Is 4GW Dead?: Point-Counterpoint and Commentary
4GW theory has always attracted overenthusiasts and raging haters ever since the concept emerged way back in 1989, so debates about the merit of 4GW are nothing new; in fact, the arguments became so routine that they had largely gone sterile years ago. After T.X. Hammes published his excellent The Sling and the Stone and John Robb went to the next level with Brave New War , it seemed that little new was left to be said. In the late 2000’s, intellectual energies shifted to arguing the nuances and flaws of Pop-centric COIN, which proved in time to be even more bitter than those about 4GW.
Generations of War Theory Visualized by Chet Richards
What is different recently is that the person taking the affirmative on the question “Is 4GW dead?” was Dr. Chet Richards, who for years ran the premier but now defunct 4GW site, D-N-I.net, now archived here by the Project on Government Oversight. Richards is no Clausewitzian true-believer or Big Army MBA with stars, but a former collaborator with John Boyd and a leading thinker of the 4GW school who had written several books with that strategic theme.
Therefore, not a critic to be dismissed lightly. Here’s Chet:
….The first thing to note is that 4GW is an evolution from 3GW, which they equate to maneuver warfare and the blitzkrieg as defined in MCDP 1 and Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict. These are styles of warfare conducted by state armies against other state armies, although the paper does invoke the notion of transnational terrorists near the end.
At some point in the late 1990s, the theory bifurcated. Bill Lind and Martin van Creveld began to emphasize the decline of the state and focus on transnational guerrilla organizations like al-Qa’ida. Tom Barnett called this the “road warrior” model. T. X. Hammes, on the other hand, characterized 4GW as “evolved insurgency” and envisioned the techniques described in the paragraphs above as also useful for state-vs-state conflicts.
….The 9/11 attacks, by a transnational guerrilla movement, seemed to confirm 4GW in both of its forms. In the last few years, however, everything has gone quiet. Transnational insurgencies, “global guerrillas” as John Robb terms them, have not become a significant factor in geopolitics. “Continuing irritation” might best describe them, whose primary function seems to be upholding national security budgets in frightened western democracies. The state system has not noticeably weakened. So it might be fair at this point to conclude that although 4GW was a legitimate theory, well supported by logic and data, the world simply didn’t develop along the lines it proposed.
A prominent critic of 4GW, Antulio J. Echevarria, may have been correct:
What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased “dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance” brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies.
Why? I’ll offer this hypothesis, that the primary reason warfare did not evolve a fourth generation is that it didn’t live long enough. The opening of Sir Rupert Smith’s 2005 treatise, The Utility of Force, states the case….
Chet’s post spurred a sharp rebuttal from William Lind, “the Father of Fourth Generation Warfare”:
So “the world simply didn’t develop along the lines it (4GW) proposed”? How do you say that in Syriac?
The basic error in Chet Richards’ piece of April 19, “Is 4GW dead?” is confusing the external and internal worlds. Internally, in the U.S. military and the larger defense and foreign policy establishment, 4GW is dead, as is maneuver warfare and increasingly any connection to the external world. The foreign policy types can only perceive a world of states, in which their job is to promote the Wilsonian nee Jacobin, follies of “democracy” and “universal human rights.” They are in fact, 4GW’s allies, in that their demand for “democracy” undermines states, opening the door for more 4GW.
In most of the world, democracy is not an option. The only real options are tyranny or anarchy, and when you work against tyranny, you are working for anarchy. The ghost of bin Laden sends his heartfelt thanks.
Third Generation doctrine has been abandoned, de facto, if not de jure, by the one service that embraced it, the U.S. Marine Corps. The others never gave it a glance. The U.S. military remains and will remain second generation until it disappears from sheer irrelevance coupled with high cost. That is coming much sooner than any of them think.
….In many of these cases, including Egypt and Pakistan, the only element strong enough to hold the state together is the army. But the “democracy” crowd in Washington immediately threatens aid cut-offs, sanctions, etc., if the army acts. Again, the children now running America’s foreign policy are 4GW’s best allies.
