Ralph Peters on the Myths of Modern War
My friend Bruce Kesler, who takes a position of healthy skepticism on theories about warfare, sent me a piece by the colorful military writer and ex-intel analyst, Ralph Peters, a few days ago which I finally had the time to read today. The article appeared in The American Legion Magazine and might have been off the radar of some of my readers ( it was off of mine -thanks Bruce!):
“Thanks to those who have served in uniform, we’ve lived in such safety and comfort for so long that for many Americans sacrifice means little more than skipping a second trip to the buffet table.Two trends over the past four decades contributed to our national ignorance of the cost, and necessity, of victory.
First, the most privileged Americans used the Vietnam War as an excuse to break their tradition of uniformed service. Ivy League universities once produced heroes. Now they resist Reserve Officer Training Corps representation on their campuses.Yet, our leading universities still produce a disproportionate number of U.S. political leaders. The men and women destined to lead us in wartime dismiss military service as a waste of their time and talents. Delighted to pose for campaign photos with our troops, elected officials in private disdain the military. Only one serious presidential aspirant in either party is a veteran, while another presidential hopeful pays as much for a single haircut as I took home in a month as an Army private.
Second, we’ve stripped in-depth U.S. history classes out of our schools. Since the 1960s, one history course after another has been cut, while the content of those remaining focuses on social issues and our alleged misdeeds. Dumbed-down textbooks minimize the wars that kept us free. As a result, ignorance of the terrible price our troops had to pay for freedom in the past creates absurd expectations about our present conflicts. When the media offer flawed or biased analyses, the public lacks the knowledge to make informed judgments.
This combination of national leadership with no military expertise and a population that hasn’t been taught the cost of freedom leaves us with a government that does whatever seems expedient and a citizenry that believes whatever’s comfortable. Thus, myths about war thrive….”
Peters goes on to list and explain the following “12 myths”:
- War doesn’t change anything
- Victory is impossible today.
- Insurgencies can never be defeated
- There’s no military solution; only negotiations can solve our problems.
- When we fight back, we only provoke our enemies
- Killing terrorists only turns them into martyrs.
- If we fight as fiercely as our enemies, we’re no better than them
- The United States is more hated today than ever before
- Our invasion of Iraq created our terrorist problems
- If we just leave, the Iraqis will patch up their differences on their own.
- It’s all Israel’s fault. Or the popular Washington corollary: “The Saudis are our friends.”
- The Middle East’s problems are all America’s fault.
In the course of his preface and the extended “de-bunking” that follows, Peters makes a large number of points that I can agree with individually in the abstract or in isolation. To that, I cheerfully admit. My problem – and it’s a serious problem, actually – is that in the big picture, where Peters takes the simplification and conflation of complex and critical variables to the point of intellectual irresponsibility.
Peters is arguing for America taking a “Jacksonian” ( in Walter Russell Meade taxonomy) posture toward our Islamist and terrorist enemies in particular and toward the world in general. It’s an argument that may appeal to members of the American Legion, in particular the GI Generation of WWII vets who experienced fighting a total war, but it’s not a helpful strategy unless our enemies manifest a sufficiently targetable center of gravity, like, say, taking over Pakistan and making Osama bin Laden Grand Emir.
Frankly, our goal should be to never permit let our enemies reach such a position of strength in the first place. That means peeling away Muslim and tribal allies of convenience to pitch in killing the al Qaida network, not lumping the Saudis in with al Qaida, the Iranians, Musharraf and whatever itinerant Middle-Eastern types seem vaguely dysfunctional in a civilizational sense ( personally, I like reading about dead terrorists and I think their supporters, financiers, intellectual cheerleaders and mosque recruiters are all fair game for rendition or assassination, wherever they are. Doesn’t that give us more than enough of room to work with without attacking the entire Arab-Islamic world ??). I won’t even bother to go into the geoeconomic lunacy of bombing or attacking Saudi Arabia.
In my humble opinion, Peters knows all this very well. He’s a very smart guy. Certainly smart enough to comprehend downstream effects. What he’s doing these days is not strategy but shtick.
November 21st, 2007 at 6:56 am
[…] Indian Muslims | News & Views wrote an interesting post today on Ralph Peters on the Myths of Modern WarHere’s a quick excerptThe article appeared in The American Legion Magazine and might have … while another presidential hopeful pays as much for a single haircut as I […]
November 21st, 2007 at 1:44 pm
I don’t think that’s the problem or, more precisely, it’s only part of the problem. I think in reality that it’s a target-rich environment. We know plenty of state sponsors of terrorism including Syria, Iran, and the KSA (and, yes, I know that the KSA doesn’t officially sponsor terrorism, it’s just the net effect). We just aren’t doing much about them. “Doing something” includes isolating them either militarily or diplomatically, punishing them either economically, diplomatically, or militarily, and the full panoply of prospective activities. Unfortunately, each and every country has a constituency and each and every action has a cost and we’re not really willing to bear costs.
