Dr. Barnett on American Grand Strategy and Russia
One of the longer pieces that Tom has blogged in some time and it’s really good to see him go en fuego on such an important topic. Dr. Barnett puts the costs of playing the Russo-Georgian War ( and/or demonizing China. Some out there would like to do both!) in an unthinkingly “feel good” way as throwing away most of our gains from winning the Cold War. The Russians, meanwhile, demonstrate that there is no monopoly on strategically shortsighted hotheadedness by having bellicose generals issue aggressive bluster that alienates all of Russia’s neighbors and makes our job of rounding up diplomatic support in Europe about ten times easier. That was a complete gift ( and also an example on how events can start to spin dangerously out of control).
The Core comes with competing rule sets
…The same would be true for a Russia that militarily subdued the Baltics or Ukraine. When you re-introduce war into situations where the Core has collectively said to itself, “We think we’ve got this one in hand for the long haul,” then you’d shift defense thinking inside the Core away from its post-9-11 tendency to focus on the Gap and once again have it start giving preeminence to defending against such possibilities inside the Core. This, to me, is how you destroy globalization. Depending on how we play Russia in the weeks and months ahead, we can certainly put much of Europe and the U.S. on that pathway.
I see that as a stupid strategic choice that throws away decades of effort and sacrifice to get our international liberal trade order (just the West til about 1980 and called the global economy and globalization since) to where it is today, with just a mere one billion truly offline and the Gap eminently shrinkable–albeit with plenty of social tumult and violence to accompany that process (but not too much to handle for a Core whose attention isn’t diverted back to senseless intra-Core conflicts). I thought along these lines for a long time before PNM was published. My first major effort at the Center for Naval Analyses in 1991 saw me advocate radically ramping up navy-to-navy cooperation with the Russians. So I’ve been making this argument for 17 years and am not (surprise!) eager to trash the situation over Georgia’s miscalculations. If we put immature democracies (who start wars more than any other type of state historically) in that driver’s seat, we’re screwed.
Despite his muscular prose, Tom is actually understating the costs of a crashed globalization and defense budgets ramped up as far as the eye can see. I can’t put a dollar figure on it but the working denomination here is “trillions”. We should really stop a moment and think about that and start calculating three or four steps down the road rather than tacking our moves to the needs of the MSM news cycle.
Galrahn at Information Dissemination, aside from some very kind words for me, which I appreciate, dives into Tom’s post and adds his own excellent analysis:
Russia – Georgia Analysis We Can Support
….Russia and the US are not equals, but can be in their approach to the gap. I would also include other major powers in this equation. I love that piece by Tom, because in a great many words, he is essentially invoking our Yin Yang theory for strategically approaching our national interests.When any major power exercises power in the gap, it ultimately represents an opposing (competitive) and, at the same time, complementary (completing) application of power towards the ends of shrinking the gap. Tom found the Yin Yang.
In this case, Georgia, which has a relationship with the United States is being consumed by Russia, and ultimately will be regardless of what the United States does. This represents a loss of influence for the United States and Europe, a gain of influence for the Russians. BUT this also represents a long term complimentary action to the strategic goals of everyone in the core. Why? Because successful military intervention by a core nation into the gap shrinks the gap.Apply the same theory to Iraq. The US military intervention there represented a loss of influence by Russia and Europe, and a gain of influence by the United States. The result is an action that is complimentary to the strategic goals of other core nations (think China and energy here), and the effects of this intervention are broad. Consider what we see in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait and we have movement towards more shrinking of the gap. There is no reason to believe that Russian intervention in Georgia couldn’t have a similar effect on regional nations, including Ukraine
The new states of the “near abroad” like Georgia are vulnerable to Russian meddling not because they are militarily weak but because their populations are disunited and their governments operate with dubious legitimacy, excess opacity and a systemic mafiya corruption that saps their national vitality. To stand strong, they need to clean up their acts in their own best interests so the help we extend can be effectively used.
August 22nd, 2008 at 1:58 pm
I’m not sure what Galrahn’s definition of Core and Gap are. Certainly it must be different from the definitions offered since 2001 or so.
On 8/8, a large central asian state invaded a New Core state. To cmpare this to Iraq is as weird as comparing the Ethiopian-Eritrea was with World W ar II.
More broadly, you seem to overestimate the strength of a low-population-density version of Portugal.
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/08/22/the-price-of-the-portuguese-this-salazar-with-a-slavic-name.html
August 22nd, 2008 at 3:10 pm
hi Dan,
.
you wrote: "On 8/8, a large central asian state invaded a New Core state…"
.
Setting aside Russia as a Gap state as you imply, how does Georgia qualify as new Core in your view ?
