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Two posts of note:

USNI Blog (Lucien Gauthier) – Training Sailors to be Autodidactic

….The conference spent a lot of time on the first half of the OODA-Loop, Observing and Orienting.  At some point I became convinced that the type of Sailor we need is one that is a “situational autodidact”.  Major Marcus Mainz, USMC, during his presentation made the brilliant comment that “training is for the known, education is for the unknown” in this sense, the spirit in which we must educate our Sailors must be towards making them capable of educating their self as needed when the unknown presents itself to them.

….For Sailors to take greater advantage of their experiences, they need to actively question their actions.  By this, I mean that a person analyses a question more than they do a statement.  But, it has been my experience that when someone recants an experience they had, it is a rare thing to hear someone say anything in terms of ‘why’ they did something.  Much more often someone only tells the ‘what’ of their actions.  Think of the Socratic Method, where Socrates would answer his students questions with another question.  A Sailor who has internalized such a ‘Socratic process’ would be in a position to provide more cogent feedback as well as learn from their mistakes more often than we do today.

What I am saying is not that the training we offer Sailors falls short of its objectives as they stand today.  But, that the spirit of the training is not where it needs to be-we focus our objectives too much on acting rather than orienting.  The training our Sailors receive are based on concrete and testable objectives that can be measured, quantified and turned into metrics, that fit well into powerpoint.  We do no help Sailors to become autodidactic-we are not training them to become students of their environment, but rather students of their school house.

We start to approach training Sailors to be autodidacts of their environment in the Operational Risk Management training we receive (One thing about ORM:  It is Boyd’s OODA-Loop operationalized.  The Navy has totally ripped off Boyd, and yet we never mention his name outside of the Warfare Universities-shame on us).  We need more and deeper training on ORM and how this method applies to everything we do, whether we consciously realize it or not.  In giving this deeper level or ORM, we should also find Sailors able to be more articulate of the process they’ve gone through.  Thereby becoming able to better train others of their experiences….

Naval affairs is not my bailwick, but my understanding of following online discussions by experts in the field like General Robert Scales, is that Professional Military Education across all the services is a) in need of significant reform and b) is facing a future of restricted budgets and possible deep cuts. My only firsthand knowledge of PME comes from a brief stint in June at The Army War College, courtesy of Dr. Steve Metz. The AWC curriculum was explained to me in detail by Col. Bill Lord, and while they were hitting the right notes in terms of trying to inculcate a strategic epistemology, the time frame allowed for doing so is extremely compressed.

Fast Transients –Boyd’s Conceptual Spiral – New Edition

This is from Dr. Chet Richards as well as Chuck Spinney….

Download Conceptual Spiral (152 KB PDF), Boyd’s take on the origin and importance of novelty:

Novelty is not only produced by the practice of science/engineering and the pursuit of technology, it is also produced by the forces of nature, by our own thinking and doing as well as by others. Furthermore, novelty is produced continuously, if somewhat erratically or haphazardly. Now, in order to thrive and grow in such a world, we must match our thinking and doing, hence our orientation, with that emerging novelty. (28)

Adds the original page numbers, which may seem a little odd because for readability this edition spreads several of Boyd’s originals over two or even three pages.  All of these will have the same number.

We are wired to crave and be attracted to novelty, it sets us thinking and generates insights and stimulates our creativity.

An research-based look at human motivation by Dan Pink:

Interestingly, the direction of corporate/billionaire driven Education Reform runs counter to most of this, being centered in strongly Taylorist ethos of micromanagement and continuous quantitative measurement, rote and synchronized usage of teaching scripts and routines, with the intention of erasing autonomy of both teachers and students. Standardized competence, set at a level of basic skills, is their systemic learning objective rather than mastery – for which they wish to charge the taxpayers a boatload of money. #EpicFail.

A fascinating online discussion between US Army intellectuals Colonel Gian Gentile, Colonel Paul Yingling and journalist and Iraq War veteran Carl Prine:

Paul Yingling  A Failure in Generalship  –AFJ

….Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America’s generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America’s generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as “Fiasco” and “Cobra II.” However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Gian Gentile A Few Questions for Colonel Paul Yingling on Failures in Generalship – Small Wars Journal

….Perhaps you see it differently, but the failure that I see in American generalship in both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (with precedence in Vietnam) is the idea that tactical and operational excellence through a certain brand of counterinsurgency (or any other form of tactical innovation) can rescue wars that ultimately are failures of strategy, or as Schlesinger more harshly puts it “national stupidity.”