Fourth generation war includes far more than just Islamic “terrorism,” and we see it gaining strength in areas far from the Middle East. Gangs have grown so powerful in Mexico, right on our border, that I predict the state will soon have to make deals with them, as the PRI has done in the past. Invasion by immigrants who do not acculturate is a powerful form of 4GW, more powerful than any terrorism, and that is occurring on a north-south basis (except Australia) literally around the world. Remember, most of the barbarians did not invade the Roman Empire to destroy it. They just wanted to move in. In fact, most were invited in. Sound familiar?
What should concern us most is precisely the disconnect between the internal and external worlds. Externally, 4GW is flourishing, while internally, in the US government and military, it does not exist. This is the kind of chasm into which empires can disappear….
Fabius Maximus – who is a both a pseudonymous blogger and a group blog, also responded:
Update about one of the seldom-discussed trends shaping our world: 4GW
One of the interesting aspects of recent history is the coincidence of
- the collapse of discussion about 4GW in US military and geopolitical circles,
- victories by insurgents using 4GW methods over foreign armies in Iraq and Afghanistan, &
- most important, the perhaps history-making victory by Bin Laden’s al Qaeda.
The second point is important to us, but the usual outcome since WW2 (after which 4GW became the dominate form of military conflict; see section C below). The third point is the big one. Based on the available information, one of Bin Laden’s goals was to destabilize the US political regime. Massive increase in military spending (using borrowed funds). The bill of rights being shredded (note yesterday’s House vote to tear another strip from the 4th amendment). Our Courts holding show trials of terrorists — recruited, financed, supported by our security services. Torture and concentration camps.
….We — the Second American Republic — have engaged in a war with nationalistic, Islamic forces using 4GW. So far we are losing. For various reasons we are unable to even perceive the nature of the threat. In DoD the hot dot is again procurement of high-tech weapons — new ships, the F-35, the hypersonic cruise missile, etc. All useless in the wars we’ve fought for the past 50 years, and probably in those of the next 50 years…..
A few comments.
4GW has been heavily criticized – and accurately so – for making selective use of history, for unsupported maximal claims, for an excessively and ahistorically linear argument and for shifting or vaguely defined terms. Presented rigidly, it is relatively easy for critics to poke holes in it simply by playing “gotcha” (some of the criticism of 4GW did not get beyond ad hominem level garbage, but more intellectually serious detractors made very effective critiques of 4GW’s flaws).
That said, there were a number of useful elements or insights in the body of 4GW writings that retain their utility and I think are worth recalling:
- Whatever one thinks of 4GW as a whole, the school drew attention to the threat of non-state irregular warfare, failed states and the decline of state vs. state warfare and did so long before it was Pentagon conventional wisdom or trendy Beltway talking head spiels on Sunday morning news programs.
- While the state is not in decline everywhere in an absolute sense, it sure is failing in some places and has utterly collapsed elsewhere. Failed, failing and hollowed out states are nexus points for geopolitical problems and feature corruption, black globalization, insurgency, tribalism, terrorism, transnational criminal organizations and zones of humanitarian crisis. Whether we call these situations “irregular”, “hybrid”, “decentralized and polycentric”, “LIC”, “4GW” or everyone’s favorite, “complex” matters less than using force to achieve political aims becomes increasingly difficult as the interested parties and observers multiply. Some of the advice offered by the 4GW school regarding “the moral level of war”, de-escalation and the perils of fighting the weak in such a conflict environment are all to the good for reducing friction.
- The emphasis of the 4GW school on the perspective of the irregular fighter and their motivations not always fitting neatly within state-centric realpolitik, Galula-ish “Maoist Model” insurgency, Clausewitzian best strategic practice or the Western intellectual tradition, were likewise ahead of their time and contrary to S.O.P. Even today, the effort to see the world through the eyes of our enemies is at best, anemic. Red teams are feared more than they are loved. Or utilized.
- The bitter criticism the 4GW school lodged of the American political elite being allergic to strategic thinking and ignorant of strategy in general was apt; that American strategy since the end of the Cold War has been exceedingly inept in thought and execution is one of the few points on which the most rabid 4GW advocate and diehard Clausewitzian can find themselves in full agreement.
The lessons of 4GW will still be relevant wherever men fight in the rubble of broken societies, atomized communities and failed states.
