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One result of Dr. Chet Richards converting Defense & The National Interest to DNI Blog is that I get to be the first blogger to award a coveted ” Hat Tip” to the notoriously technophobic, pipe-smoking, “Father of Fourth Generation Warfare”, William Lind ,for pointing to the new book Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare .

Read William Lind’s review here.

Fellow member of  The Small Wars Council  , Dr. Steven Metz, visted here the other day and left a comment on an old post where his most recent SSI monograph, Rethinking Insurgency, had appeared with some critical commentary from me. Here was Dr. Metz’s response, since the sidebar plug in for comments did not let readers hop into the archives (possibly because the post was at my old site and archived here in a category):

“I’m not sure the distinction between my position and Tom Barnett’s is as stark as you suggest.  AFRICOM will mostly be focused on preventative measures.  I’m greatly in favor of that.  I was, for instance, an early supporter of the African Crisis Response Initiative. 

I would only warn that we resist any urge to unilaterally undertake major counterinsurgency support from any African government unwilling to address its systemic problems. 

I did, on the other hand, advocate military disengagement from the Arab world.  Having spent time in both places, my impression is that American security assistance provokes hostility in the Arab world and does not, at least to the same extent, in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Nice blog, by the way!”

Thanks, and a fair criticism of my post . As a result of Steve’s comment I decided to give Rethinking Insurgency another read without the AFRICOM context being the foremost concept  in my mind as it was at the time when I wrote that post. Here’s my second take.

There’s a lot to like in Rethinking Insurgency. I was particularly impressed with how Metz dealt with militias ( loyalist paramilitaries) and their permutations in terms of sophistication, their origin and relationship to states and/or criminal organizations and the risks such forces present. Metz presents an extensive analysis of the interrelationships of non-state actors (militias, insurgents, OC, PMC’s) in a conflict zone with one another, the state and foreign entities that readers here will find quite engaging.

Another twist that readers here will like is Metz’s take on ” fourth forces” – media, IGO’s, NGO’s and transnational corporations – and how they impact what Boyd termed the “mental” and “moral” levels of warfare, usually to the disadvantage of the state and complicating the already delicate dynamics of counterinsurgency operations. Even the most benevolent intervention by fourth forces can be an unsettling variable. According to Metz:

“….External humanitarian efforts, while exceptionally valuable to alleviate suffering, may leave a state unprepared to take over the provision of services when the conflict ends or subsides. Hence the widespread involvement of international or nongovernmental organizations in an insurgency increases the chances that conflict will reemerge once the shortcomings and weaknesses of the state provide political space for insurgents or other violent actors….what seems best -the alleviation of suffering- may increase the chances of renewed suffering at a later date”

With insurgency often being a contest of will and popular perceptions of political legitimacy, having conflicts “burn out” naturally with higher intensity will often be preferred by states to letting them drag on for decades. It may be, to use SEA as an example, that the Indonesian military’s attempt to block relief to hurricaine victims in rebellious Aceh or Thailand’s more recent appointment of the admired and feared General Pallop Pinmanee, run to this line of thinking argued by Metz. Countervailing pressures of a globalized environment and communally-oriented actors though will, according to Metz, force most regimes to settle for ” sustaining a controllable conflict” rather than inflicting a decisive military defeat on their enemies. Insurgency, in a certain light, becomes one of the costs of doing business as a state.

I recommend that you read Dr. Metz’s paper in full, which can be downloaded here at SSI.

My friend Bruce Kesler, who takes a position of healthy skepticism on theories about warfare, sent me a piece by the colorful military writer and ex-intel analyst, Ralph Peters, a few days ago which I finally had the time to read today. The article appeared in The American Legion Magazine and might have been off the radar of some of my readers ( it was off of mine -thanks Bruce!):

12 Myths of 21st-Century War

“Thanks to those who have served in uniform, we’ve lived in such safety and comfort for so long that for many Americans sacrifice means little more than skipping a second trip to the buffet table.Two trends over the past four decades contributed to our national ignorance of the cost, and necessity, of victory.

