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Wednesday, May 2nd, 2007

SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE ON ” THE GENERALS”

When I was in my twenties, I studied a fair amount of economics and economic history. One concept that stuck with me was that of “Countervailing Power” which came from the book American Capitalism, by the famous liberal Keynesian economist John Kenneth Galbraith. While Galbraith was interested in how bargaining could be leveraged by non-economic factors, “countervailing power” has great utility as a concept in terms of disciplining the mind to explore contraindicative examples. This is one reason I tend to feature a range of views here that I sometimes agree with only in part, just a little bit or even not at all. Arguments are improved only by competition and criticism, not from being sheltered from them.

In that spirit, Shane Deichman of IATGR offered a robust critique of the article by LTC Paul Yingling and my question regarding military reform in my comment section; it was too good to leave there. Deichman himself has considerable military experience with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Joint Forces Command and I reproduce his insightful remarks below:

“Before we consider “reforming” the system, I think it is useful to first note some facts about our system. For more than 30 years (nearly an entire career for some), we’ve had an all-volunteer military with high standards for admission. America has probably invested more proportionally in its military (Leviathan) than any other all-volunteer military force in history (this is conjecture on my part, based on what Tom Barnett’s mentor Art Cebrowski would call “Data Free Analysis” :-).

So, with an all-volunteer force in a $10T+/yr GDP nation with a low (<5%) unemployment rate, you get some interesting dynamics. "Careerism" is one of them. I am not a Personnelist, but I know of many who have written extensively on the concept (most notably my good friend Don Vandergriff, a fine Tanker who was outspoken and revered by his troops but whose career was deep-sixed by a vindictive CO). Don has written much on personnel reform, training and the “culture wars” in the DoD; a link to one of his monographs on D-N-I is here:

Culture Wars

Without getting too long-winded, I believe that there is a fundamental lack of accountability within the Pentagon. Not only in budgets (ask anyone in OSD if they REALLY know where all the money goes; they don’t), but also in performance.

Paul’s idea of implementing 360-degree profiles merits consideration (I did a couple myself as a middle manager at U.S. Joint Forces Command, and commented on several others). That might be a good place to start enhancing a culture of accountability within all ranks.

But there is no “silver bullet”, especially in a system as complex as the U.S. military. I think Paul would have been more effective had he focused on the civilian leaders’ roles in the “failures” he cites.

Fundamentally, I believe the system is sound. Every soldier/sailor/airman/Marine and guardsman — enlisted, NCO, and officer alike — as well as every civilian employee of the U.S. Government swore an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign AND DOMESTIC. And we all took that oath freely, without any mental reservation nor purpose of evasion.

Accountability begins inside. And sometimes we all need to be reminded of our promises.

It’s a good thing that we have an all-volunteer military. And it’s a good thing that we have civilian oversight of the warmaking capacity of our nation. And it’s a good thing that we have a Legislative Branch that holds the purse strings. Separation of powers works.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution deliberately split the powers across the branches of the government to protect our individual freedoms. We wanted weak government in the early days of the Republic, and I submit that we still want it today.

As a final bit of “Data Free Analysis”, consider the fate that befell the Roman empire after the creation of the Praetorian Guard. The “new elite” lost touch with their roots, with their sense of personal integrity and service to the republic. And that may be the direction that our own Republic goes if we continue to indulge a paucity of personal accountability within ALL ranks of leadership. “

Well said. I still believe Yingling has put his finger on a systemic problem but Shane’s caveats are the proper kind of countervailing considerations in seeking a solution.

ADDENDUM:

Shane’s fellow director at Enterra, Tom Barnett, also posted on Col. Yingling and the Generals

Tuesday, May 1st, 2007

SPEAKING OF UTILIZING “TRIBAL” FORMS

“Follow up on this vein of research suggests that as the task gets more complex, that decentralized networks actually do better than centralized. An interesting and relevant critique of this research, by Guetzkow and Simon (1955), was that all-channel networks can and do sometimes perform better than hub-spoke networks. That is, the performance of all channel networks was contingent on how they were used. The original Bavelas findings were based on the fact that they were usually used badly.”
– David Lazer

Bavelas revisited: hub-spoke vs all-channel networks” at Complexity and Social Networks Blog

Sounds reasonable to me. If you have ever been part of a team that seemed to reach a moment of ” flow” where everyone was intuitively “in synch” in handling a creative or complicated performance task, then that dynamic probably “felt” much like the findings of the research described by Lazer.

