose analytical framework is deeply rooted in the ideas of John Boyd, is throwing the 4GW hat into the ring of grand strategy, remediating a frequent criticism that 4GW thinkers are focused primarily upon tactical conflict and the destructive rather than constructive levels of strategic thinking. It will no doubt be an interesting and thought-provoking book that will stampede an entire herd of sacred cows beloved by defense intellectuals off of a cliff. That alone will make it a useful read.

My questions ( and Richards may very well answer them in his forthcoming book) raised by If We Can Keep It, would hinge on several variables:

* The utility of nuclear deterrence, upon which Richards’ strategic transformation seems to depend, in an era when significant power (WMD capacity) appears to be devolving to progressively smaller ( and potentially less accountable, predictable and deterrable) substate and non-state networks. The history of nuclear deterrence and accompanying theory represents a large and complex literature with such thinkers as Brodie, Wohlstetter, Kahn, Kissinger and others who never satisfactorily arrived at answers to the conundrum presented by nuclear weapons.

Eisenhower-Dulles ” massive retaliation” and “brinksmanship” put a brake on defense spending ( as Ike intended) but it was a very risky and blunt instrument. The idea that Washington would “trade New York for Paris” with the Soviets was never entirely a credible one. Nor did America’s massive nuclear arsenal prevent Nasser from closing the Suez or Ho Chi Minh from subverting Saigon or even deter Khrushchev from his nuclear gamble in Cuba (in fact, our lopsided nuclear advantage probably was an incentive in Khrushchev’s eyes to gain parity on the cheap).

* Steady-state assumptions about nation-state behavior in the international arena if conventional American power projection capacity was drastically reduced to levels proportionate to Western Europe. This is a major point to consider when offering a non-interventionist alternative to current strategy – American military power is the focal point of most regional security systems ( or opposition to them). To my mind, statesmen calculate their actions and plan their military expenditures based upon assumptions of American hegemony, welcome or not. The inability to even get to the starting block for military competition with the U.S. – we must think not just in terms of annual military budgets but in the colossal sunk costs of establishing a military-industrial base – is inhibiting regional arms races to a degree. Remove American preeminence from the equation and foreign statesmen are going to arrive at different calculations regarding their interests and security.

I look forward to reading it and entertaining Dr. Richards’ argument in full.

2007 BOYD CONFERENCE

Excellent! Thanks to the kind offices of Dr. Chet Richards, I’ll be attending the Boyd Conference come July. Looks to be a stellar program of presenters on the ideas of Colonel John Boyd and 4GW theory, from whom I expect to learn a great deal.