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Archive for the ‘4GW’ Category

Taking the War to the Mexican State, 4GW Style

Friday, May 9th, 2008

Mexico’s equivalent to an acting FBI director was assassinated earlier on Thursday, most likely by Zetas or similarly skilled team of hitmen working for one of several of Mexico’s crime cartels currently being pressured by recently dispatched Mexican Army troops.

Reminiscient of attacks on the Italian state during the 1970’s and 1980’s by leftist Red Brigades and the Mafia, the drug cartels of Mexico are hobbled neither by antiquated Marxist ideology nor old-time, rustic, crime family traditions. They are adaptive, professional, transnational in outlook and far better equipped than state police forces on either side of the border. Mexico’s corrupt political elite by contrast, cannot be bothered to restrain their greed enough to properly pay, train and arm the very security forces that defend their primacy.

ADDENDUM:

Fester, the resident 4GW aficinado at the vibrant left of center blog, The NewsHoggers, greatly expands on the economic aspect of competing resource resource flows in this conflict. Nice job!

The Establishment’s Flagship Embraces 4GW

Wednesday, April 30th, 2008

Richard Haass  jumps the shark in Foreign Affairs:

The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.

….At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The major powers — China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States — contain just over half the world’s people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today’s world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places.

Read the rest here.

Fragile States, Failed States and Spatial Anthropology

Sunday, April 27th, 2008

A pleasant downstream effect of having blogged for a while is that readers will send you interesting things from time to time. Like the following…

Check out: The Complex Terrain Laboratory

Snippets:

This is muddled and confusing. Human Terrain is “an emerging area of study”? No it’s not. Human “terrain” is a label, a metaphor, for guess what? History, geography, anthropology, sociology, psychology, communications, etc., etc. It’s “major goal is to create operational technologies”? No it’s not. That’s what mathematicians and engineers can deliver on multimillion dollar DoD contracts. Human terrain is, just in case anyone hasn’t read a newspaper or wireclip over the last few years, about people, what they think, their perceptions, their loyalties, the consequences they bear in wartime, the support they may or may not provide to insurgents, the physical, cultural, and informational spaces they create and occupy in  times of conflict and crisis. 

Freaking mad scientists. They’re everywhere. Technology is a tool, not the answer

and

What is really meant by ‘fragile’ states is ones that have acquired legal sovereignty but that have lost, or more probably never acquired, the effective powers attached to that status. There are more and more such states. How many depends on one’s definition of fragility. The United Kingdom’s government development agency, the Department for International Development (DFID), one of the smartest outfits in the business, estimates that 46 states, over one quarter of the world’s total, fall within its definition of ‘fragile states’. The population of these 46 states is over 870 million. DFID bases its definition of fragility on a state’s record in combating poverty. Others define fragility not by reference to poverty, but to security. Referring to the slightly different concept of ‘failure’, in the United States’ 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush stated that America ‘is now more threatened by weak and failing states than…by conquering ones’.

Human Terrain Mapping” is one of those relatively new concepts I’ve been meaning to investigate and CTLab – run by a distinguished trio of scholars and authors Stephen D.K. Ellis, Michael A. Innes and Brian Glyn Williams – fits the bill. Definitely a “blogroll-worthy” site for all of the Intel/COIN/IO/DIME/Foreign Policy bloggers and of interest to the history blogosphere as well since two of the three gentlemen are professional historians.

I look forward to many enjoyable and profitable visits.

UPDATE:

Mike Innes has written in to explain that CTLabs is still expanding their team of SME’s as well as the working on the aesthetic and functionality aspects of the site itself, which will be formally “rolled out” with a higher level of interactivity and collaboration.

New Journal of Asymmetric Warfare

Wednesday, April 23rd, 2008

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. Hat tip to Selil.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Monday, April 14th, 2008

Two papers:

The excellent Insurgency Research Group points to a paper by Dr. Brynjar Lia, an expert on al Qaida, entitled “Al-Qaida’s Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points” (PDF).

On the other side of the coin ( note: pun intended), blogfriend Charles Cameron sent me a paper by Israeli General Ya’akov Amidror, “Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience“(PDF).

Of course, it can be said that the Israelis have a mixed rep in the COIN community and that counterterrorism against an ideological network (Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhoff Gang, PIJ, al Qaida) is not exactly the same thing as COIN against a broad-based, popular insurgency (Viet Cong, FMLN, Afghan Mujahedin, HAMAS, Iraqi insurgency). Nevertheless, an author with a long career at the intersection of intelligence and military policy.


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