Applicable, it seems to me, to any ” free play” group learning scenario – whether it be small unit combat, improv theater, team sports and many others.

Tuesday, May 1st, 2007

SWJ BLOG: THE THIRD GENERATION GANGS OF IRAQ

The SWJ Blog is developing very nicely in terms of steadily drawing high quality contributors. The latest examples are Dr. Robert J. Bunker ( Non-State Threats and Future Wars) and John P. Sullivan ( Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism). They have a post up entitled:

Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects

“Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades. (1) Basically, from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity.

….From a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, Iraq has been essentially overrun by 3rd generation gangs and their criminal-soldier equivalents. This is reminiscent of the nightmare scenario for the US already starting to develop in Central and South America (and, to a lesser extent, within the US) with the emergence, growth, and expansion of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and other Maras. In many ways, the ‘Gangs of Iraq’ are a prelude to the ‘Gangs of the Americas’ that we will be increasingly facing in the Western Hemisphere.”

This brings to mind the analysis of RAND scholar, David Ronfeldt in his excellent working paper ” In Search of How Societies Work: Tribes – The First And Forever Form “.

Monday, April 30th, 2007

BRAVE NEW WAR

Brave New War by John Robb is a book that was really written for two audiences.

The first is the relatively small number of specialists in military affairs, serious students of geopolitics and bloggers who are already avid readers of Robb’s Global Guerillas site. For them, Brave New War is a systematic and footnoted exposition of the theories of conflict and “dangerous ideas” that Robb discusses daily on his blog. They will be entertained and challenged by the same analysis that makes them return again and again to Global Guerillas to debate John Robb and one another.

The second audience is composed of everyone else. Brave New War is simply going to blow them away.

Brave New War is a tightly written, fast-paced work on the emergent nature of warfare, conflict global society with a decidedly dystopian take. In a mixture of original ideas and synthesis of the works of other cutting edge “thought leaders”, Robb, a platform designer and former mission commander for USAF Counterterrorism operations, draws analogies from the tech world to explain changes in warfare in the age of globalization. Calling the Iraq War “ the modern equivalent of the Spanish Civil War” Robb highlights a robust number of critical concepts in Brave New War that are, in his view, altering international and subnational conflict, including:

Bazaar of Violence
Black Swans
Brittle Security
Dynamc Decentralized Resilience
Emergent Intelligence
Fourth Generation Warfare
Guerilla Entrepreneurs
Global Guerillas
Market-States
Minimalist Platforms
Open-Source Warfare
Plausible Promises
Primary Loyalties
Stigmergic Systems
Superempowered Groups
Systempunkt
The Long Tail of Warfare

Urban Takedowns

Some of these concepts are Robb’s, some belong to others and in Brave New War you will find citations for figures as diverse as William Lind, Chris Anderson, Nicholas Nassim Taleb, Valdis Krebs, Eric S. Raymond, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Philip Bobbitt, Moises Naim and David A. Deptula. One of the great strengths of Brave New War is Robb’s capacity as an analyst and theorist to apply the revelations of research into network theory to warfare, and to conceptualize armed political conflict within the framework of platforms and ecosystems. This gives Robb’s arguments a degree of horizontal “interconnectedness” seldom seen in works on military affairs ( except, as Robb himself points out, in the work of his frequent online sparring partner, Thomas Barnett).

Robb is betting heavily on increasing levels of global instability and systemic breakdown as “feedback” from global guerillas overloads “the system” and disrupts globalization. It is this orientation toward discerning the worst-case scenarios and descent into entropy that will raise hackles amongst some readers, though Robb ultimately predicts a strengthening of systemic resilience and a burst of innovation as a result of these tribulations.

Brave New War is the must read book of 2007.

OTHER REVIEWS:

Haft of The Spear

Simulated Laughter

Futurejacked

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

RECOMMENDED READING

Shorter today as I have some irons in the fire:

Top Billing! Hidden Unities ” Children of War” Series:

Children At War I , Children At War II: What Can Be Done To Help Stem It? and Children At War III: Beyond The Paralysis Of Pity And The Trauma Of Fighting Children

A subject and set of posts deserving of greater attention.

How to Work With Tribesmen” by Col. W. Patrick Lang. (Hat tip to Tequila)

Danger Room offers up Laser Rifles and Lightning Guns ( “Holy Nikola Tesla, Batman!”)

PINR – “Afghanistan’s Role in Iranian Foreign Policy

That’s it!


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