May 28th, 2013 at 2:00 pm
My experience tells me the approaches are what’s wrong. 4GW’s views are often unable to resolve vital aspects of “winning” on the modern battlefield. If the enemy is using 4GW techniques still (or if not) the civil populace remains the defeat mechanism. It’s less about maneuver warfare and more about moving the populace towards the “legitimate” government. If we fight in a way that ignores moving the populace…then victory is not a controllable element. Even the mighty smart modern Marines are missing the point. The over reliance of drones, COIN, unit achievements, biometric databases focuses too much attention on a microfraction of the battlefield population. Move the populace and you win on both the micro and macro battlefield. Whether or not 4GW is dead is irrelevant…we aren’t training to fight a fight we know how to win. What we have managed to do the past 20+ years is reinvent or modify colonialism. Maybe the better question is why did we create 2nd Gen Colonialism?
May 28th, 2013 at 2:31 pm
And, Pete: For the amount of blood and treasure we’ve expended, we’re pretty poor at 2G Colonialism…
May 28th, 2013 at 3:02 pm
.In many of these cases, including Egypt and Pakistan, the only element strong enough to hold the state together is the army. But the “democracy” crowd in Washington immediately threatens aid cut-offs, sanctions, etc., if the army acts. Again, the children now running America’s foreign policy are 4GW’s best allies.
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For Pakistan, no, that is propaganda that works very well on a certain type of person. The Army, quite clever at UW, cultivated a variety of non-state/state actors to counteract conventional Indian military superiority. This disorder also draws in a variety of Western and other states that pay into the system, worried about the disorder. This allows more money to be spent on nuclear and other weapons which allows the non-state/state actor bleeding to continue.
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There may be some change now because even the Chinese and Saudis are no longer amused and may no longer find it useful to keep the Americans, Iranians, Indians, Russians, whomever, in check, and may have sent word to tone it down.
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Who knows? Only time will tell. This anarchy vs. tyranny fantasia is just that, complete and utter fantasy.
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The good thing about this post is that I can safely ignore this nonsense, plenty of people warned about anarchy and they were states targeted by the very anarchy at times leveraged by other states. They said it first, and back in the 80’s when the Soviet focused types ignored it, and during the 90’s when the Clinton administratin prioritized a certain kind of relationship with China which only increased disorder while bringing order, all at the same time, depending on the individual situation.
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Good grief. Like boys or girls playing with toys.
May 28th, 2013 at 3:06 pm
Whatever one thinks of 4GW as a whole, the school drew attention to the threat of non-state irregular warfare, failed states and the decline of state vs. state warfare and did so long before it was Pentagon conventional wisdom or trendy Beltway talking head spiels on Sunday morning news programs.
Go back and read the warnings by Indians and others; this is an American, Beltway-centric view of the world which is completely ignorant of the very many people that drew attention to the threat of non-state irregular warfare, it wasn’t just state sponsored insurgencies, they worried about the “virus” itself and have done so almost from the beginning of their state.
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Zen, is this an insider conversation aimed at someone else besides your regular readers? You know this stuff.
May 28th, 2013 at 3:09 pm
A state went in and removed Saddam Hussain and Al Q piggy backed on that. So, is it the strong state that is at issue, or the weak state left behind?
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Chicken-and-egg. Fantasia. Tonka toys. Lego diagrams. Little Green Army Men. Play, play, play at intellectual games while the actual world, the stuff beyond Lew Rockwell and Counterpunch and flickering fluorescent light conferences moves, in its own way, in its own time.
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Outta here, be good everyone!
May 28th, 2013 at 3:59 pm
The problem is that 4GW as a theory was either misconceived or only vaguely conceived from the beginning. Robb misconceived, but had the freedom to do so because Lind only vaguely conceived it originally. But having built the podiums to certain specifications, the speakers could not alter their perspectives and speak from a different direction. Heck, look at most recent official talk about future warfare—e.g., Obama’s insistence that future conflict will not be like past conflict—and it might be clear that something has shifted. Most Americans who pay attention, having been subjected to a decade+ of Iraq and Afghanistan and seeing the results of the Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, Libya, mass demonstrations vs. YouTube videos across the Islamic world….The Tsarnaev bros. and beheadings on UK streets….Well, they see that the horizon doesn’t look much like what they thought they saw in the 20th C. But all of this is still rather vague.