In light of how you respond to these questions might you consider writing “A Failure of Generalship, Version 2” for Afghanistan?

If not, might you spell out the differences between what you saw as the failure of American generalship in Iraq from 2003-2006 with the past two years plus in Afghanistan.  In other words, how has American generalship been a failure in Iraq and not in Afghanistan?

Paul Yingling The Gentile-Yingling Dialogue: ISAF Exit Strategy – Neither International nor an Exit nor a Strategy – Small Wars Journal

….Those of us charged with strategic thinking ought to heed this example.  Imagine a failed Pakistan that results in a terrorist organization acquiring one or more nuclear weapons.  What would our response be in the aftermath of such a crisis?  What intelligence capabilities do we need to locate compromised nuclear materials?  What civil security and law enforcement measures might disrupt or minimize the impacts of such a threat?  What counter-proliferation capabilities are required to seize and render safe compromised nuclear weapons or materials?  Imagine further the capabilities required to avoid such a crisis.  What diplomatic measures might change the Pakistani strategic calculus that lends support to extremism?  What broader engagement with Pakistani civil society might render this troubled country less amenable to radical ideology?  Now imagine still further back to the institutional arrangements that generate national security capabilities.  Do we have the right priorities?  Are we buying the right equipment?  Are we selecting the right leaders?  Are we making the best use of increasingly scarce tax payer dollars?

Too often, what passes for strategic thought in the United States is actually a struggle among self-interested elites seeking political, commercial or bureaucratic advantage.  Such behavior is the privilege of a country that is both rich and safe.  However, a pattern of such behavior is self-correcting: no country that behaves this way will stay rich or safe for long.

Carl Prine A Colonel of Truth – Line of Departure

….Gentile and I agreed nevertheless that Yingling failed to seal the deal by naming names, something that would’ve allowed readers the chance to test empirically whether the LTC’s overall thesis had merit.  Here’s Yingling’s nutgraf, words scribbled during the worst days in Iraq when Gentile commanded a cavalry squadron in Baghdad and I was stuck in Anbar as a lowly infantry SPC:

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

….Perhaps because it was so brief, Yingling’s essay lacked subtlety.  It’s not true that America’s generals in Vietnam saw the conflict merely in terms of conventional warfare, although some surely did.  He spun a dubious bit of scholarship on Malaya by John Nagl into a larger argument about Cold War generals choosing to orient American arms toward highly kinetic campaigns – as if the threat of Soviet arms in Europe had nothing to do with that.  And he peppered his analysis with bromides that remain unproven, perhaps my favorite being the chestnut that “?opulation security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency.”

That read better in 2007 than it does today. But Yingling’s larger point held true:  America’s generals failed to adapt our shrinking forces to how policymakers might direct their use, even if there was a re-emphasis on operations other than conventional war both in practice (Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Haiti, Somalia, Kovoso, Bosnia, Timor, Cambodia) and theory.

This is an important discussion because the failure of generalship is merely part of a larger paradigm of leadership by abdication and moral evasion that is corroding the fabric of American society to a degree not seen since the 1970’s. Or perhaps since the 1870’s. Colonel John Boyd once chided his brother officers for being willing to take a bullet for their country but not willing to risk their careers for their country. How much worse then is an elite civilian political class that grabs the largesse of government contracts with great gusto but is chronically unable to do the hard work of providing strategic leadership when in office?

Truman’s famous desk sign that indicated the buck stopped at his desk. To update the sign to fit the spirit of the times would require replacing it with a dead fish rotting from the head.

[ by Charles Cameron — Christopher Hitchens, Muhammad, Jack Chick, and Joseph Smith ]

.

I get so tired of people not doing their homework, left and right.

Or perhaps that should read, Left and Right.

1.