August 22nd, 2008 at 3:53 pm
"a New Core state…"It could also be thought of as a New Core Theme Park.
August 22nd, 2008 at 4:03 pm
Mark,
Thanks for the reply.
To answer your question
Setting aside Russia as a Gap state as you imply, how does Georgia qualify as new Core in your view ?
WTO members, NATO accession status, EU accession status, life expectancy.non-natural-resource based economy, &c.
In other words, mass import of western rulesets, not being a petro-state, caring for its citizens.
Those claiming Russia is new core puzzle me, as the only arguments they are making apply to Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, and so on — and no one recognizes those states are Core.
August 22nd, 2008 at 4:05 pm
vanderleun’s comment is typical of the knee-jerk lack of thought that typifies much of online discussion.
"omg lol georgia b small" seems to be his point.
August 22nd, 2008 at 8:23 pm
"Those claiming Russia is new core puzzle me, as the only arguments they are making apply to Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, and so on — and no one recognizes those states are Core."
Yep, also something that bother me about this "core".Is Saudi Arabia any less integrated in the global economic system than Russia?And their demographics are probably in better shape too….
August 22nd, 2008 at 9:35 pm
[…] support actions such as this, by claiming (for no good reason, as far as I can tell) that Russia is a Core state. Hardly: Russian is an central asian dictatorship, a bigger version of […]
August 23rd, 2008 at 12:03 am
Moreover, the claim that Georgia is weak because its population is, "disunited and their governments operate with dubious legitimacy, excess opacity and a systemic mafiya corruption that saps their national vitality" is pretty false as well. Georgia is really only disunited as much as Abkhazia and South Ossetia count as disunity; while the various factions squabble over who should be in charge, they are united in their friendliness toward the US and Europe and their hostility to Russia. Similarly, by defining Georgia in this way, Russia can be properly labeled weak and non-core — its population is by no means united if we are to examine Ingushetia and Chechnya (or hell, the last gasps of free media left in the country), just as most of the government below Putin/Medvedev operates in a capricious and unpopular fashion. Corruption is rampant, ministries are routinely documented as opaque and non-transparent, and their entire political and business environment is dominated by mafia groups.
How again is Georgia any worse than Russia on any of these fronts? Russia has a military 25x larger than Georgia’s. Case closed when it comes to a fight.
August 23rd, 2008 at 3:21 am
Hi guys,
.
Hmmm. If you subtract FDI and government spending ( how much of the budget is foreign aid/loans I’m not certain but I’m guessing it isn’t insignificant) I have to ask what percent of the GDP of Georgia is a result of native Georgian enterprises? Before the war about a third of Georgians were unemployed with per capita in the lower 4 digits. I see a Third World economy with a lot of native Georgians in the agricultural sector or resource extraction while higher-added value companies are foreign owned or partnered. Russia is not nearly so badly off and it’s undeniable corruption does not prevent the Russian state from achieving it’s primary objectives.
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Now in terms of military power, it’s not what you have but what you can bring to bear. Small states do not need to be able to defeat a great power but be reliably known to be able to impose punishing costs. It’s why Nazi Germany never occupied Switzerland, why Stalin did not press to make Finland an East bloc satellite. Georgia was unable to impose those costs ( perhaps what the Georgians really need most right now are .50 caliber sniper rifles).
August 23rd, 2008 at 5:02 am
[…] “Dr. Barnett on American Grand Strategy and Russia“, Zenpundit, 22 August 2008 — Excerpt: […]
August 24th, 2008 at 1:57 am
So again, you’re saying that Georgia’s military wasn’t sufficient. A military is more than equipment, it is also logistics and doctrine. Which you already know. A small state cannot win against a far larger state in an offensive war; it can, however, at least in theory, reliably defend itself. But Georgia wasn’t defending itself.
August 24th, 2008 at 3:51 pm
" But Georgia wasn’t defending itself."
A serious strategic misjudgment on their part. Coupled with a lack of defensive strategy or even tactics to deal with one of the likeliest threats to their security
August 25th, 2008 at 1:55 am
Putin has stated something to the effect that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe ever. It’s not all about us; i.e. the plans that he/they have developed are centered on putting Russia back at the center of the world stage. If Putin wants a cold war II it seems he can get one…the alternative being?
August 25th, 2008 at 2:27 pm
You are correct that Georgia was not able to inflict punishing costs on Russia.
With the US exporting security since the end of the Gulf War, many many states cut back on military spending, as they expect that the services they buy from the US (in the form of public debt) will be of sufficient quality to protect themselves.
Our general inaction so far indicates states have been overpaying for security from us.