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Presented rigidly, it is relatively easy for critics to poke holes in it simply by playing “gotcha”
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Precisely. I will apply something I more or less said about 5GW once or twice: Regardless of what we call it or don’t call it; regardless of whether we even address it formally — or entirely fail to consider it —; regardless of however many arguments for the idea or against the idea are made, good and bad arguments on either side, it is still going to happen. The form it takes, it will take; and this form might not reflect precisely any theory now given of it. What I mean by this is that these sometimes self-interested pseudo-scholarly debates are precisely beside the point. If we had never formulated a concept for gravity and complex formulae describing how it works, gravity would not suddenly cease to occur, and people would still go about their lives informed by gravity, addressing it. And, because the future context will be…the future context, whatever we do in the future will address that future. That someone should be able to thump his chest in the future and say, “See, I told you so!” is quite irrelevant.
May 28th, 2013 at 8:21 pm
Man.
Lind’s still really worked up into a lather over Versailles. Someone needs to get Karl Thomas Robert Maria Franziskus Georg Bahnam von Hapsburg-Lothringen to fax him a birthday hug.
May 28th, 2013 at 8:22 pm
Meanwhile, Sen. McCain just had tea with the first Al-Heart and Lung Eaters Brigade in Syria.
May 28th, 2013 at 9:12 pm
i’ve never cottoned to the 4GW term, and it may well be dead. but what it’s proponents were calling attention to – the underlying trends and dynamics, mostly concerning the rise of new network forms of organization, technology, and doctrine – are indeed still alive and growing.
4GW is presumably a postmodern kind of conflict / warfare. but i’ve yet to see a totally postmodern bunch engaging in 4GW in a violent manner. instead, the ablest postmodern practitioners appear to be lobbyists, public-relation firms, and activist ngos. plus some cyber gangs dedicated to malevolent hacking. linn’s comments above notice this as well.
as for violent war-like conflict, most (all?) of 4GW’s perpetrators so far — to the extent that al qaeda, the taliban, la familia michoacana, etc., reflect 4GW — are laden with antique tribal and clan dynamics and engage in ancient modes of violence. in that sense, many of today’s exemplars of 4GW are primarily practitioners of pre-generation warfare. the standard 1GW, 2W, 3GW, 4GW spectrum leaves out this earlier mode, and recategorizes it under 4GW. someone a few years ago did a timeline about 4GW that starts with the notion of a pre-formal generation of war: 0GW. it corresponds to my concern, but even so i still find the whole 0-4GW spectrum problematic, and prefer other options.
as for 4GW’s evocations about state failure — notably about states being eroded by tribal, market, and new network actors, as well as by internal corruption and incompetence — my view remains that the state is far from finito. it’ll go through adaptations and reformulations, remaining essential for the construction and governance of complex societies. indeed, most 4GW actors aim to reinstitute the state in some form.
much as i appreciate linn’s points above, they overdraw that democracy is the key alternative outside of tyranny versus anarchy. much of the world remains more suited to patrimonial corporatism than to liberal democracy. and that’s not necessarily a bad bad thing. to treat patrimonial corporatist regimes as tyrannies misjudges their deep appeal, as well as fact that some are much less tyrannical than others.
finally, ahem, i’d note that 4G seems to have spread beyond warfare and then telecom levels, to capture what i see as a 4G mentality among some folks preparing for the worst: the 4 G’s being guns, gold, gardens, and gigabytes – the more the better.
May 28th, 2013 at 9:20 pm
“as for 4GW’s evocations about state failure — notably about states being eroded by tribal, market, and new network actors, as well as by internal corruption and incompetence — my view remains that the state is far from finito. it’ll go through adaptations and reformulations, remaining essential for the construction and governance of complex societies. indeed, most 4GW actors aim to reinstitute the state in some form.”
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Exactly the major problem with the Old School 4GW theory. While spinning fancy fantasies of global guerillas and other miscellaneous non-state actors, they failed utterly to understand the state.