First, the most privileged Americans used the Vietnam War as an excuse to break their tradition of uniformed service. Ivy League universities once produced heroes. Now they resist Reserve Officer Training Corps representation on their campuses.Yet, our leading universities still produce a disproportionate number of U.S. political leaders. The men and women destined to lead us in wartime dismiss military service as a waste of their time and talents. Delighted to pose for campaign photos with our troops, elected officials in private disdain the military. Only one serious presidential aspirant in either party is a veteran, while another presidential hopeful pays as much for a single haircut as I took home in a month as an Army private.

Second, we’ve stripped in-depth U.S. history classes out of our schools. Since the 1960s, one history course after another has been cut, while the content of those remaining focuses on social issues and our alleged misdeeds. Dumbed-down textbooks minimize the wars that kept us free. As a result, ignorance of the terrible price our troops had to pay for freedom in the past creates absurd expectations about our present conflicts. When the media offer flawed or biased analyses, the public lacks the knowledge to make informed judgments.

This combination of national leadership with no military expertise and a population that hasn’t been taught the cost of freedom leaves us with a government that does whatever seems expedient and a citizenry that believes whatever’s comfortable. Thus, myths about war thrive….”

Peters goes on to list and explain the following “12 myths”:

1. War doesn’t change anything
2. Victory is impossible today.
3. Insurgencies can never be defeated
4. There’s no military solution; only negotiations can solve our problems.
5. When we fight back, we only provoke our enemies
6. Killing terrorists only turns them into martyrs.
7. If we fight as fiercely as our enemies, we’re no better than them
8. The United States is more hated today than ever before
9. Our invasion of Iraq created our terrorist problems
10. If we just leave, the Iraqis will patch up their differences on their own.
11. It’s all Israel’s fault. Or the popular Washington corollary: “The Saudis are our friends.”
12. The Middle East’s problems are all America’s fault.
    

In the course of his preface and the extended “de-bunking” that follows, Peters makes a large number of points that I can agree with individually in the abstract or in isolation. To that, I cheerfully admit. My problem – and it’s a serious problem, actually – is that in the big picture, where Peters takes the simplification and conflation of complex and critical variables to the point of intellectual irresponsibility.

Peters is arguing for America taking a “Jacksonian” ( in Walter Russell Meade taxonomy) posture toward our Islamist and terrorist enemies in particular and toward the world in general. It’s an argument that may appeal to members of the American Legion, in particular the GI Generation of WWII vets who experienced fighting a total war, but it’s not a helpful strategy unless our enemies manifest a sufficiently targetable center of gravity, like, say, taking over Pakistan and making Osama bin Laden Grand Emir.

Frankly, our goal should be to never permit let our enemies reach such a position of strength in the first place. That means peeling away Muslim and tribal allies of convenience to pitch in killing the al Qaida network, not lumping the Saudis in with al Qaida, the Iranians, Musharraf and whatever itinerant Middle-Eastern types seem vaguely dysfunctional in a civilizational sense ( personally, I like reading about dead terrorists and I think their supporters, financiers, intellectual cheerleaders and mosque recruiters are all fair game for rendition or assassination, wherever they are. Doesn’t that give us more than enough of room to work with without attacking the entire Arab-Islamic world ??). I won’t even bother to go into the geoeconomic lunacy of bombing or attacking Saudi Arabia.

In my humble opinion, Peters knows all this very well. He’s a very smart guy. Certainly smart enough to comprehend downstream effects. What he’s doing these days is not strategy but shtick.

THE SMALL WARS JOURNAL HITS THE MSM BIG TIME

The publisher and the editor-in-chief of the highly regarded Small Wars Journal, respectively Bill Nagl and Dave Dilegge, are doing a public Q&A at noon on Tuesday with the powerhouse The Washington Post. I imagine that Bill Arkin will be involved somewhere as well – but we can hope otherwise. ;o)

Read about the details at the SWJ BLog.

Submit YOUR questions here.

INSTANT HISTORY

Picked up both of these on a lark on Saturday, as I cruised through Border’s with The Son of Zenpundit, who was getting some independent reader level books about Spider-Man fighting -well- some villain or other. The usual suspects.

Any thoughts from readers as to how high these tomes merit being placed on the “Must read” pile ? I’m currently innundated with things to read, so prioritizing is a must.