The al-Masri Dialogue
Charles Cameron, in his latest guest post here, penned a beautiful essay regarding the ongoing exchanges between Australian counter-terrorism scholar Leah Farrall and Abu Walid al-Masri, an adviser to the Taliban and an experienced strategist of Islamist insurgency. Farrall has translated and posted this dialogue on her blog, All Things Counter Terrorism, which has received much attention, commentary and criticism in the blogosphere and on private listservs and quasi-official bulletin boards.
Generally, I leave this sort of subject to Charles, since he has the academic expertise to drill down to a granular level of Islamic theology and Islamist ideology, but al-Masri is an intriguing figure and his public conversation with Farrall is a novelty worth investigating. It would be hard to imagine during the Cold War, an open media debate between a Western CI official and a Soviet spymaster still engaged in espionage in the field ( Kim Philby hurled public jermiads it is true, but that was in retirement in Moscow and only after his long-suffering KGB handlers had managed to get his severe alcoholism under control). In that spirit, I want to offer a few observations.
While there is artifice present, as al-Masri is consciously speaking to a multiplicity of audiences in his remarks, the idea that we should therefore dismiss the dialogue with Farrall, as some suggest, is an error. There is also posturing in purely intra-Islamist-debates on which we eavesdrop and, frankly, within our own arguments inside government and out. We learn from what people do and do not do, from what they say and what is left unsaid. Being able to speak to multiple audiences is a constraint, as well as an advantage, as it shapes the parameters of the premises to be employed and the extent to which the underlying logic can be permissably extrapolated. To quote a Zen saying, if you wish to fence in a bull, give him a large meadow.
The constraints, if correctly discerned, are illuminating and are analytically useful in constructing our own tactical responses and message strategy (assuming someone can convince the State Department bureaucracy that IO and public diplomacy are important and persuade Congressional leaders to fund such activities with more than pocket change). They are also useful in helping to understand the worldview and governing paradigms of our opponents in more complex and nuanced manner than reflexively saying “they hate our freedoms”. Well, many jihadi types do in fact, viscerally hate our freedoms or deny that democracy is a legitimate form of government in an abstract sense, much the same way they casually disparage Hindus as “cow worshippers” or Thais as “crazy Buddhists”; however those loose attitudes and spasms of hostility are not akin to operational principles or strategic doctrines.
For that, we have to dig deeper into the politico-religious motivations of violent Islamists and listen closely to what our enemies are saying – particularly when they are making an effort to speak to us directly, as al-Masri is doing, his determination to score propaganda points in his little elicitation dance with Farrall notwithstanding. Americans are not very good at listening and our elites are deeply uncomfortable with the entire subject of religion, tending to view pious expressions of Christianity with contempt and Islam as a completely taboo subject. There is a strong preference in government and academia for analytical models of terrorism or insurgency that dwell on DIME spectrum variables because these fit in the personal comfort zones and the educational, social and professional experiences of the American elite. This would be a perfect approach if al Qaida’s leadership were composed of Ivy League alumni and Fortune 500 CEOs.
Economics and military force are always factors in geopolitical conflict, the war of terror included, but until Islamist extremists oblige us by becoming secular Marxist revolutionaries waving little red books, it would behoove us to look with greater scrutiny at the curiously reified religious ideology with which they justify or eschew courses of action to themselves. Our own strategies might be more focused and effective if the operators across our intelligence, military, diplomatic and law enforcement agencies had something approaching a shared understanding of violent Islamism and if they could communicate this understanding along with the benefit of their experience and current intelligence to help political leaders shape American policy.
February 9th, 2010 at 4:34 pm
“The strategic game” as John Boyd called it, is one of isolation and interaction. Interaction permits vitality and growth (strength and the ability to adapt) while isolation leads to decay and disintegration (weakness, lack of awareness and unpreparedness).
Boyd went on to say “strategy is “a game in which we must be able to diminish an adversary’s ability to communicate or interact with his environment while sustaining or improving ours”.
Does shutting down dialog shut down interection, which in simple terms shuts down our ability to learn more about the climate (intent and motives) of our adversary? Could this not win an adversary over? My gut and experience says yes it does. So why not learn even from our adversary?
Just a thought!
February 9th, 2010 at 5:03 pm
Agreed Fred.
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Liberal democracy has little to fear in any moral debate with radical Islamists, even with an atypically worldly and pragmatic figure like al-Masri who avoids the kind of nonsense spewed by AQ. Islamism on its own terms holds little popular appeal, even among Muslims, but for most Westerners, Islamist beliefs are a complete enigma and adherents are usually written off as being "crazy" when that’s not the case. Fanatical, yes but running an insurgency requires rational planning and forethought. We need to understand their thought processes better and engagement helps us learn something, as you suggested.
February 9th, 2010 at 11:28 pm
Our elites seem uncomfortable with reality AS IT IS.
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I seem to like the phrase "reality as it is" because I used it over at Inkspots, too. I dunno. Frustrated with the governing class, I suppose, like a lot of people these days. Seriously, have you ever seen people in such a foul mood?
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– Madhu
February 10th, 2010 at 12:35 am
In my lifetime?
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1. 1973-75
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2. 1980
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3. 1994