May 28th, 2013 at 10:57 pm
Most contingencies dealing with the unstated were dealt with by the Law of Nations. For example, from Vattel:
or
The power to define what that means for the United States is a power granted to Congress:
An example of U.S. defense policy mediated through the lens of the Law of Nations: James Monroe’s second report to Congress on the State of the Union (this section was probably written by John Quincy Adams, Monroe’s Secretary of State):
U.S. discussion of intervention in Cuba in 1898 was also informed by the law of nations.
May 29th, 2013 at 4:42 am
Excellent comments my friends,
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Pete,
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Move the populace and you win on both the micro and macro battlefield. Whether or not 4GW is dead is irrelevant…we aren’t training to fight a fight we know how to win. What we have managed to do the past 20+ years is reinvent or modify colonialism. Maybe the better question is why did we create 2nd Gen Colonialism?
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Excellent question. My best answer to that is that Americans decided somewhere that they don’t “do” foreign languages and culture anymore. If you compare the # of Americans who learned Arabic, Urdu or Pashto or did MENA area studies 2001-2013 with the # who studied and fluently spoke Russian, Korean or Vietnamese in a similar time frame during the Cold War, the comparison is embarrassing. We went from a handful of USG diplos who could speak Russian in the 40’s (literally Kennan, Bohlen and a half dozen others) to thousands by the mid fifties. If you can’t understand what ppl are saying and don’t care about their cultural norms it’s easier to impose your way of doing things on them ( which neatly overlaps with training missions which in the process of teaching useful basic military skills basically downloads an administrative-logistical system for their military no country on earth can afford except the US, Japan, China or maybe KSA. Not sure how ANA is going to pay all those soldiers in 2015 but whatever)
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More in the am – I’m dead tired…..
May 29th, 2013 at 4:48 am
Zen do you have a source for the number-of-Americans speaking Vietnamese/Korean/etc. statistic? Not that I doubt it. But I would love to be able to cite the fact in future writings.
May 29th, 2013 at 1:27 pm
“4GW,” being an acronym of three characters, is surely the most concise term we’ll ever have to refer to the phenomenon, which is real and ongoing.
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I do not see how it’s going to die any time soon. Perhaps several months of follow-up essays will convince me? (Just kidding: please. Don’t.)
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PS: Is 6GW when we realize the world is too crowded and complex for simple “victories” ? It’s all unintended consequences from here on out…then again, it always was.
May 29th, 2013 at 1:41 pm
“4GW,” being an acronym of three characters, is surely the most concise term we’ll ever have to refer to the phenomenon, which is real and ongoing.
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A theory is only as good as its eventual application if it is a theory meant to explain aspects of war or warfare. My problem is with the application of said theory in terms of explanation. Anarchy, disorder, hollowing out of states, these are not exactly new concepts and plenty of people have made the same arguments or got to the same point without referring to the theory.
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The theory is so loosey goosey that anything can be made to say it “fits”. How does this help real men and real women with an actual job to do?
May 29th, 2013 at 1:47 pm
Yeah, I know I’m being a huge jerk these days here and on other blogs. It’s just that I keep feeling as if I’m being sold a bill of goods by people that are more interested in drawing pretty power point pictures than understanding, albeit imperfectly, the world as it is. \.
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When Zen writes, “Excellent question. My best answer to that is that Americans decided somewhere that they don’t “do” foreign languages and culture anymore,” he’s making the correct argument. A lot of this is about a kind of intellectual laziness in our foreign policy apparatus and within certain military theorist circles. I’m sorry, but there it is. Afpak was ahistorical and based on lazy theorizing that was basically a bunch of State department and DC standard formulas passed off as a strategy. There is an entire literature about why the United States has followed certain policies in that region, a robust literature written by Americans and non-Americans alike. Better than 4GW or Pop Coin might have been doing one’s homework. People have to do their jobs but they want some theory to do it for them.
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I guess I’m too emotionally invested in the subject seeing its effects on a daily basis. You all will have to patient with me, I will try and write more carefully. I’m sorry I made fun in my earlier comments but honestly, what does a person have to do to get through to people?
May 29th, 2013 at 2:14 pm
@ Madhu:
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“but honestly, what does a person have to do to get through to people?”