I don’t know quite how you’d classify Christopher Hitchens, but in a Slate article today titled Romney’s Mormon Problem: Mitt Romney and the weird and sinister beliefs of Mormonism, he asserts:

On his later forays into the chartless wilderness, there to play the role of Moses to his followers (who were permitted and even encouraged in plural marriage, so as to go forth and mass-produce little Mormons), Smith also announced that he wanted to be known as the Prophet Muhammad of North America, with the fearsome slogan: “Either al-Koran or the Sword.”

Juicy, eh?

Luckily, Hitchens has linked the phrase “Either al-Koran or the Sword” – so we can source the quote in, let’s see, Christopher Hitchens, in his book God is Not Great, as excerpted in Slate again:

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints-hereafter known as the Mormons-was founded by a gifted opportunist who, despite couching his text in openly plagiarized Christian terms, announced that “I shall be to this generation a new Muhammad” and adopted as his fighting slogan the words, which he thought he had learned from Islam, “Either the Al-Koran or the sword.”

Sadly, there’s no link this time, no further sourcing of the quote.

2.

Hugh Nibley is my go-to man for Mormon scholarship (orthodox), and it doesn’t surprise me that there’s an essay of his on the web comparing Islam and Mormonism [.pdf].

Nibley accepts that “in fact, early Mormon leaders saw no reason why Mohammed should not be considered a true prophet, for there have been many prophets, great and small, in the past whose words are not in the Bible.” But that impression didn’t long survive a second observation:

[T]he striking resemblance turns almost at once into an equally striking contrast when the Moslems announce that Mohammed is the last of the prophets and that there can be no prophet after him. “When a doctrine is sealed,” writes an eminent Moslem scholar, “it is complete, and there can be no further addition. The holy Prophet Mohammed closed the long line of Apostles. … there has been and will be no prophet after Mohammed.”

Nibley’s six-page essay has no quotation in which Joseph Smith speaks of “Al-Koran or the sword”.

Neither, in fact, does Todd Harris in his 162-page 2007 BYU Master’s thesis A Comparison of Muhammad and Joseph Smith in the Prophetic Pattern [.pdf].

3.

Jack Chick to the rescue.

As you may know, Jack Chick publishes some appallingly poorly illustrated Christian booklets that are almost as small as large postage stamps, and almost as much fun to collect.

Chick’s larger-than-usual publication The Enchanter, whose cover graces the top of this post, includes the following garishly interesting graphic:

But – poor taste in art aside – Chick is more thoroughgoing than Hitchens, and is kind enough to supply us with references for the statements he makes. In a commentary on his own pamphlet, he writes:

On October 14, 1838, Joseph Smith called himself a “second Muhammad” as he was concluding a speech in the public square at Far West, Missouri. Those words have been verified by affidavits from Thomas B. Marsh, Orson Hyde (from Joseph’s Quorum of the Twelve), George M. Hinkle, John Corrill, W.W. Phelps (a major leader in the Mormon church), Samson Avard (founder of the Danites), and Reed Peck.

To Marsh’s statement, he footnotes thus:

For the full affidavit of Thomas B. Marsh, see The Rocky Mountain Saints by T. B. H. Stenhouse (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1873), pp. 89-90.

and points out that we can read the relevant pages ourselves on Google Books.

4.

There’s an article titled From the Archives: Joseph Smith or the Sword!? at the Juvenile Instructor blog, commenting on the Jack Chick publication, which handily quotes the various 1838 testimonies in which associates and one-time associates attest that Smith compared himself with the Prophet of Islam – that of Thomas Marsh being the only one of which actually offers us the phrase that Hitchens — remember Hitchens? – was (almost) quoting.

Marsh’s statement reads:

I have heard the prophet say that he should yet tread down his enemies, and walk over their dead bodies; that if he was not let alone he would be a second Mahomet to this generation, and that he would make it one gore of blood from the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean; that like Mahomet, whose motto, in treating for peace, was “the Alcoran or the Sword,” so should it be eventually with us, “Joseph Smith or the Sword.”

And so — with the exceptions that the original has “Mohammed” where the Juvenile Instructor has “Mahomet” and that the original has single quotes where the Juvenile Instructor has double — Marsh’s testimony as published in Stenhouse’s book does indeed read.

5.