My view has always been that our government’s proper priorities in dealing with terrorism should always have been the states that sponsor terrorism. Once those have been contained, isolated, or deterred I think the scope of the problem would have been greatly reduced.
November 21st, 2007 at 4:19 pm
Mark-
What he’s doing these days is not strategy but shtick.
Thank you, yours is a very sane response. We’re in a political conflict, not a military one, primarily.
November 21st, 2007 at 5:35 pm
Hi Dave,
I agree that there is no consensus about what costs we are willing to bear as a country or within the elite, a factor which contributes to our erratic and inconsistent response to terrorism and to state-sponsors and weak states with pro-terrorism factions. Nor do I see this situation changing in 2009.
Hi Mithras,
Thanks! I’ve read or perhaps been told by some acquaintence who has seen Peters in action, that he trims his sails to the audience and that this “war-god” theme gets set aside when prudent. Don’t know firsthand though. Peters is a good military writer but I find it hard to take this sort of stuff seriously. It ratchets up frustration while offering counterproductive suggestions.
November 21st, 2007 at 8:05 pm
Mark-
With regard to your response to Dave Schuler’s comment, I think the “lack of consensus” relates more to confusion about means and ends than simple partisanship. What does “pushing them … economically, diplomatically, or militarily” mean with respect to KSA or Pakistan? What do we expect them to do? The basic disconnect is that actual democratic elections – our putative strategic goal – would result in significant political gains for the jihadis.
November 21st, 2007 at 9:31 pm
Dave,
“we’re not really willing to bear costs.”
When you say “costs” don’t you actually mean the number of people we are willing to kill to get what we want? I mean that is some kind of a code word, right?
If we kill everyone the costs would be too high for us to remain an image of that which we think we are.
On the other side, the insurgents are trying to show that the costs are too high for us to remain on the moral high ground.
When you say, “unfortunately,…and we’re not really willing to bear costs.” you seem to say you believe we can “spend” a little more in this area. What do you base your estimate on? Is this something you personally know (say having been there) or is this just something you are wishing for?
November 22nd, 2007 at 2:25 am
No, I don’t, Larry. I mean that we aren’t willing to re-align relationships, use less oil, monitor our ports, and everything else that would go in to making us more secure. For me force is a last resort and by “last resort” I don’t mean that we asked once, didn’t get our way, and decided to attack. I mean last resort in an inescapable situation.
November 23rd, 2007 at 1:39 am
Eddie sent me this a while back. The Jacksonian link is right on.
November 23rd, 2007 at 6:10 am
Hi A.E.
Gracias! Eddie sends out a lot of good stuff – almost as much as does Bruce.
Hi Mithras,
"I think the “lack of consensus” relates more to confusion about means and ends than simple partisanship"
We are having a scary amount of agreement lately Mithras – I’m amazed how conservative that you are becoming. ;o)
On a serious note, I think that is correct. Our national security wonks who are of an age to hold a second or third tier positions in the bureaucracy and shape policy, regardless of party, had their formative intellectual and academic experiences during the Cold War, especially Vietnam and post-Vietnam 1970’s. While all that knowledge accumulated is still useful, the visceral reactions, attitudes and intuitive judgments that come with them do not really fit current geopolitical conditions.
al Qaida isn’t like the Baader-Meinhoff gang or even the PLO; Iraq is far more complex than Vietnam or Korea; America is not in the same positional role in the world affairs in 2007 as it was in 1947 or 1967. Our elite policy folks have had a terrible time getting outside of this box and trying to analyze events with " new eyes" rather than legacy blinders.
November 23rd, 2007 at 6:56 pm
Dave,
thanks for the feedback. I’ve heard the phrase, not willing to bear cost before and never been sure exactly what that person meant. Now I at least know one person’s definition of it.
With war being about displacement and not really about force, it is hard sometimes, at least for me, to keep up with which part of power we are talking about.
Isolation is about force but then realignment of relationships sounds more like displacement. Force is always across a gap and at a distance, while displacement is basically that which is inside or, in other words, fills the gap. Friction is kind of that relationship which precedes displacement. Of course friction might be still present, if done properly, after displacement as well.