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This is the question that even terrorists ask themselves at least once in their short careers, at least the planners and the lone wolves. (I’m guessing that many of the pawns, e.g. suicide bombers employed by terrorist orgs, often have other concerns motivating them.)
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Whether through words or actions….Words are actions; actions, words; and the modern milieu presents opportunities not as widely available or as potentially effective in much of history prior to our present era. Employed, focused performative strategies have always had a place in conflict — e.g., this from the LOOOOOONG comment Rees left,
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“The enemy makes use of his right, of the right of arms, which authorizes him to call in the aid of terror to a certain degree, in order that the subjects of the sovereign with whom he is at war may not be willing to venture on such bold undertakings, the success of which might prove fatal to him.”
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— but I think we would err if we failed to recognize how modern technology and other factors of our present milieu have altered the context of warfare & conflict (& peace) relative to such strategies. I’ve always been in favor of recognizing these differences, even bastardizing Ye Ol’ 4GW Theory in an attempt to take from that theory whatever insight it might offer into the present context—but also, recognizing that certain aspects of Old School 4GW theory are quite inadequate, even silly.
May 29th, 2013 at 2:55 pm
Madhu,
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“intellectual laziness,” indeed, and widespread. At some point, the “sound bite” culture took over, and rigor was valued less. We (the USA) were wealthy enough to paper over the imperfections. By-products are the nostalgic, those who don’t do anything but harken back to the good ole days (while doing little about today), and the peddlers of utopia: if we have just enough _______________ things will be perfect. Few apply the rigor necessary to avoid these alluring traps—mostly because they don’t know any better. Michael Lotus and James Bennett’s new America 3.0 refreshingly takes neither path.
May 29th, 2013 at 4:20 pm
Hey T. Greer.
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briefly – the first wave of Russian experts came in the twenties with the reforms of Huges and the professional Foreign Service, a special Russian/Soviet program was established of which Kennan and a very small # of FSO were alums. Gaddis has some details in his bio Kennan:An American Life. I do not have the exact stats on the Russian students in the fifties which I read in a journal and blogged about the Cold War ramp up to seed universities with FL and Soviet studies programs to meet USG and mil demand – I will have to search to find that one.
May 30th, 2013 at 1:18 pm
How does this help real men and real women with an actual job to do?
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I would hope it helps by providing a valuable life lesson that one should never look to the theorizing class for “help” when you’ve got an actual job to do.
May 30th, 2013 at 1:44 pm
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 (Thomas E. Ricks)
http://www.amazon.com/Fiasco-American-Military-Adventure-ebook/dp/B004IATD6U/
He mentions that after Vietnam that the Army did its best to remake itself and forget everything it learned about counterinsurgency.
Ricks also seems to waffle between 1) the decision to invade Iraq was made early and then did everything to fabricate the justifications for the decisions and 2) two camps that had honest disagreements about justifications to invade Iraq. He does make the point that enormous amounts of resources were diverted to the fabrications which significantly distracted from the real issues that needed to be faced. In the background seems to lurk Spinney’s theme about MICC objective for “Perpetual War” and constant flow of funds for major weapons systems(major counterinsurgency is effectively diplomacy which MICC has constantly undermined since it represents little funds flowing into MICC).
Talks about overlap with the players between Desert Storm and the last decade … however, he doesn’t talk about the same players going back to “Team B” … Colby being replaced with Bush1 in the mid-70s … because the CIA wouldn’t get in line with the MICC analysis.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_B
Eisenhower was able to debunk MICC claims with CIA U2 photo recon. The Colby firing was getting CIA inline with MICC. He also doesn’t talk about “Team B” supporting Iraq in Iran/Iraq war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_support_for_Iraq_during_the_Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_war
Then it turns out that US is arms merchant to both sides
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Contra_affair
lots of details were to be released in 2001 under the Presidential Records Act when the new president signs executive order keeping them classified.
http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/president-who-eviscerated-presidential-records-act-relying-on-his-presidential-library-to-boost-his-legacy/
however “Fiasco” was written before a newer president rescended the 2001 executive order
May 30th, 2013 at 1:51 pm
one of Bin Laden’s goals was to destabilize the US political regime
No. This is the goal of cartoon super villains not Al Qaeda
Bin Laden’s goal was to drive the US out of the Arabian Peninsula in order to overthrow the Saudi Royal family. He thought attacks on Americans would cause us to retreat due to our self-absorbed and weak society. He may have gotten this idea from subplot in one of his porn movies.