So that’s the closest thing we have to a source for Joseph Smith having made the statement that Hitchens says Smith “adopted as his fighting slogan” – when even that one source has Smith uttering it with the conditional “if he was not left alone” and the future-oriented “so should it be eventually with us”…

For what it may be worth — no more and no less, and I shall not be the judge of that — the third volume of BH Roberts‘ History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints contains the following, which I take to be placed in the mouth of Smith himself, but drawn from his diaries and other contemporary papers:

Thomas B. Marsh, formerly president of the Twelve, having apostatized, repaired to Richmond and made affidavit before Henry Jacobs, justice of the peace, to all the vilest slanders, aspersions, lies and calumnies towards myself and the Church, that his wicked heart could invent. He had been lifted up in pride by his exaltation to office and the revelations of heaven concerning him, until he was ready to be overthrown by the first adverse wind that should cross his track, and now he has fallen, lied and sworn falsely, and is ready to take the lives of his best friends. Let all men take warning by him, and learn that he who exalteth himself, God will abase.

This at least gives us a sense of the tension between the two men…

And consider this:

The disaffected and the apostate are in particular informants whose evidence has to be used with circumspection. The apostate is generally in need of self-justification. He seeks to reconstruct his own past, to excuse his former affiliations, and to blame those who were formerly his closest associates. Not uncommonly the apostate learns to rehearse an ‘atrocity story’ to explain how, by manipulation, trickery, coercion, or deceit, he was induced to join or to remain within an organization that he now forswears and condemns.

That’s from Bryan Wilson, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and author of The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism: Sects and New Religious Movements in Contemporary Society.

6.

Homework, Hitchens, homework!

I shouldn’t say stuff like that – I’m sure I’ve missed a few points myself.

7.

At least Hitchens is wittier than Limbaugh.

 [by J. Scott Shipman]

Following the remarkable enthusiasm of the participants of Boyd & Beyond 2010, the expectations with respect to this years’ second annual event were high and in my estimation, no one was disappointed. Both days began at 0800 and went until 1800, with large groups of participants meeting after the meeting over food and beverages to continue the conversations. For me, the adrenaline was running so high, I got less than 8 hours sleep in the two days; as winding down was easier said than done.

Through the good offices of Mr. Stan Coerr, GS-15 and Colonel of the USMCR, our group met at the USMC Command and Staff college for the two day, no-PowerPoint event. Unlike last year, there were no initial retrospectives on John Boyd’s life. Instead, our agenda moved directly to broad themes derived from Boyd’s work and legacy. After lunch on Friday, the 29th Commandant of the USMC, General Al Gray made a surprise visit and spoke for two hours on his friendship and association with Boyd and the period when the USMC was integrating Boyd’s ideas on maneuver warfare. Those two hours went by in a flash, and I believe our group would agree, Gen Gray could have kept our attention for the remainder of the afternoon.

The morning began with speakers discussing Boyd’s legacy to the military services. Don Vandergriff lead off with an excellent review of methods he has adopted to help train leaders in adaptive decision making. Picking up where he left off last year, Don demonstrated the power of his methods. Don was followed by a presentation that challenged our group on the power of context and relationships between law enforcement and the community. Using a vehicle of an evolving story narrative of a historic event, our group was provided facts in a method akin to peeling an onion—after all the facts of the story had been shared, opinons were solicited; not surprisingly the conclusion was a surprise, but illustrative of a leader who “sees” (think: the Observe of OODA).

We were very fortunate to have uniformed representatives of Boyd’s US Air Force, and a representative from the US Navy. Speaking separately on different topics, these three bright young men provided observations from within their respective services on leadership, learning, and organizational adaptability. They reviewed the perils of a zero-defect culture where metrics and hardware are more important than people. [Reminded of Boyd’s famous quote: People, ideas, hardware: in that order!”]

Marcus Mainz, Major USMC, followed-up and extended on his observations made last year with respect to Boyd’s continuing influence on professional military education in the Marine Corps. He emphasized time and fighting on the three levels of the physical, mental, and moral, and the importance of deception in the disruption of any enemy’s OODA. He also provided an excellent quote:

“Training is for the known, education is for the unknowns.”

