I will have some comments on Big Steve’s presentation in an update here later tonight.
UPDATE:
The presentation was informative and thorough and I often found myself in agreement.
Liked Metz’s emphasis of affordability/efficiency, vertical/horizontal and especially internal vs. external variables and would suggest that in the future he compact elsewhere to expand that section. Perhaps this is not the most significant aspect for the military officers that come to study at NDU and SSI, but the internal-external dynamic is the “third rail” of grand strategic thought – the connection between the domestic political conception of what Walter Lippmann called “The Good Society” and the capacity of that good society to survive and thrive in a hostile world ( John Boyd emphasized this point – what Metz calls “augmenting”, Boyd referred to variously as “constructive”, “pumping up”, “attracting”or “vitality and growth” and considered it a definitive characteristic of grand strategy).
When there is what Steve in his lecture called a “strong consensus” on grand strategy, a nation’s state and political economy are in sync with its foreign relations and military posture. For example, the Founding Fathers, aware of America’s great potential but weak condition, erected the Constitution and Federalism, Hamilton’s plan for economic development and Washington’s “no entangling alliances”, modest navy and small military establishment. FDR and Truman realized that the American system of liberal capitalist democracy could not last in a world dominated by depression, totalitarianism and autarky and delivered the Atlantic Charter, the UN, Bretton Woods, the IMF and World Bank, the GATT, the Marshall Plan and NATO, imparting American values into global institutions and importing global institutions into America. Where there is a “weak consensus” – as there is today – it is because the nation is divided on the nature of a good society and/or its role in the world leaving grand strategy flawed or absent.
….Ultimately, though, the Obama strategy in Afghanistan and the Bush strategy in Iraq are more alike than different–variations on a theme rather than stark alternatives. Both were attempts to give a beleaguered ally an opportunity to reverse its slide into disaster. And both were gambles. In Iraq, President Bush bet that the Maliki government would rein in sectarian violence, and that the Iraqi Security Forces were nearly ready to assume responsibility for their nation’s security. This panned out. Now President Obama is making the same bet. His strategy is contingent on the Afghan security forces, bolstered by increased assistance from the U.S. military, being able to conduct counterinsurgency on its own by 2011. Even more importantly, Obama’s plan is contingent on the Karzai government’s reining in its crushing corruption and addressing the myriad problems that the Afghan people face. If the Afghan security forces or the Karzai government are not up to the task, nothing the United States can do will matter. A surge of 20,000, 30,000, or 100,000 would be equally irrelevant. Unfortunately, only President Karzai and the Afghan security forces can determine whether the Obama strategy works. Our fate is in their hands.
Steve has spotted a poor contingency for the administration to rely upon. Putting the war strategy on Karzai’s performance is akin to building a house on quicksand. It might look a little like wet cement but it is not going to harden into a foundation no matter how much time passes. We need to work within the parameters of our own capacities and with realistic and not utopian options.
We’d garner more goodwill giving every Afghan child a pony than by waiting for villagers to see honest officials from Kabul appear. It’d be cheaper too.
It’s good. The perspective is current but integrated with historical examples, seeking to examine where tribal structures, which Taylor sees as complex social institutions, fit in with the entire spectrum of American strategic and operational goals. An excerpt:
…Insights. Using tribal contributions as a “means” or a resource of achieving multinational operational success has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of employing the organizational strength of tribes is that historically they have provided valued assistance to intelligence, security and law 10 enforcement, combat arms, and civil affairs capabilities. Recognition of this “means” as a functional support tool is not explicitly stated in the NMS. Considering the broad range of nations across the “arc of instability” that are comprised of ethnic-tribal units, one could implicitly deduce that tribes are included as part of “multinational capability” in the NMS. A second advantage to using tribes as a resource provider (“means”) is that tribes bring unique cultural and physical geographic knowledge to the success of any military operation. Tribes know the terrain, the language, and the culture; tribes contribute to the cultural learning of American military forces. Conversely, incorporating tribes as part of a multinational capability may not encourage democratic or modernizing practices among the society as a whole. More specifically, U.S. associations with tribes may be interpreted as a silent agreement to practices such as discrimination against women or tribal out-groups. Similarly, it is hoped that the sins (mandated settlement policies, land use restrictions, and failure to honor tribal treaty commitments) of colonial tribal policies are not carried forward into the 21st century by U.S. military commands. A distinct disadvantage in working with tribes as a “means” to strategy success is fragmentation. Depending on geographic location, tribal connections among members may not be as coherent as in the past.
“Two institutions failed the American people in the run-up to the ongoing war in Iraq. Neither the Congress nor the media provided oversight of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally required of the first institution and expected of the latter. As a consequence a fundamentally flawed strategy was implemented by an equally flawed military plan. The results have been tragic and costly. Dr. Steven Metz does our nation a great service by exploring the causes of this U.S. strategic debacle, one that may well exceed that of the Vietnam War. Recognizing a problem and its cause are the first steps in setting things right. In this book Dr. Metz identifies the problem, explains what caused it, and most importantly, shows us a better path for the future.”
From SS Einsatzgruppen to Bosnian Serb paramilitaries to Indonesian brush gangs, intoxicants have frequently been given to erode irregular fighters’ moral constraints and facilitate atrocities.
Zenpundit is a blog dedicated to exploring the intersections of foreign policy, history, military theory, national security,strategic thinking, futurism, cognition and a number of other esoteric pursuits.