There aren’t trans-state actors, only sub state actors driven by transnational ideologies. This was a switch from the post – post – cold war world and a novel idea to the Sovietologists, but nothing new to the rest of the world.
On the other hand, dismissing insurgencies as mere skirmishes in proxy wars risks lapsing right back into the chessboard ludic fallacies Madhu mentions.
The civil war in Syria is not a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but the Arab Spring was/is a movement that has sprung up out of the vacuum that resulted after Iraq.
“Maybe the better question is why did we create 2nd Gen Colonialism?”
The first version of Middle East colonialism was motivated by two things: the ideology of centralized state control and the need to secure oil supplies. The latest version is the opposite.
Remember Rumsfeld’s classic dismissive line, “you go to war with the army you have”. Well you also go to war in the time you live in.
So forget what you see on the news , or what they try to sell you.
The past decade of conflict was about the West unwinding the old system (they created) and to transition into to a post-petroleum world, or, at least in the short term, transition to a post Middle East energy dependent world.
May 30th, 2013 at 11:39 pm
Another problem w/ 4GW theory, consequent of those theorists’ failure to understand the state, is that the theory as a whole comes from a state-centric worldview even if those theorists are incapable of seeing this for themselves. They are almost trapped within their state-centric p.o.v. even as they argue 4GW’s state-destroying motif. The problem is further exacerbated when arguments against 4GW theory also come from a state-centric worldview.
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E.g., “looking out” from the state, they see these transnational non-state actors encroaching — and can delineate ever so many features of those non-state actors, in detail, individually and in conglomerate — and they ask, “Whatever is the state to do?” Having not looked as closely at the state, they do not see that many of the capabilities they assign to those encroaching actors are present within the state’s population as well, informing that state’s actions and even operating independent of the state’s organizing powers. No, they continue to imagine the state having to act alone, even apart from the population within the state, utilizing state power organized hierarchically and rigidly directed vs. swarms of non-state actors.
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While to some extent the state is organized hierarchically — the shifting populace’s influences and “non-state qualities, powers” are funneled into leaders, branches of the government, and so forth via election and law — and is thereby limited in what it may do at any given moment, the state, particularly if it is democratic and bureaucratic, may “go through adaptations and reformulations” as David Ronfeldt said above. Furthermore, the population within the state may be highly adaptive and resourceful quite apart from the state apparatus (also influencing the state) — and rather resilient. For a 4GW performative strategy, which seeks to demoralize and confuse a populace, this is a major problem. (I would say that 4GW successes vs. despotic, rigid, non-democratic states within the Middle East and Africa are symptomatic of an easier playing field.)
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As Scott said above, in a society like ours, where a “‘sound bite’ culture” can “take over,” 4GW efforts might be peculiarly effective in the short term, and perhaps advanced and extremely well-devised 4GW efforts could be extremely effective over a longer period; but, I would return again to David’s observation that “the ablest postmodern practitioners appear to be lobbyists, public-relation firms, and activist ngos.” In my past attempts to bastardize Old School 4GW theory in order to make something useful of it, I’ve tried to draw attention to the fact that American politics is rather 4GW and has been for a long time, albeit 4GW without the violence. (I.e., performatively 4GW, but without using violence to “speak” and influence. This is not to say that violence has never been used in America in performative strategies, however; just look at lynchings etc. during and following Reconstruction. Certainly, the threat of violence remains ever-present: Note however that the state employs this in America, rather than non-state actors so much.)
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Another symptom of a state-centric worldview in Old School 4GW theorists: “Whatever will the military do?” Here you have a more solid argument re: the problems with hierarchy and rigid operations vs. non-state actors. But still, the p.o.v. is state-centric. And so, when 4GW theorists have continually asked, “What will the state do?” and “What will/can the military do?” and only ask these things from a state-centric worldview, it’s easy to see how their final answer to these questions must be, “THE STATE IS DOOMED!!”
