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A Brief Observation on COIN vs. 4GW or Strategic IO

The implementation of COIN in Iraq has garnered success even as American public diplomacy and IO efforts are justifiably trashed by…well…everyone, really. Why is that?

Perhaps the reason has to do with the credibility of the actors operating on different levels of conflict. Unit commanders in Iraq, if they are engaged with locals and dependably follow through on their commitments and threats, they gain a degree of authenticity with their audience, friend and foe alike. More or less this is happening at the tactical level.

Our national leaders, broadly speaking, carry no such weight on the strategic level, neither at home nor abroad. Regardless of their position on the war, most politicians appear to be disconnected economically and socially from the lives of ordinary Americans, much less foreign audiences – unless they are foreign elites who were educated in American Ivy League schools. “Spin” has become so habitual and baldfaced lying, denial of reality and lawyerly semantics so commonplace a tactic in American politics, that our words no longer carry any credibility, just our actions. When our actions then contradict our values as well, the game is over.

Our elite cannot wage 4GW or strategic IO until they first become connected enough to reality to systematically execute actions that build legitimacy in the eyes of a multiplicity of audiences. Our checking account is overdrawn and we need to start making deposits. This isn’t a call to appease anyone but to earn the respect of even our enemies by making the certitude of what America is fighting for a given.

After that, the rest is simply a discussion of means.

5 Responses to “A Brief Observation on COIN vs. 4GW or Strategic IO”

  1. Wiggins Says:

    Very well put, Zen.  One of the most succinct statements I’ve read.

    In hindsight, this captures a significant piece missing from Betts’ article on restoring strategic solvency[1].

    cheers,
    W

    [1] http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/10/30/disciplined-defense/

  2. Larry Says:

    I also want to say well put and add that maybe a part of this disconnect also comes from the fact that our elites keep fighting WWII over and over again, because that is all they know. It is them or us and a war of attrition separates the two. It is an idelogy that is maintained by its seemly success.

    On a different subject, what have you heard about OBL? Early Christmas?

  3. zen Says:

    Hi Wiggins,

    Thank you! Very nice post on your part. The USG is virtually allergic to making strategic choices; when forced to do so, the process is not usually rationally related to national security but domestic or bureaucratic political equations.

    "I also want to say well put and add that maybe a part of this disconnect also comes from the fact that our elites keep fighting WWII over and over again, because that is all they know"

    Hi Larry,

    WWII and Vietnam. It’s our strategic dichotomy, Munich vs. Tonkin Gulf.

  4. The Lounsbury Says:

    Not a bad obs mate, although your caveat, <i> unless they are foreign elites who were educated in American Ivy League schools</i> I would add even there one seems to find a disconnect in the present enviro.

    I find it sad you have to preface a call for building street cred as not "a call to appease anyone but to earn the respect of even our enemies" – the issues of negotiating cred strikes me as so basic that only the most vulgar ideologues and provincials would not be able to grasp.

    But sadly, it seems necessary.  (as useful would be putting the concept of appeasement in its proper place, rather than abusively calling any deal making ‘appeasement’)

  5. zen Says:

    Hi Col,

    "I would add even there one seems to find a disconnect in the present enviro."

    A bad sign.

    Such prefaces are required these days.  Apparently "not negotiating" under any conditions has become some kind of vital objective in itself that overrides acquiring tangible gains in the national interest; evidently people with short memories have forgotten that we negotiated with the Soviets, the Chinese, North Koreans and North Vietnamese even while we were sticking sharp objects between their ribs and vice-versa.

    Such a postion is harsh but feasible if you hold all the cards. It’s lunacy when you have only modest leverage.


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