Maj Mainz was followed by Mark Williams in a discussion on the epistemology and ontology of Boyd’s OODA, and the implications for warrior training. Mark is a former fighter pilot and spoke with passion about the importance of continuous learning and adaptability. Using riveting example from his experience in the cockpit, Mark illustrated the need for fluidity between the Observe and Orient.

Bruce Greene, Major, USMC, presented on the topic of unmanned vs manned aircraft in relation to Boyd’s theories. This presentation provoked a lively discussion on the both the moral and practical aspects of unmanned vehicles—particularly in light of fratricidal events involving UUVs and US ground troops. Major Greene emphasized the “morality of attitude” with respect to decisions in this arena.

Day two had a lively start requiring our group to orient on the fly. We arrived to find power was out in the Command & Staff College building. Maj Mainz, in a deft move of Boydian orientation, suggested we decamp to the Expeditionary Warfare School, about a mile away. We moved coffee, bagels, coolers, books, bags and people in about half an hour and picked up where we left off.

Dr. Terry Barnhart led off with a remarkable exercise using questions to determine real needs. Terry contends that questions elicit more information and buy-in than statements, and with this exercise proved his point. Terry divided participants into two groups to tackle two problems ad hoc using a simple and straight-forward process. This robust exercise worked quite well and many remarked they were taking the experience and example back to their respective organizations.

World-renowned law enforcement expert and combat Marine, Sid Heal used a rare-for-B&B PowerPoint presentation to discuss Forecasting With Density. Sid’s presentation was engaging and informative and covered how law enforcement can use density in nature, urban areas, and data for law enforcement—particularly riot control. The presentation was rare in that the slides truly complimented the topic. Sid also offered a notable quote:

“All human understanding can be boiled down to comparison and metaphor.” {Regular zenpundit readers perhaps know the appeal to me of patterns, metaphors and analogies, so this quote will be remembered and used.}

Fred Leland, longtime user of Boyd’s ideas, offered a riveting presentation on interaction and isolation in police operational art. During his talk Fred reiterated the hazards of a culture driven by policies and procedures at the expense of thinking and common sense.

Chip Pearson, owner of a software company in Minnesota, spoke again this year, providing updates from last years’ presentation and insight into the evolution of his company. Chip made a distinction between those “in business to make money, or those in business to satisfy customer needs.” This comment reminded me of Boyd’s “to be or to do” challenge. During his talk, Chip emphasized the importance of common understanding for organizational harmony. It was also during Chip’s talk that Sid Heal offered another quote to remember:

“Mediocrity and controversy cannot peacefully coexist.”

Michael Moore gave his much anticipated presentation on his Win Bowl concept. Michael’s ideas tie directly to Sun Tzu’s:

“Military actions are like water, flowing from high to low points…And just as water adapts to the ground it flows over, so a successful soldier adapts his victories to the specific foe he faces.”

(Section 6:29, 31)

Michael demonstrated how his Win Bowl concept captures the fluidity of tracking goals. He says the model has been used in the learning environment and demonstrated the simplicity and approachability of the model. Michael suggested his outline offers a “”mental tapestry” metaphor Boyd was seeking in military strategy” and I believe he he is right.

Longtime friend of this blog, Adam Elkus followed with a powerful talk on Boyd’s influence on campaign planning and the influence of design theory. Adam emphasized the importance of simplicity in the development of strategy and the avoidance of tools, jargons, and excuses that more often than not decrease clarity of purpose.

Katya Drozdova of Seattle Pacific University was our concluding speaker. She offered her expert insight into alternative strategies in the Afghan theater that would be revolutionary in scope and a significant change to current US government policy. For instance, she offered the US should consider granting autonomy to those areas of Afghanistan that have demonstrated a capability to sustain and secure themselves.

This review did not include all of the speakers. Last year I took over five pages of notes, however for this event my notes were more sketchy, so my apologies in advance for the speakers and topics not covered. I would encourage those who attended to fill in blanks that I no doubt missed or neglected. Also, last year I published the reading list recommended by participants. I will do this in a update to this post in the days to come, so stay tuned.

We have every intention of having another event the same weekend in October next year, so stay tuned and keep the dates open on your calendar for Boyd & Beyond 2012.