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Hammes fell into this trap in another way. One can see the problem in his exploration of 5GW. First when describing 4GW, and then when postulating the coming (or already-developing) 5GW, Hammes saw both as being what the other guy did. This is a point of view that is always looking out—looking out from the state, and wondering whatever the state and the military can do. That the state and the military might adopt 4GW and 5GW strategies in order to compete never really seemed to enter his mind. Those strats are what the other guy does. The problem with that approach is that it creates a certain rigidity in the theories of 4GW or 5GW, a kind of too-limited, too-stable and ultimately, returning back to the question the original blog post above raises, a stale concept of 4GW (and 5GW.)
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Within this very comment thread, it might be possible to detect a state-centric exploration of 4GW as a theory. Madhu for instance says, “A theory is only as good as its eventual application if it is a theory meant to explain aspects of war or warfare,” and asks, “How does this help real men and real women with an actual job to do?” I think this is a very valuable question; but behind it is an assumption (apparently; I could be wrong) that those “real men and real women” are in the military and/or the state apparatus: those are the men and women Madhu has in mind. The fact that 4GW theory and the whole Generations of Modern Warfare Theory has been an ongoing exploration and debate by and among polisci and mil theory folk (professionals or hobbyists), may point at an intrinsic effort to develop a state-centric and military-centric answer to the question, “Whatever shall we do?” Perhaps this is symptomatic of the presumed deficiencies of The State ™ after all.
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The problem, as I see it, is that there is more to “we” than the military and the state. Indeed, 4GW (and 5GW) inherently suppose a non-state set of actors, their behaviors and motivations, a broader milieu than that of government officials and military personnel. More importantly, the targets of 4GW and 5GW endeavors are that broader “we.” My answer to how 4GW theory may help real men and real women may still be rather vague — mine is an ongoing exploration — but I would say that the application of the theory should be broader than mere considerations of what the state or military can do with it. For the general populace to be able to recognize 4GW and 5GW efforts, and to know that they are the ones being targeted by those efforts — and that they themselves might utilize 4GW and 5GW strategies in self-defense — perhaps would be more empowering than trying to devise procedures and strategies the state and the military (as objects not of the people) may use.
May 31st, 2013 at 1:36 pm
Is there a Mel Gibson movie for 6GW? After all he is the sage of Generational Warfare:
0GW: Braveheart
1GW: The Patriot
2GW: Gallipoli
3GW: We Were Soldiers
4GW: Mad Max
5GW: Conspiracy Theory
May 31st, 2013 at 10:22 pm
couldn’t resist … recent “perpetual war”
Top Marine Sees A Future Of Perpetual War — Sandra I. Erwin, National Defense
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.com/2013/05/military-and-intelligence-news-briefs_31.html
Top Marine Sees a Future of Perpetual War
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1158
and Spinney’s reference
http://chuckspinney.blogspot.com/p/domestic-roots-of-perpetual-war.html
June 2nd, 2013 at 1:10 am
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June 2nd, 2013 at 11:28 pm
Nicely, this correlates with the discussion of 4GW re: state failure (and “Global Guerrilla Syndrome” otherwise known as World War Z hah.) Fits some of my old thinking about the necessity of being aware of “the angels” as well as “the devils” re: superempowerment and DIY approaches and what I said above, that “the population within the state may be highly adaptive and resourceful quite apart from the state apparatus.”
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“The End Of The World Isn’t As Likely As Humans Fighting Back” @ http://www.fastcoexist.com/1682109/the-end-of-the-world-isnt-as-likely-as-humans-fighting-back via @DavidBrin on Twitter:
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Maybe Charles, who likes to focus on End Time thinking, could make use of the above as well. I’ve written previously (albeit not always clearly) about how GGs and like instigators have an extremely narrow worldview, narrow perspectival approach to operations…It is interesting to consider how End Time thinking might well be a symptom of a narrow observational capability that sees the near (or only isolated realities) and universalizes the observation into prophecies of Doom and Gloom etc.
June 8th, 2013 at 4:48 pm
@ Curtis: You make good points.
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@ Justin: That’s a good comeback!
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@ deichmans: You win every discussion on the internet ever with that comment.
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Okay, I’m still skeptical but I will try and be more open-minded on the subject.